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Chapter I
Introduction
No one doubts that the world economy is undergoing transformation. There is,
however, considerable disagreement about the ultimate shape of this transformation,
with some anticipating the emergence of one seamless global economy and others
anticipating instead segmentation into regional associations. The shape of this
transformation will affect all human lives in virtually all areas because it will determine
who will have which opportunities, which jobs are available to whom, how income will
be distributed, and what will be consumed. The transformation of the world economy
has been a subject of debate for political scientists and economists concerned with the
consequences of this change on the distribution of power among states and definitions
of sovereignty. For the business and investment community, this transformation
represents a threat to current operations and strategy and at the same time new
opportunities for growth and innovation. Given the scope and depth of this issue, the
transformation of the world economy is one of the most fascinating economic, social
and political issues of the 1990's.
In this thesis, I postulate that the world economy is becoming simultaneously
more regional and global, but in different ways. It is becoming more regionalized in
terms of both trade and investment flows, but more global in the sense of developing
greater similarity in the organization of economic activity. This similarity goes beyond
a macro level of convergence on capitalist market principles as the basic form of
economic organization at the macro level to a deeper convergence of economic and
business practices at the micro level as investors and firms have increasingly adopted
the "Anglo-American" shareholder rather than the "continental European" stakeholder
variant of capitalist organization. 1
So while individuals are increasingly engaging in commerce with their
neighbors, they are behaving more and more like one another. This convergence of
1 Cox, Albert, Fink & Haiss, et. al.
practice has serious implications for the role of the state. The convergence of economic
organization is potentially more significant than the regionalization of investment and
trade flows, because this change toward a single set of ideas on how the economy ought
to be organized reaches into more profound levels of social organization and structuring
of day-to-day activities.
The theoretical basis for this work is Virginia Haufler's work on the role of
private actors in international regime formation and maintenance. Haufler's hypothesis
is that private organizations can play central roles in the formation, shaping, and
maintenance of regimes .2 Haufler claims that the bias against private actors in regime
theory, and in international relations theory more generally has led to ignoring purely
private sector initiatives and cooperation. By attaching different labels such as “cartels"
or “oligopolies/' private regimes are excluded as an object of study.
The focus has been on states because states, at least formally, engender and
enforce the laws under which all others may act. This last point is especially important.
Just because states have formal legal authority and a formal monopoly of force, does not
mean that states are effectively in a position of power at all times. One clear example of
a private organization "drafting legislation" was the recent case of Thailand and
Citicorp. In an aggressive consumer banking program, Citicorp introduced credit cards
into the Thai market, even though there was little to no legal infrastructure to support
this activity (i.e. no collection laws or laws on consumer credit card defaults). The credit
card business exploded and was a smashing success practically upon introduction.
Having created a strong need for regulations, the bank gave the Thai government had
no choice but to create regulation for this new area. In this example, the Thai state still
had formal legislative and enforcement power, but was effectively forced into creating
credit card legislation. Non-governmental organization effectively made public policy
and the state implemented it .3
2 Virginia Haufler, "Crossing the Border between Public and Private: International Regimes and
Non-State Actors," in Rittberger, Volker, ed. Reeime Theory and International Relations . Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1993. pp. 94-111.
3 Barnet, Richard J. Global Dreams: Imperial Corporations and the New World Order . New
York: Bertelsmann, 1994.
2
Haufler takes the standard definition of regimes and asks why, according to this
definition, private actors cannot influence or form regimes, even completely private
ones. According to Haufler, different forms of free market organization could be
considered regimes. That is, "common institutions and practices surrounding more
than the production and marketing of products [ are necessary] in order to label these
'regimes.'" * Haufler uses the insurance industry as a second example of a private
regime. Insurers worldwide have created institutions that negotiate standard contracts,
prov ide information on practices, and provide collective services.
Geoffrey Underhill has also examined the cooperation of private regulators
across national boundaries to form effective regimes on securities trading rules and
practices by focusing on the International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO) as a non-governmental organization that is involved in facilitating the
internationalization of securities markets and creating a regulatory framework
.
5 The
IOSCO' s members are national securities regulators, both public and private . 6 Although
private members have a formally lower status than public ones, the securities industry
in many countries has a long self-regulatory tradition. Thus it is common practice for
the public authority to delegate power to the private regulator. For instance, the US
Securities and Exchange Commission delegates to the National Association of Securities
Dealers and the New York Stock Exchange while the UK Securities and Investments
Board delegates to six private self-regulators. The resulting group of actual decision
makers then considers itself to be a non-governmental international organization. The
goal of the group is to create a seamless global market for securities. This requires the
harmonization of regulations to create an acceptable underlying structure on which
markets can safely function. Clearly a political process, it is being driven not by
governments, but by private regulators. There is a strong incentive among investors
4 Virginia Haufler, "Crossing the Border between Public and Private: International Regimes and
Non-State Actors," pp. 103-105.
5 Geoffrey Underhill, "Keeping Governments out of Politics: Transnational Securities Markets,
Regulatory Cooperation, and Political Legitimacy." Review of International Studies, vol. 21, no.
3, p. 252.
6 Examples of public organizations are American Securities and Exchange Commission, or SEC,
and the Commission des Operations de Bourse. Private regulatory organizations are typically
stock exchanges or other financial exchanges.
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and speculators for international cooperation on regulation and reporting standards in
financial markets worldwide. Without quality information and quality monitoring
systems to ensure fair application of this information, investors are faced with added
uncertainty or risk, which diminishes returns which they seek.
Another example of the power of private actors in setting policy comes from
Raymond Vernon. Vernon explained the ineffectiveness of the American government's
efforts to restrain capital exports through multinational corporations. In 1965, for
example, the American government created a "voluntary" program designed to
pressure multinationals mto exporting less capital and into repatriating profits more
quickly. After three years of almost continual revision under the pressure of
multinationals, the government decided to change the program to make the guidelines
mandatory. The regulations were thereafter watered down to the point of irrelevance.7
Usmg Haufler's work as a theoretical point of departure, I will focus on private
actors in researching economic globalization. Based on Haufler's work on private actors
as a legitimate area of study for students of international affairs, I will examine the
globalization debate through interactions of private actors.
This argument suggests that financial flows are only one influence on business
practices. If these flows were a major influence, then the regionalization of financial
flows ought to be paralleled by a regionalization of business practices. Yet evidence of
the growth of capital markets, corporate restructuring, and a liberal fiscal and monetary
policy in both regions indicates a trend toward acceptance of an equity culture
"shareholder" value model. This apparent paradox can be explained in two ways. First,
causality is complex, including domestic sources. Second, firms' reasons and
motivations for investing abroad help to explain this apparent paradox.
Large multinational corporations invest abroad primarily to gain access to
markets and to prevent the early capturing of foreign markets by competitors, or to
"globalize." They view regional expansion as a part of a global or multi-regional
strategy. In contrast, small companies invest primarily in their neighboring countries as
a way to better service their home market or a regional market. Small firms are
7 Raymond Vernon and Debora Spar, Beyond Globalism: Remaking American Foreign Economic
Policy
.
New York: The Free Press, 1989. pp. 188-189.
4
motivated partially by a desire for increased market access, but also by the desire to
enjoy cheaper factor costs. My argument is that the globalizing influence of large firms
wipes out the regionalizing influence of smaller firms because smaller companies
largely need to conform to pricing and quality standards set by the global competition
of multinationals. The standards set by large firms are achieved through global
positioning through organic growth or acquisition. By this global positioning,
compames can take advantage of arbitrage opportunities in all aspects of the
functioning of the firm.8 McKinsey & Co., a consulting company, also takes the view of
globalization as an arbitrage process. Arbitraging means buying cheaply somewhere
and selling at a higher price somewhere else. It is a process which smoothes out price
differences between markets. A classic example of arbitrage is in the market for foreign
exchange, in which sophisticated arbitrage models have been generated by physicists
turned "financial engineers." Arbitrage need not just happen in highly liquid and
transparent markets such as the foreign exchange market, but can also happen in the
market for almost anything, even markets themselves. 9 This is happening on a large
scale, in a world where the world's largest 200 companies control at least 28.3% of the
world's economy. At the same time, these companies employ only 0.3% of the world's
work force. 10
Arbitraging smoothes out price differences in markets. Only a relatively small
amount of activity at the margin is needed to create a new competitive global
environment. Arbitraging is reinforced by a process of imitation. Even when
multinationals do not buy into each other,11 they imitate each other by buying the best
practices, management techniques, technology and products of the other company. 12
8
e.g. financing, production, sales and marketing, etc.
9 Joel Bleeke and David Ernst, "The Death of the Predator," in Joel Bleeke and David Ernst - Me
Kinsey & Co. (eds.) Collaboratine to Compete: Using Strategic Alliances and Acquisitions in the
Global Marketplace . New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1993. pp.1-16.
10 P C. Longworth, "New Global Economics Toss the Rule Book out the Door," Chicago Tribune
,
October 20, 1996, p. 12.
11 e.g. Hoechst buys Marion Merrel Dow for DM 7.1 billion or approximately $5 billion.
"Kapitalismus ohne Grenzen," Spiegel Magazine Archive 39/96 pp.80-95,
http:/ / www.spiegel.de/ aktuell/ spiegel.html.
12 From Leslie Hanna, "'Marshall's Trees' and the 'Global Forest': Were 'Giant Redwoods'
Different?" in "Clash of the Titans," The Economist, November 2, 1996, p. 94.
5
Imitation, however, does not necessarily require investment, just copying of business
practices and ideas, and therefore does not necessarily show up through FDI or other
cross border investment statistics. The multinationals are competitors on a global scale
and imitate best practices in order to more effectively compete against other
multinationals. Small companies often either collaborate with or compete against large
MNC's. For this reason, they need to conform to price and quality standards set by the
MNC s or risk losmg business. So while large companies propagate a shareholder value
system, by mutation and mergers & acquisitions, small companies, though more often
regional in scope, are pulled along with them.
I will validate this hypothesis by evaluating both the quantitative financial flows
and the qualitative consequences of those flows on business practices in two regions,
Central Europe and Latin America. These regions are particularly interesting to study,
since they are both undergoing a process of transformation. Roughly the same time that
Latin American countries were redirecting their economic policies from statist closed
economies to liberal open economies, the revolution in Central Europe brought a formal
end to state socialism as a viable form of economic organization. 13 The Central and
Eastern European region is moving more weakly toward a shareholder model than
Latin America, but recent developments taken in perspective with global trends
suggests that though Central and Eastern Europe resembles a stakeholder model. In
some ways, it is poised to move toward a shareholder model or economic organization.
A fuller study would also include the Asia-Pacific region as Central and Eastern Europe
and Latin America represent only 41% of recent total capital flows (c.f. figure 1).
Nonetheless, a comparison between the Central Europe and Latin America suffices to
demonstrate the contrasting forms of regionalization and globalization at work in the
13 In this thesis, I will use the terms economic organization, business practices, and economic
practices interchangably. These terms designate a broadly defined way of looking at how the
economy is organized on a macro (legislation, economic policy and environment, norms) and
micro scale (interactions of individuals within the macro framework, and their engendering of it
through their interaction). The definition is purposefully broad to match the breadth of the topic
at hand, widesweeping global trends. As another point of definition, I will use the terms "Central
Europe" and "the ViSegrad countries" interchangeably to designate Poland, Hungary, Slovakia,
and the Czech Republic. I will use the term "Eastern Europe" to designate Poland, Hungary, the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, the European states of the former Soviet Union, Slovenia, Croatia,
Serbia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.
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world econonry today. Though partial, this study provides a signiflcant addition to the
globalization versus regionalization debate by supporting claims that though there is a
tendency toward regional financial flows, economic practices are converging in ways
that create an effective globalization of economic activity.
The focus is to determine whether regionalization or globalization is occurring as
it has been described in recent international political economy and business literature,
not primarily to assess the consequences this has for workers, consumers, states, or
firms. Rather it is an attempt to understand the recent evolution of the world economy.
It can serve as a resource and building block for further studies of these impacts on
various social groups.
Instead of usmg trade patterns as a testing ground for the hypothesis, I will focus
on investment patterns. This is because this focus has been neglected in international
political economy literature on commercial regionalization or globalization. There
appears to be a bias in writers on international political economy, perhaps because trade
is more tangible or simpler to understand, perhaps because some may take total
global financial integration to be a foregone conclusion not worthy of discussion.
International finance has been studied almost exclusively by international economists
and participants in the financial services industry. International political economists
such as Roger Tooze, Craig Murphy, Susan Strange, and Eric Helleiner argue that trade
has been privileged" in the study of globalization and international political
economy
.
14 Authors such as Hazel Johnson and R.J. Barry Jones are examples of
international political economists viewing the globalization debate through the lens of
trade policy. This paper will serve to counterbalance the bias of authors such as these . 15
14 Eric Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the
J990's . Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994. p. 195. and "States and the Future of Global
Finance," Review of International Studies (1992), 18, p. 31, and Tooze, Roger and Craig
Murphy, "Getting beyond the 'Common Sense' of the IPE Orthodoxy," in The New International
Political Economy, ed. Richard Tooze and Craig Murphy. Boulder: Lynne Reiner, 1991.
15 Hazel Johnson, Dispelling the Myth of Globalization: the Case for Regionalization
. Westport
and London: Greenwood, Praeger, 1991. and R. J. Barry Jones, Globalisation and
Interdependence in the International Political Economy: Rhetoric and Reality
. London and New
York: Pinter Publishers, 1995. (Even on the short section dedicated to globalization and finance,
the author bases his evidence on trade statistics.) and Susan Strange, "Finance and capitalism: the
City's imperial role yesterday and today," Review of International Studies (1994), vol. 20, pp.
407-410.
7
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Source: World Bank, 1996. 16
Figure 1: Total Capital Flows to Developing Countries, 1990-1995: $1,640 billion
Examining investment patterns is critical to grappling with the globalization
issue, because it affects the transfer of business practices which underlie the
globalization hypothesis in ways which trade integration cannot. It is therefore
important that the investment perspective be brought into a debate that has been held in
the language of trade, at least among international political economists. Charles Oman
of the OECD Development Center stresses the importance of financial flows vis-a-vis
trade flows when he writes that.
A milestone was reached [and since] the mid-1 980's...the
value of global FDI flows has grown several times faster
than those of global trade and output. Indeed, the
strength of FDI growth and the declining ratio of trade
growth to output growth have led more than one author to
question the relative importance of both trade imbalances
and trade policy. As The Economist puts it, 'current-
account imbalances are becoming less and less helpful as a
guide to economic performance, let alone as a goal for
economic policy [and] international rules on competition
policy and direct investment will start to replace trade
16 Zhen Kun Wang, "Integrating Transition Economies into the Global Economy," Finance &
Development, September, 1996. p. 22.
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policy as the most contentious areas of economic
relations/" 17
Because of changing patterns of business and production, investment flows are
becoming more and more important in comparison with trade flows and ought to be
investigated more widely and rigorously. This study is designed to fill a perceived gap
on the investment side of the research and thus intentionally focuses much more
strongly on investment patterns, practices, and results.
The thesis will start with a methodology which explains the dependent and
mdependent variables, business practices and financial flows. In this section, I will
explain the variables and how they will be applied. Case studies on Central Europe and
Latin America follow, first providing a general overview of the region, then providing
detailed analysis of financial flows and business practices in the three largest
destinations of foreign capital flows of each region. After having examined both
regions, the conclusion will relate the two case studies and place it in the broader
context of the globalization of the world economy. Implications of this process will be
briefly discussed.
1 (Italics in original quote) Charles Oman, "Investment Strategies and Policy Issues: Emerging
Policy Issues for the Dynamic Non-Member Economies; Trends in Global FDI and Latin
America." in OECD, Foreign Direct Investment: OECD Countries and the Dynamic Countries of
Asia and Latin America . Paris: OECD, 1995. p. 59. The Economist quote was taken from the 30th
March, 1991, p. 61.
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Chapter II
Methodology
The methodology will be both quantitative and qualitative. It will be
quantitative insofar as it will document actual financial flows. Tracing actual financial
flows will permit drawing conclusions about whether there is a tendency toward
regionalism or globalism. If capital flows predominantly occur within an area generally
conceded by regionalists to be a region (e.g. Latin America or Central and Eastern
Europe), there is a tendency toward regionalism. If capital enters and exits the "region"
as frequently as it is transferred within the region, then there is a globalizing tendency
of investment relations.
The qualitative aspect of the study is more complicated. It will set out to answer
the question whether actors are behaving more and more like one another by adopting a
particular form of capitalist organization. It will rely on the theoretical work of
prominent scholars of International Relations to establish a framework which will allow
me to test the hypothesis that business practices are converging toward an Anglo equity
model. Business practices are an independent variable to test the dependent variables
of globalization and regionalization. International relations theorists employed will
include Haufler, Underhill, and Vernon. It is based on the contending "shareholder"
and "stakeholder" models of business practices well established in both International
Political Economy and Business Management literatures. The shareholder model of
economic organizations focuses on bringing the highest overall returns to owners of
equity in private firms. The stakeholder value model distributes returns as the result of
a negotiated solution among various stakeholders such as owners, management,
workers, and the community. These differing foci lead to different conceptions of
capitalist organization and will be explained in detail in the section on methodology
and definitions.
The thesis proceeds by comparing financial flows and business practices in two
areas generally accepted as regions, Latin America and Central Europe. By comparing
10
Latin America
-generally conceded by regionalists to be in the U.S. sphere of influence-
- and Central Europe
-generally conceded by regionalists to be in the Western
European or German sphere of influence- the study could be construed to begin with a
bias toward regionalist findings. This follows from the idea that by looking for the
existence of a region, it is easier to find one. Though the tendency toward a
regionalization of economic activity is partly confirmed by the financial flows, it is not
confirmed by the evidence on commercial practices. Hence, then, the examples serve as
"least likely cases" that strengthen the finding that there is a growing, though far from
unanimous, global consensus on commercial practices.
The investigation will focus within the region on key economic players, in order
to provide the necessary depth to do a qualitative analysis. In Central Europe, I will pay
special attention to Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary and in Latin America to
Mexico, Argentina, Brazil. These countries have been selected on the basis of the size of
portfolio and foreign direct investment they receive and because of their regional
importance. Focusing on the more significant countries in each region will allow a
richer discussion than a less detailed pan-regional survey.
Investigating business practices requires tracking the activities of the private
actors, mostly companies that create and maintain them. Governments play a key role
in enacting legislation and economic policies that create the environment in which
investors act, but day-to-day business practices in capitalist economies are exhibited by
private firms. This is reinforced by the fact that the state has been playing a diminishing
role and that the private sector is becoming ever more important as a source of
investment funds. In an almost uninterrupted pattern, the resource flows to developing
countries from OECD governments have been declining and private flows have
increased. From 1987 to 1995, flows changed from roughly equal transfers by states and
private actors to private resource flows outpacing public ones by a ratio of three to
one. 18
18 OECD, "Financial Flows to Developing Countries in 1995: Sharp Decline in Official Aid:
Private Flows Rise." OECD Website, 1996.
Table 1: Financial Flows to Emerging Markets in USD billions 19
—
W • «* v « W -
Official Development finance
Official Grants
Bilateral Loans
19.2
11.6
29.4
13.5
37.5
13.2
31.9
10.8
29.4
9.4
32.5
6 1
32.9
18 8
Multilateral Loans 11.8 15.0 14.8 12.3 14.2 10.0 12.5
oil Dtoldl 42.6 57.9 65.5 55.0 53.0 48.6 64.2
Private Debt Flows
Bonds 5.3 3.0 12.8 13.2 38.3 32.2 33 7
Commercial Bank Loans 0.8 1.7 2.5 13.8 (4.9) 9.2 17.1
Suppliers 1.1 7.3 (2.2) _ 2.0
Other 5.5 10.6 3.7 12.6 6.9 2.4 4.0
Subtotal 12.7 15.3 19.0 39.6 40.3 43.8 54.8
Foreign Direct Investment 25.7 25.0 35.0 46.6 68.3 80.1 90.3
Portfolio Equity Flows 3.5 3.7 7.6 14.1 45.6 34.9 22.0
Total Private Flows 41.9 44.0 61.6 100.3 154.2 158.9 167.1
Total Net Resource Flows 84.5 101.9 127.1 155.3 207.2 207.4 231.3
% public 50% 57 52 35 26 23 28%
% private 50% 43 48 65 74 77 72%
% portfolio equity 4% 4 6 9 22 17 10%
According to estimates by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), private capital flows continued to rise following a five year trend
to an all-time high of $170 billion in 1995, almost twice as high as the flows only two
years before, despite the Mexican peso crisis of 1994. Foreign direct investment has also
steadily increased over the past five years and is estimated to have to some $60 billion in
1995. At the same time, cross-border bank lending to the developing countries also
continued to rise. 1994 data are now seen to have been even larger than first estimates,
registering a flow of $42.6 billion. The increase was over 40% to $75 billion.
19 International Finance Corporation, Investment Funds in Emerging Markets, Washington, DC:
The World Bank, 1996. p. 58. Numbers may not add due to rounding errors.
12
In the next section, I will explain and operationalize the differences between the
two models in detail so that it can be applied to the issue of globalization or
regionalization of business practices.
In the next section, I will outline the operational definitions of the dependent
variables, globalization and regionalization and the independent variables, financial
flows and business practices. It will also include the forms of data to be measured.
A. Dependent variables
1. Globalization
In terms of financial flows, globalization occurs when flows occur less and less within a
region and become more and more diversified worldwide. In terms of business
practices, globalization occurs when the practices converge toward one set of practices
as measured against the shareholder and stakeholder models posited.
2. Regionalization
In terms of financial flows, regionalization occurs when flows occur more and more
within a region and become less and less diversified worldwide. In terms of business
practices, regionalization occurs when the practices remain distinct or diverge across
posited regions, as measured against the shareholder and stakeholder models posited.
B. Independent variables
1. Financial flows
Financial flows to be measured will be the major private flows: foreign direct
investment, portfolio flows, and commercial bank claims and other debt. Official
development aid will not be a central part of this study. This is because of the declining
relevance of these flows and the explicit focus of this study on the private sector . 20
20
c.f. Haufler & Underhill.
a. Portfolio investment
Portfolio investment, following the definition provided by the World Bank,
includes bonds, equities, securities, and derivatives with such bonds or equities as
underlying assets. Portfolio investment is generally considered an investment with the
purpose of returning value to investors, not giving investors control of the companies in
which they invest. If an investor owns a substantial portion of equity in a company,
large enough to influence management, the investment is generally considered to be
foreign direct investment.
Data employed will include statistics as published by the World Bank and its
affiliates and from the OECD, The Economist, and the U.S. Federal Reserve, where
available. Most statistics will be net flows. Other useful data employed will include
information on the number and character of emerging markets funds, and is largely
drawn from Euromoney and Micro-pal, two private reporters of international financial
flows. This information is widely used by academics writing for the World Bank and is
therefore considered the best information available on foreign portfolio investment
Portfolio investment is more liquid than foreign direct investment and bank debt
because it is easier and cheaper to transform it into cash. Because of the liquidity of
portfolio flows, these flows are conventionally considered short-term or "hot money,"
though a few observers have questioned whether these flows really are as volatile as
conventional wisdom seems to suggest .21
21 Stijn Claessens and Sudarshan Gooptu (eds.). Portfolio Investment in Developing Countries,
World Bank Discussion Paper 228. Washington: World Bank, 1995. p. 1-10.
Table 2: Recourse to international capital markets
by emerging markets in USD billion. 2*
L__c I
•
1993 1994 1995
South America
Bonds 15.6 10.1 14 6
Loans 1.8 1.0 3 4
Shares 3.0 2.8 2.1
Net issue of euro-notes 2.9 4.2 8.7
Central and Eastern Eumpp
Bonds 5.8 2.4 4.0
Loans 0.6 1.2 2.0
Shares
- 0.2 0.4
Net issue of euro-notes 0.1 -0.1
Portfolio investment is growing in both OECD countries and the emerging
markets due to a trend in the financial industry called "securitization." Securitization is
the process of transforming parts of the balance sheet of a company into a tradable
security, thus taking it off the balance sheet. For example, a bank would transform a
loan mto a bond or security. In banking, securitization commonly happens by bundling
together a portfolio of loans, collecting the interest and principal payments, and selling
the claims as a security to third parties. 23 This way, the bank "outsources" the risk to a
wider market of investors, which in turn, by their trading activities, are supposed to be
more accurately valuing the risk by pricing it on capital markets. The Brady Plan, which
transformed sovereign debt into tradable bonds, is an example of a securitization.
Securitization encourages more openness and access, but also shifts the role of the bank
from lender to market-maker.24 This trend of the bank being replaced by a market-
maker is called disintermediation. These trends are expected to continue, and on this
basis, portfolio investment should continue to grow in line with it. Increasingly, it is
22 OECD, Financial Market Trends. No. 64. Paris: OECD, June, 1996.
23 Anne Y. Kester and the Panel on International Capital Movements, Following the Money, US
Finance in the World Economy
. Washington: National Academy Press, 1995. p. 28. The Panel on
International Capital Movements has among its members: Sam Y. Cross, School of International
and Public Affairs, Columbia University; Stephen H. Axilrod, Nikko Securities; Richard Cooper,
Dept, of Economics, Harvard University; David Devlin, Citibank; Rimmers De Vries, Morgan
Guaranty Trust Co.; John Heimann, Merrill Lynch & Co.; Peter Kenen, Dept, of Economics,
Princeton University; Lawrence Klein, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania;
Robert Soloman, Brookings Institution; Nancy Teeters, IBM; Lawrence Thibodeau, Price
Waterhouse; and H. David Willey, Morgan Stanley & Co.
24 Richard O'Brien, Global Financial Integration: the End of Geography . London: Pinter
Publishers for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992. p. 40.
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bemg employed in the emerging markets and will continue to grow strongly there*
Figure 3 shows the overwhelming size of bonds as a portion of portfolio investment in
Central Europe and Latin America.
It should be born in mind that portfolio investment is very difficult to measure.
First, there is no single definition of what ought to be measured or how the information
should be broken out into different categories, nor is there an organization that tracks
portfolio flows and acts as a clearing house.* The small size of these flows compared to
flows within the OECD provtdes a low incentive by creditor governments to monitor
flows closely. 27 This lack of information on portfolio flows represents a serious issue for
govern merits and multilateral agencies to address in the future, as a recent Economist
article lamented.* Despite these difficulties, I will use the best information available on
portfolio flows as reported by multilateral organizations as part of the financial flows
analysis to determine whether globalization or regionalization in economic affairs is in
fact occurring.
The most important aspect of portfolio investment for the purposes of this paper
is the incredible growth in portfolio investment activity in emerging markets in the past
ten years. The number of foreign portfolio investment funds as well as the value of
foreign portfolio investment has mushroomed in recent years, due to favorable
economic and political conditions. This trend will be discussed in the conclusion as one
of the key drivers of the globalization of shareholder value business practices. The
following charts offer a telling snapshot of the number and value of OECD-based funds
active in emerging markets since 1981:
25 Internal Report, "November Monthly Letter," Citicorp. New York, December, 1996.
26 The organizations that do report on these flows such as the OECD, the World Bank, and
Micropal rely on information that takes the form of voluntary reporting by private organizations
and individuals.
27 Stijn Claessens and Sudarshan Gooptu, Portfolio Investment in Developing Countries, p. 1.
28
"The Unmeasurable Lightness of Being," The Economist, November 23, 1996. pp.85-6.
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To measure portfolio investment for the purposes of determining regionalization
or globalization of financial flows, I will use US dollar values of portfolio investment as
reported by the IMF or the OECD. If there is a clearly dominant country in terms of
dollar value invested and that country is part of the posited region (the Americas or
Europe), then there is a regionalizing tendency with respect to portfolio investment. It
is also interesting to note the currency in which bonds are denominated. For example,
while examining Latin American debt, it is interesting to note that while the share of
bonds and debt issued in US dollars has declined, US dollar-denominated loans still
account for an absolute majority of issues in Latin America. If portfolio investment is
relatively evenly distributed within and outside of the posited region, then there is a
globalizing tendency with respect to portfolio investment.
24 Figures for 1981-1994, Micropal Directory of Emerging Markets Funds in International Finance
Corporation, Investment Funds in Emerging Markets, p. 102.
30 Regional and single country. The IFC publication from which this information was drawn did
not break out the Eastern Europe funds by country.
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Table 4: Asset Value of International Emerging Market
millions31
Funds, 1981-1995 in USD
Global
Latin
1981
o’
0
1982
o'
0
1983
o'
0
1984
o~
0
1985
(T
0
1986
7cT
0
1987
592"
1988
900
1989
1,350
1990
2,300
1991
3,750
1992
7,750
1993
~24,750
1994
34,416
1995
”
36,000
American
0 0 175 380 1,510 2,000 5,200 10,919 8,500
Regional
Argentina 0 0 0 0 0 o 0
63
225
0
0
220
300
0
320
330
0
165
530
115
380
780
Brazil
Mexico
Eastern
0
125
0
0
150
0
0
150
0
0
175
0
0
175
0
0
200
0
105
485
1,040
170
625
1,865
214
1,854
1,783
212
1,350
1,060
Europe
0 90 210 240 350 570 1,476 2,000
1 U 1 AL
Emerging
Markets
290 315 380 730 1,310 1,886 3,699 5,977 10,270 13,680 19,525 29,487 72,778 105,882 108,788
b. Foreign Direct Investment
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is one of the prime vehicles for global economic
integration. Though the definitions of which financial flows qualify as FDI vary, all
define it as involving an equity stake taken in order to gain partial or total control of the
company m question. FDI flows are central to an assessment of the globalization or
regionalization of the world economy because they have become an increasingly large
component of financial flows to the developing world and economies in transition.32
Precisely because it gives investors control of their own capital, it has been seen as an
increasingly useful way to enter developing and high-risk markets. An increasing
number of firms view FDI as necessary to maintaining their competitive advantage.
Figures 5 and 6 show the growth of FDI in Central Europe and Latin America.
It must be noted that FDI, like many other economic statistics, is inexact. This is
in part because of disagreement on what constitutes FDI and how it is measured.33
Governments have not agreed on a single definition of FDI and thus have different
31 Figures for 1981-1994, Micropal Directory of Emerging Markets Funds in International Finance
Corporation, Investment Funds in Emerging Markets, p. 102. The IFC publication from which
this information was drawn did not break out the Eastern Europe funds by country.
32 Since 1993, foreign direct investment has been the largest single source of external finance for
the developing countries. FDI has been increasingly attracted by developing countries, reaching
an all time high in 1995 of 38% of all world FDI.
33 Klaus E. Meyer. "Foreign direct investment in the early years of economic transition: a survey,"
Economics of Transition, Vol. 3 (3), 1995. p. 302.
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reporting standards- FD. inflows to emerging markets are usually understated
because statistical offices are new or inefficient and there is no formal approval process
for FDI. Further, joint ventures or other partnerships in which one party enters only a
small amount of equity, but gains control through side-agreements, understate the
potential impact on busmess practices. Realizing that the quality of FDI statistics is not
always good, I will employ it on "best information available" basis.
Forms of data used will include OECD statistics from its Direct Investment
abroad database on both FDI flows and stocks, where available. FDI flows will also be
used as quoted from The Economist and the U.S. Federal Reserve. These sources and
types of information are the best available information on FDI. For some countries, only
incomplete information is available on details of the flows such as country of origin and
composition of FDI by industry. This lack of information reflects the international
community's lack of commitment to reporting these statistics and making them publicly
available. For my purposes, absolute precision is not necessary, as I am looking for
larger trends and patterns. If there is a clearly dominant in FDI and that investor is part
of the posited region (the Americas or Europe), then there is a regionalizing tendency
with respect to foreign direct investment. If foreign direct investment is relatively
evenly distributed within and outside of the posited region, then there is a globalizing
tendency with respect to FDI.
FDI is key in examining the transfer of business practices because it is an
important way of transferring managerial know-how and business practices. There is
broad agreement among both Eastern reformers and Western advisors that the positive
benefits of FDI in transition economies goes beyond the economic to also effect
institutional changes . 35 As Sebastian Edwards, a leading commentator on finance in
Latin America, notes,
"...analysts agree that a fundamental role of direct foreign
investment is to allow the host country to come in contact with new
34 Klaus E. Meyer. "Foreign direct investment in the early years of economic transition: a survey,"
p. 302.
35 Carl H. McMillan, "Foreign Direct Investment in Eastern Europe: Harnessing FDI to the
Transition from Plan to Market," in Chan, Steve (ed.). Foreign Direct Investment in a Changing
Global Economy
. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995. pp 127-149.
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chruques and new management styles. Even if its volume ismodest, direct foreign investment helps to diffuse innovations
encourages the imitation of best practices in more industrial
'
countries, and accelerates the pace of productivity of growth."36
This transfer of best practices results in a globalization of application of management
styles and business practices. For this reason, FDI is an excellent pornt of departure to
examine the globalization of business practices.
As foreign investors enter emerging markets, they have a need for financial and
business services. As demand is stimulated for these services by FDI in the non-
financial or business service industries, it encourages FDI from banks, insurers,
accounts, law firms, and others which in turn have a significant effect on the business
culture of the recipient country. FDI in financial and business services has been one of
the prime targets for foreign investors in Central Europe.* Though the investment sizes
are small, these investments are particularly meaningful in terms of transfers of business
practices and transfer of know-how and technology. The small size in capital terms is
also due to the fact that capital flows do not accurately record human capital flows and
the service industries are less capital intensive than industries such as the
manufacturing industries
.
38
Through on-the-job training, provided by very many Western investors and also
through government-sponsored programs, managerial skills are transferred to Central
and East European and Latin American nationals. In addition to introducing new
managerial skills, FDI can bring about a change in the general approach to work by
using western incentive structures, but also by introducing business ethics standards
generally accepted by market economies
.
39 Furthermore, through forward and
backward linkages on the value chain, business practices are diffused beyond the
activities of the foreign affiliate itself. One model example of this is Me Donald
36 Sebastian Edwards, Crisis and Reform in Latin America, From Despair to Hope . New York:
Oxford University Press for International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / World
Bank, 1995. p. 246.
37 Carl H. McMillan, "Foreign Direct Investment in Eastern Europe: Harnessing FDI to the
Transition from Plan to Market," p. 134.
38 Klaus E. Meyer. "Foreign direct investment in the early years of economic transition: a survey."
pp. 301-320.
39 Carl H. McMillan, "Foreign Direct Investment in Eastern Europe: Harnessing FDI to the
Transition from Plan to Market," pp 127-149.
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Corporation. To maintain world quality standards, it has had to create its own new
supply chains, from farm all the way to the restaurant.™ A key FDI sector in the transfer
of bustness practices is the business services industry (legal, financial services,
consulting) because it directly disseminates business practices.
Figure 2: Comparison of FDI in Central Europe and Latin America41
40 Carl H. McMillan, "Foreign Direct Investment in Eastern Europe: Harnessing FDI to the
Transition from Plan to Market," p. 136.
41 OECD, Financial Market Trends, Vol. 64 June, 1996.
Figure 3: FDI Flows, 1985-1992 in USD millions.42
c. Bank Loans
These include loans and other financing by banks. Information on these flows is
difficult to track and contains less meaning, as short-term loans, such as factoring, are
aggregated with longer-term and other obligations, as published by the leading source
of information on these flows, a publication put out by the World Bank called Financial
Flows and the Developing World. Information on cross-border commercial bank claims
will be drawn from the statistical appendix of this publication. Bank loans and other
flows will be mentioned where available, but are mostly covered in the discussions on
debt and bonds in the portfolio investment sections of this thesis. As with other flows,
these flows will be measured in terms of values.
I will also use the number of investments as a subordinate measure of
regionalization or globalization, where that information is available. This measure is
less important to me as a measure of globalization largely because consistent
information on number of investments does not exist, but also because the value of the
investment is more or less indicative of the commitment of the investor. It will be used
as a "tie-breaker" of sorts. That is, if the aggregate investment value of the FDI is more
42 Thomas Brewer, "Foreign Direct Investment in Emerging Market Countries" in Lar Oxelheim
(ed.). The Global Race for Foreign Direct Investment Prospects for the Future . Heidelberg:
Springer Verlag, 1993. p.191.(177-203) Note: The price deflator is the World Bank's MUV
(Manufacturers Unit Value) Index, based on US$ value of G-5 manufactured goods exports,
weighed by their exports to developing countries (1980=100).
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or less equal between two countries, but the number of investments is massively
asymmetric, then the country with many investments will be considered the primary
investor. For example, though Germany leads the USA by a small margin (22% to 20%
in terms of officially reported FDI) in FDI in the Czech Republic, German firms are
involved in a much larger number of smaller FDI projects. The multiplicity of
investments coupled with the slightly larger aggregate value of the FDI, leads me to
conclude that Germany is the dominant direct investor to the Czech Republic. The main
metric, though will be aggregate value of FDI.
To sum up, I will use aggregate values as reported by multilateral institutions or
best available information to determine whether financial flows are becoming more
regional or more global. Portfolio investment and FDI will have an equal weighting and
bank loans will have a subordinate weighting in the final analysis.
2. Business practices
A number of thinkers have differentiated between a Continental European and
an Anglo-American model for economic activity.43 The Continental European,
consensus-based model I will call a "stakeholder value" model and the Anglo-American
model I will label "shareholder value" model. The models differ in their goals and
therefore in their practices. The stakeholder value model views the firm as a location of
compromise between groups (management, workers, owners, community,
environment, etc.) in which compromise is required to distribute the benefits of
economic activity, while the shareholder value model is designed to return maximum
profit to the owners of the firm.
I will define the models more precisely, drawing on distinctions made by Fink &
Haas, Michael Albert, and Robert Cox. Having developed solid working definitions, I
can use them to examine the globalization or regionalization of business practices. If
America is the dominant force in Latin America and Germany is the dominant force in
Central Europe, a reproduction of business practices in each respective region of the
major economic actor is evidence of regionalization and lack of reproduction is a
validation of the globalization hypothesis.
43 Cox, Albert, Fink & Haiss, and Vernon, among others.
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Michael Albert, in his work Capitalism contra Capitalism, compares the
continental European model with the Angel-American one. He does so in part by
looking at degrees of liquidity in the economy. That is, how easy is it to trade a certain
thing for something else? Firms, for example, are more easily tradable in the USA than
m the German system. Employment, insurance, and real estate are also generally more
liquid in the United States
.
44 Though this is a useful and thought-provoking way to
look at the differences, it is a bit abstract for the purposes of identifying a trend toward a
shareholder or stakeholder value model. Robert Cox agrees that there are various types
of capitalism. He identifies three kinds of capitalism: "hyperliberal Anglo-Amercian,"
"social market of central and northern Europe," and an "East Asian form." 45 Because
this thesis touches just the "hyperliberal Anglo-Amercian" and the "social market of
central and northern Europe," I will only use these two as a basis to carry out my
analysis. This is also a reason to indicate that the results of this study indicate a trend
toward globalization, but not globalization itself, because a large portion of the world
economy, Asia, is not within the purview of this study.
While Albert and Cox explain the differences between the models in broad
statements, Fink and Haiss develop specific criteria to differentiate between the
continental and the American models. Relying strongly on Fink and Haiss, I have
developed observable criteria to distinguish between the two models.
a. Stakeholder Value
Definition
The stakeholder value model is based on the idea that the goal of the firm is to
meet the needs of all parties involved: owners, workers, management, community,
environment, and other interest groups impacted by the activities of the firm. That is, a
compromise is made to appease all groups. The operations of the firm depend on a
politics of consensus.
44 Michel Albert, Kapitalismus contra Kapitalismus . Frankfurt and New York: Campus Verlag,
1992 (originally Capitalisme contra Capitalisme . Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1991). p. 105-107.
45 Robert Cox, "A Perspective on Globalization" in James Mittelman (ed.) Globalization, Critical
Reflections . International Political Economy, vol. 9. Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1996.
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Historical Evolution
The stakeholder model can be seen to have evolved as a response to Germany's
political situation in the 19th and 20th Centuries. Germany's leadership, faced with the
threat of Russia on one side and France on the other, felt a strong need to industrialize
quickly. In order to secure agreement of workers to promote a quick industrialization,
German policy makers sought to construct a relationship between workers and
employers of social partnership. Both parties were to share in the profits of the firm.
This, along with strong policies by the state to ensure rapid development, led to a
"corporatist" system of consensus building among government, industrial, and labor
groups. After the war, this system was employed again, this time to rebuild the
destroyed economy. Professor Raymond Vernon notes that the statutory requirement
that labor and management be equally represented on supervisory boards and the EU's
''social charter" are indicators of the contemporary expression of this corporatist
economic policy.46
Characteristics of the stakeholder value model:
The economy:
• There are high levels of social welfare and generous public pension plans.
• Corporatist structures are in place to mediate social and economic conflict.
• High bank deposit savines level as opposed to other forms of savings such as
securities, generally associated with higher risk levels.
Firms in stakeholder value systems:
• A large number of small and mid-sized firms with a tendency to finance
operations through debt. Firms tend to fund operations through debt, for two
reasons. Immediately after World War II, there was no capital to finance the
reconstruction of Germany.47 Therefore, companies had no choice but borrow
46 Raymond Vernon, Exerpt from In the Eye of the Storm: Multinational Enterprises in the
Twenty-first Century , forthcoming. Located at http:/ / www.cipe.org/ e20/ ver_E20.html. 1996.
47 Lehman Brothers, German Valuation Methodology
.
January, 1993. Frankfurt: Lehman
Brothers Presentation. Section I.
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to finance their activities. Second, equity markets are not developed, making
them more expensive to enter. German equity markets have remained under
developed, though recent events suggest this may be changing.
• Long-term ownership of majority stakes
. Because of a lack of liquidity in the
market for ownership (equity), ownership changes hands infrequently.
Because of a lack of an equity culture, a much smaller portion of the economy
is owned in the form of public-listed companies. Many firms are family-
owned and are a matter of family identity and pride. Of the companies that
are listed on stock exchanges, it is common that banks take large blocks of
shares. In Germany, only 15% of the top 170 quoted companies have diffused
shareholder structures.^
• Goal is return on investment instead of return on equity or other measures.
This means that the focus is on return on equity plus long-term funded debt.
For the purposes of this thesis, it means that earnings for creditors are
calculated as a part of this equation and not just for shareholders. The profit
goals of creditors and shareholders are not always in harmony.
• Firm is partially under control of the bank. The division between public and
private is less clear, in part due to corporate structures and an economic
culture of compromise and accommodation.
• Banks play a role in the firm's decision-making. Equity participations and
global custody rights transfers by banks ensure access and influence in the
firm's strategy and operations. Banks sit on supervisory boards of companies
due to their participation in companies and because of the proxy votes they
exercise for the banks' customers who have purchased shares through them.
German banks request that the customers who have deposited shares with
them authorize the bank to act on their behalf by transferring their voting
rights to the banks. This allows the banks to have a stronger control over
firms than their own equity holdings would suggest. Through this process of
proxy and direct control, the banks are able to claim board memberships in
48 Janet Bush, "Called to account: Short term, long term," International Management, v. 48 n. 6,
July/ August, 1993, pp. 40-41.
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most large industrial companies. The banks then hope to influence the
management decisions in a way that is both profitable for them as a
shareholder and as a commercial bank offering credit to their companies.
Unlike the stakeholder value system, the financing and investment functions
are separated in the shareholder value system.49
* Restricted access to information on the firm
. There is a lack of transparency in
public financial reporting. This hinders the development of equity markets,
which require quality information to function. The very lax public disclosure
standards create a lack of transparency in the company which can result in
poor investment decisions. A striking example of this is the German
accounting practice of not disclosing "hidden reserves," or the value of
undisclosed assets on the balance sheet. Hidden reserves can mask the value
of a firm and therefore lead to poor asset allocation decisions. On the other
hand, it allows firms to plan long-term.
• Firms that do not meet profit expectations are forced to restructure by their
banks . The ownership of industry by banks forces banks to help their
companies develop long-term strategy, but at the same time, causes a "moral
hazard" problem. "Moral hazard" is the label bankers give to the tendency to
offer credit where credit might not be financially prudent due to conflicts of
interest. An example of this was the bailout of Metallgesellschaft by Deutsche
Bank in the summer of 1996. Deutsche Bank owns approximately 1/3 of
Metallgesellschaft and Metallgesellschaft reported heavy losses. Deutsche
was faced with the dilemma of letting the company file for bankruptcy and
losing the value of their equity stake, or to propping up the dying company
with loans and thereby saving the equity aspect of their relationship, and
perhaps more importantly, saving face among industrialists and workers by
showing long-term, though costly commitment. Deutsche Bank chose the
49 Through the Glass-Stegal Act. Note: this act has recently been weakened allowing commercial
banks to claim more profits from equity-related business, and may change even more in the
future. This is a case in which the Anglo system is converging toward that continental one.
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latter route and lost a large undisclosed amount to keep Metallgesellschaft
afloat.
Banks and the Capital Markets
-
Broad product offerings
. Banks offer all financial services including
brokerage and insurance. They have been called universal banks.
* EflultY participation in client firms to ensure the maintenance of a
relationship. They have equity participations in industrial and trade
enterprises as well as the finance sector. The bank plays a dual role as
shareholder and credit issuer.
* Relatively high proportion of long-term fixed-interest loans. This is due to
risk aversion and a lack of alternatives.
b. Shareholder Value
Definition:
Professor Raymond Vernon wrote that, "in contrast to Germany,
..., the US
culture is strongly inclined to the proposition that 'the business of business is
business/" 50 That is, instead of mediating between various interest groups in a society,
the purpose of the firm is to make profits for its owners.
History:
The early American experience, according to Raymond Vernon, was formative in
the construction of a liberal capitalist system. Vernon cites the early pioneer spirit of
emigrants fleeing from countries with strong interventionist states. Because of the
different view of the relationship between workers and employers, restructuring and
relocating workers was easier than, for example, in Germany. This trend toward a
shareholder value system has been accelerating due to the growth of securities markets
in response to deregulation during the Reagan-Thatcher era and due to improved
information infrastructure and the trends of securitization and disintermediation.
50 Raymond Vernon, Exerpt from In the Eye of the Storm: Multinational Enterprises in the
Twenty-first Century .
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Characteristics:
The Economy
* Low social welfare level. Private pensions play a larger role in the social security
system than in the stakeholder value model.
*
-
Pure" market economy
. Efficiency rather than equality is the value.
* Large population segments holds securities
. This is in sharp contrast to the
stakeholder model. Shareholdings can be indirect, as through mutual funds or
insurance policies.
Firms
• Large and multinational firms have major importance and tend toward
financing through capital markets. Capital markets play a large role in
financing. This is increasing worldwide through the growing popularity of
securitization and disintermediation. The trend toward securitization is clear
in the United States. In 1970, the US economy was 80% financed by banks.
By 1990, the number fell to 20%. This is due to the exceptional growth of the
stock and bond markets vis-a-vis bank debt financing.51 Another substantial
reason for the expected growth of portfolio investment is the growth of
institutional investors.
• Short-term investors hold stakes through small packets of stock. Stock is
easily tradable and therefore positions can be entered and exited quickly. The
shareholder value economy is an "equity" economy in which ownership of
companies is predominantly held through publicly-traded securities, as
opposed to private or family ownership.
• Investors' goal is return on equity. Return on equity is the amount earned on
common stock investment. Because equity markets are developed and liquid
and there is little conflict of interest or moral hazard resulting from
ownership and financing structures as in the stakeholder model; the result is a
51 Michel Albert, Kapitalismus contra Kapitalismus, p. 18-19.
drive for short-term profits in order to encourage shareholders to continue to
hold these shares instead of an alternative investment.
• firm is held and run by private individuals
.
Bank managers do not intervene in material strategic decisions of the firm.
Depending of the structure of the investment vehicle, some equity investors
do intervene m strategic decisions. Financing and strategic decisions are
separated.
Information is widely available, accessible, and up-to-datp. As a part- ^
high level of development of equities and other securities markets, the quality
and access level of information is high. As an example of access to
information, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
has complete filings of all publicly-listed companies on the world-wide-web
on the SEC homepage. This information is free and available to anyone and
discloses quarterly and annual earnings, descriptions of business activities,
and information that would affect the share price such as new issues, mergers
and acquisitions, restructuring, and so forth. Strict and extensive reporting
standards promote accurate pricing by markets and more liquidity.
• Firms restructure through take-overs or the threat of takeovers
. Failing firms
are liquidated, acquired, or replace management through shareholder
initiatives.
Banks and the Capital Markets
• Deep" product offerings
. Banks specialize in products instead offering
universal products.
• Banks only have participations in the financial services sector (in many cases
excluding insurance). For example, even though it is not legally prohibited by
banks in England to take equity stakes in non-financial services sectors, there
is an unspoken consensus that this is not to be done, or at least not for the
long-term. In America, it is forbidden by law. Commercial banking is
separated from investment banking.
• Financing and control functions are separated.
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* Short-term financing through hanks long-term financing thro,,,*
markets
.
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Following Fink & Haiss and adding to this the insights of Albert, I will examine the
recent trends toward shareholder or stakeholder value as influenced by foreign capital
flows on Central Europe and Latin America. A slightly adapted table from a typology
created by two German economists, Fink & Haiss, is useful to summarize the differences
between the two models:
52 Gerhard Fink and Peter Haiss. "Finanzmarktreform in Osteuropa, Teil 1: Erbschaft und
organisatorischer Aufbau." Bankarchiv, Zeitschrift fiir das Gesamte Bank- und Borsenwesen .
Vol. 44. June, 1996. pp. 537.
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Table 5: Comparison of Stakeholder & Shareholder Models
.Stakeholder Value Economy
Economy High social welfare public pension
Shareholder Value Prnn^y.
Low social welfare level and private
pension provision
Corporate structures
High bank deposit savings level
"pure" market economy
Large population segments holds
securities.
Banks have equity participations in
industrial and trade enterprises as well
as the finance sector.
Banks only have participations in the
financial services sector (in many
cases excluding insurance).
Firms Large number of small and mid-sized
firms with a tendency to finance
operations through debt.
Large and multinational firms have
major importance and tend toward
financing through capital markets.
Long-term ownership of majority stakes Short-term investors hold stakes
through small packets of stock.
Owner's goal is return on investment Investors' goal is quarterly earnings
Firm is partially under control of the
bank and/or public organizations
Firm is held and run by private
individuals.
Equity participations and global
custody rights transfers by banks ensure
access and influence in the firm's
strategy and operations.
Bank managers do not intervene in
material strategic decisions of the
firm. Some equity investors do
intervene in strategic decisions.
Restricted access to information on the
i firm. Lack of transparency.
Information is widely available,
accessible, and up-to-date.
Firms that do not meet profit
expectations of their banks are put
under pressure to restructure.
Firms restructure through take-overs
or the threat of takeovers.
Banks
and
"Broad" product offerings
Capital
Markets
"Deep" product offerings
Equity participation in client firms to
ensure a relationship.
Relationship to or participation in
investment or pension funds.
Financing and control functions are
separated.
Relatively high proportion of long-term
fixed-interest loans
Relatively high proportion of short-
term variable-interest rate loans
Bank provides both long and short-term
financing.
Short-term financing through banks,
long-term financing through capital
markets. 33
53 Gerhard Fink and Peter Haiss. "Finanzmarktreform in Osteuropa, Teil 1: Erbschaft und
organisatorischer Aufbau," pp. 537.
Business practices will be measured according to the criteria set forth in the
shareholder and stakeholder models of economic organization. The three main
categories of comparison are the economy, firms, and banks and capital markets.
First, In terms of the economy, if there is movement toward private pension
provision, lower social welfare, pure market economy, broad direct or indirect holdings
of securities, and a separation of banking and industrial activity, there is a tendency
toward the shareholder model. If there is movement toward public pension provision,
high social welfare, corporate structures in the economy, high bank savings deposit
levels, and strong cross-overs between banking and industry, there is a tendency toward
a stakeholder model. Evidence of trends in the economy will be drawn from academic
and journalistic commentary on market trends as well as government policy.
Second, firms that display the following traits indicate a tendency toward the
shareholder model. Large and multinational firms have major importance and tend
toward financing through capital markets. Short-term investors hold stakes through
small packets of stock. Return on equity is the goal of the company and shareholders
can act to ensure this. Firms are held and run by private individuals, not banks or the
government. Information on companies is widely available, accessible, and up-to-date.
Firms restructure through take-overs or the threat of takeovers. Firms that show these
characteristics indicate a tendency toward a shareholder value model.
Firms with the following traits indicate a tendency toward the stakeholder value
model: There is a large number of small and mid-sized firms with a tendency to finance
operations through debt instead of equity. Equity is owned in long-term stakes, more
often in large blocks to ensure control or influence. Firms are often partially under
control of the bank and/ or public organizations and may influence the firm's strategy
and operations. There is limited transparency or access to information on the firm.
Firms that exhibit these traits indicate a tendency toward a stakeholder value system.
Evidence of the activities of firms will be drawn from journalistic and academic
sources, and due to the nature of these criteria, are more often accessible through
journalistic sources, which are incomplete, but indicative of general trends in company
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structures and strategies. Evidence will take the form of case-studies (e.g. Previ Pension
fund in Brazil), short illustrative examples, and general market overviews, as available.
Evidence on the development of capital markets will be taken from the International
Finance Corporation's Emerging Stock Markets Factbook, 1994-1996 editions. Market
capitalization, number of stocks, liquidity, market transparency, shareholder activism
and number and size of investment funds or institutional investors will be basic
indicators of the development of capital markets.
Third, banks that display the following characteristics indicate a trend toward
the shareholder model: Banks specialize in certain products, such as commercial or
investment banking. They do not invest directly in industry, but may participate
through distinct vehicles such as investment or pension funds. Financing and control
functions are separated. Short-term financing is offered through banks, while long-term
financing is provided by capital markets. Indications of the stakeholder model, on the
other hand, are the following: The bank provides universal products, including
commercial and investment banking products, as well as insurance services. Banks
participate in industry to ensure relationships as credit issuer. Banks provide both long
and short-term financing. Evidence to investigate the banking sector will include
journalistic and academic articles. Some evidence will take the form of case studies (e.g.
Previ in Brazil), interviews and quotes from financial market participants, and market
overviews.
I will evaluate the development of each of the three representative countries of
Central Europe and Latin America based on the three criteria described above, 1) the
economy, 2) firms, and 3) banks and capital markets. If the economy, firms and banks
and capital markets display a movement toward preponderance of traits of a
shareholder value model, the country will be deemed as moving toward a shareholder
value model. If the converse is true, the country will be labeled as moving toward a
stakeholder value model. Conclusions will be based on how the countries have
progressed from the late 1980's to 1995/96. After having evaluated the three countries
in the region, I will draw a general conclusion about movement toward a shareholder or
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stakeholder model, having taken into consideration a broader picture of trends
worldwide.
Chapter III
Central Europe
A. Overview of Central Europe
In this section, I will investigate the financial flows in Central Europe, focusing
on the three countries that have attracted the most capital, Hungary, the Czech
Republic, and Poland. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the
Newly Independent States have received 15% of total capital flows to developing
countries during 1990-1995. Of the over $60 billion entering ah of Eastern Europe
including the former Soviet Union from 1990-1995, the Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Hungary and Poland have received three fourths. 54 To give a detailed picture of the
flows and business practices, I will provide three focused snapshots of developments
from 1989-1995, in the respective countries. Before doing so, some general comments on
recent developments in the region will provide a backdrop for the more detailed
discussions.
In terms of the sources of investment, it is interesting to note that Germany is the
largest single investor in the region and the European Union as a whole is clearly the
dominant commercial partner. 55 The second largest private investor, the United States,
with approximately 20% of total investment flows to Central and Eastern Europe, is not
far behind Germany's 22%. This statistic may be surprising to analysts who assume a
strong regional influence of Germany. As far as the character of German investment is
concerned, it is largely in the manufacturing sector. Comparing German FDI
worldwide to FDI in Central and Eastern Europe, manufacturing investment is 70% of
54 Zhen Kun Wang, "Integrating Transition Economies into the Global Economy," p. 23.
55 In terms of official flows, Germany has granted over $106 billion in bilateral aid to the region
since the end of the cold war, more than any other country and over 50% of all international aid
to the region. Friedbert Pflueger, "Is Germany a Threat? No, There is No Need to Fear." Central
European Economic Review, October 1996, p. 6.
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total investment in the region against 39.3% globally and financial services are lower
(15% against 22% globally).56
Other: $9.6
39%
Austria: $1 .8
8%
Italy: $0.6
3%
France: $1 .9
8%
USA: $4.8
20%
Figure 4: Cumulative Flows from Major Investors
Figure 4 illustrates the relative share of investment in the region. Scandinavians
are focusing on Poland and the Baltics. Germans and Austrians are important for the
whole region, although smaller investments are closer to the borderlands. Larger
investments tend to be less geographically selected. The UK, Canada, and the United
States have a much more pan-regional investment pattern, and therefore tend to be
relatively more important in the CIS and less in Central Europe.57 The Dutch(largely
trough ING / Barings) and Austrians (through Creditanstalt, Raiffeisen, and Bank
Austria) have large shares of the financial services sectors, amounting to 16.4% and 20%
56 Klaus E. Meyer. "Foreign direct investment in the early years of economic transition: a survey,"
pp. 301-320.
57 Klaus E. Meyer. "Foreign direct investment in the early years of economic transition: a survey,"
pp. 301-320.
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respectively.58 Asian investment has been relatively unimportant in the region, with the
possible exception of Korean investment, particularly through Daewoo.5*
As a percentage of official GDP, capital inflows to Central and Eastern Europe
have been considerable. Compared with the Marshall Plan, which averaged 2.5% of
GDP of the recipient countries, official disbursements to Central and Eastern European
countries amounted to approximately 2.7% of GDP. This comparison is not completely
valid, as the GDP s of Central and Eastern European countries are considered to be
underreported.60
The region has been growing rapidly in the mid- to late-nineties, after a
contractionary period in the early nineties.61 This growth picture in Poland, the Czech
Republic and Hungary is a positive indicator that helps these countries to continue to
attract further investment. Recent Gross Domestic Product growth rates are illustrated
in the following figure:
58 Klaus E. Meyer. "Foreign direct investment in the early years of economic transition: a survey,"
pp. 301-320.
59 Klaus E. Meyer. "Foreign direct investment in the early years of economic transition: a survey,"
pp. 301-320.
60 Zhen Kun Wang, "Integrating Transition Economies into the Global Economy," p. 22.
61 It is interesting to compare growth and investment of the Czech Republic, Poland, and
Hungary with their former Warsaw Pact ally, the German Democratic Republic. While the
former German Democratic Republic has received almost $700 billion from the former West
Germany, net annual flows to all CEE and NIS countries averaged $8.8 billion from 1990-1995.
At the same time, eastern Germany has stagnated while Eastern Europe has been growing rapidly
in past years. This is largely due to the monetary unification of Germany. Setting the western
German Deutsche Mark equal to the eastern German Ostmark immediately raised real wages of
Eastern German labor. In terms of labor productivity, eastern Germany has priced itself out of
the European labor market, in spite of German efforts to mitigate this through massive
intervention. Ironically, the poorer nieghbors are growing much more rapidly, in spite of the
comparatively miniscule capital flows.
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Figure 5: GDP Growth Rates in Percent
A notable change has occurred in the capital flows to Central Europe away from
bank debt and bonds (“debt-creating flows") toward equity or ownership-based
investment and tradable debt (bonds). Bank and bond finance fell from 87% of total
private sector inflows in 1990 to 32% in 1995.62 Throughout most of the 1990's to date,
bank loans have been negative, while foreign direct investment has been steadily
growing. Equity investment has been relatively small to date, but is expected to account
for an increasing share of total capital flows in the next ten years. The following table
shows a comprehensive breakdown of financial flows in the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland from 1990 to 1995. As the macroeconomic environment improves, overall
investment has been accelerating.
62 Dorothy M. Sobol, “Central and Eastern Europe: Financial Markets and Private Capital Flows,"
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Research Paper #9626 . New York: Public Information
Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, August, 1996.
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1. Foreign Direct Investment
Table 6: Macroeconomic investment rates
in Central Europe: (average value in %)
86-88 89-91 92-94
Czech Republic 27.8 28.4 21.1
Hungary 26.2 23.6 21.8
Poland 30.1 25.4 16.
1
63
FDI can fill the gap between domestic investment needs and actual savings. By
importing capital, privatization has been made possible, since real savings in Central
Europe were too low to provide for the purchase of significant portions of the economy.
See the following table for information on savings levels in Central Europe.64
Though Romania and Hungary had joint venture laws permitting FDI in the
early 1970 s, inflows did not occur until a market-friendly environment was created 66
Nonetheless, investment did not take off until the revolutions of 1989.
63 Gerhard Fink and Peter Haiss, "Finanzmarktreform in Osteuropa Teil 1: Erbschaft und
organisatorischer Aufbau," p. 430.
64 There are exceptions, such as the case of Slovakia, in which privatization proceeded largely
through management buy-out MBO's on quite generous terms. This was a move on the part of
the nationalist Mecair coalition to maintain its power-base in the clique of Slovak industrialists.
Carl H. McMillan, "Foreign Direct Investment in Eastern Europe: Harnessing FDI to the
Transition from Plan to Market," pp 127-149.
65 Additionally, Explicit legislation on profit repatriation and guarantees against expropriation
was passed in Hungary in 1988, allowing majority foreign ownership. Klaus E. Meyer. "Foreign
direct investment in the early years of economic transition: a survey," pp. 301-320.
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Recent History ofFDI in Central Europe:
Table 7: Composition of Private Capital Flows
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Czech Republic66 995 -656
-652
-163 1,953 1,746
Hungary 200
-1,395
-1,899
-1,234 1,068 411
Poland 2,138 1,061 -882
-891
-4,929 324
TOTAL 3,293 -990
-3,433
-2,288
-1,908 2,481
Net Foreign Direct
Investment
Czech Republic 187 586 1,073 564 762 2,525
Hungary 354 1,462 1,479 2,339 1,095 4,453
Poland 89 298 665 1,697 1,846 2,511
TOTAL 630 2,346 3,217 4,600 3,703 9,489
International Equity
Investment
Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 10 32 Jun-95
Hungary 68 91 33 17 214 0 Jun-95
Poland 0 0 0 1 0 14 Jun-95
TOTAL 68 91 33 18 224 46 Jun-95
International Bond
Investment
Czech Republic 375 277 129 697 396 0 Jun-95
Hungary 888 1,186 1,242 4,796 2,250 1,778 Jun-95
Poland 0 0 0 0 -624 250 Jun-95
TOTAL 1,263 1,463 1,371 5,493 2,022 2,028 Jun-95
GRAND TOTAL 5,254 2,910 1,188 7,823 4,041 14,044 (part year)67
Privatization of existing enterprises rather than start-up or "greenfield"
investment has been the major driver for FDI in the region . 68 This is because of the
desire by governments to rapidly transform the economies from state-directed to a
66 Czech data for 1990-92 includes Slovakia.
67 Dorothy M. Sobol, "Central and Eastern Europe: Financial Markets and Private Capital Flows.
68Klaus E. Meyer. "Foreign direct investment in the early years of economic transition: a survey,
pp. 301-320.
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market-oriented system and the desire of foreign firms to establish a presence qu.ckly in
these previously inaccessible markets.*- The OECD estimates that only 20% of FDI was
dedicated to "greenfield" operations. This is changing, however. Though privatization
will continue to play an important role in certain countries in certain sectors, it has
already been completed in many areas.
Early FDI into Central Europe was driven by globalization strategies to gain
market share in new economies and to take advantage of lower production costs. One
of the most important aspects for western investors was control, either through majority
participation or by a side-agreement accompanying the establishment of a joint-venture.
Although short-term control issues such as the requirement to maintain a certain level
of employment or acquire entire firms rather than just the desired parts were not so
important. Western partners had to be ensured eventual control.™
A surprising number of partnerships between Western and East European
companies have been successful. Central European managers realized that they would
not be able to change their enterprises to meet western technology, efficiency, and
marketing standards fast enough on their own to be able to survive. The only choice
was to team up with western firms. These managers become a group that tends to
promote the reduction of trade and investment barriers and promote further opening.
Of course, there are groups that view FDI with fear and suspicion, due to the legacy of
the Communist regime or previous experiences with Germany, or because their interests
are directly threatened by FDI. 71
The strategic drivers for joint-ventures, strategic alliances, or acquisitions were
basically the same as such cross-border transactions anywhere: arbitrage in skills,
financing, market access, or cost-saving across firms and legal systems. 72 The process
was not a one-sided move of westerners to buy up Central Europe, but also of Central
European managers actively seeking out foreign partners in order to stay competitive.
69 Dorothy M. Sobol, "Central and Eastern Europe: Financial Markets and Private Capital Flows."
70 Carol Holmes, "Global strategies in the transition," Economics of Transition, Vol 1(4), 471-488,
1993.
71 Carl H. McMillan, "Foreign Direct Investment in Eastern Europe: Harnessing FDI to the
Transition from Plan to Market," pp. 127-149.
72 Carol Holmes, "Global strategies in the transition," p. 481.
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Central European managers receive capital, technology, and know-how in exchange for
access to their markets and lower labor, energy, materials and other factor costs. All
three of the academic surveys known to me indicate that market access was far more
important than factor cost as drivers for investment in the region.
Gatling surveyed major investors in Central and Eastern Europe on main
reasons for investment and the leading four reasons were l)"to establish a market
share, 2) tap into regional market," 3) "Low cost-sourcing," and 4)" tap into the EU
market." An OECD study reinforced these findings with the conclusion that the main
reasons for investment were to capture market share, with only a small portion of the
respondents mentioning low cost of production or cost of raw materials.73
A similar survey was conducted by Carol Holmes, who surveyed a number of
western firms setting up industrial production facilities in Hungary and the Czech
Republic. Less than one-fifth of the respondents mentioned low-cost production as the
sole reason for investment. The main reasons were 1) the potential of rapidly growing
markets, 2) additions to capacity, and 3) balancing manufacturing facilities in Europe as
a whole.74 Early entrants especially were interested in balancing production capacity
across Western and Eastern Europe. Producers who entered the market solely for low
labor costs were the least successful, as productivity was also low and personal relations
and political connections figured prominently in day -to-day supplier and
manufacturing relationships. 75
Presently, FDI in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland is fairly unregulated,
except for restrictions in certain industries and the requirement to register investments. 76
Much of the early investment had been made without a clear legal framework, with the
rationale that a quick entry was worth more than the legal risk western companies
faced. 77
73 Klaus E. Meyer. "Foreign direct investment in the early years of economic transition: a survey,"
pp. 301-320.
74 Carol Holmes, "Global strategies in the transition," p. 478.
75 Carol Holmes, "Global strategies in the transition," p. 480.
76 Klaus E. Meyer. "Foreign direct investment in the early years of economic transition: a survey,"
pp. 301-320.
77 Carol Holmes, "Global strategies in the transition," p. 471.
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Two examples: FDI in Branded Consumer Goods and Automotive Components
Food, beverage and tobacco have been large targets for FDI, reaching
approximately 30% of total FDI in Hungary at 1992.* In Central Europe, the per capita
penetration of consumer durables and non-durables is low compared to western
markets. This fact coupled with a strong desire on the part of East Europeans to
purchase western goods, fueled market entry through foreign direct investment and
other means. There is simply a large growth potential compared to western
economies. 79 Branded consumer products, as well as apparel, had basically stopped
growing in the western countries and needed a new outlet. The combination was
compelling as, for example, American jeans' reputation was even "mystical" in the
words of one manager.80
In branded-consumer industries, low production costs were not the driver for
investment. Productivity was commensurably low and rising wage expectations
coupled with anticipated inflation would erode manufacturing competitiveness in a
matter of years, especially because capital costs are high compared with labor costs in
the branded consumer industry
,
8 i Advertising is an interesting change of business
practice that Western firms, European and American, brought to Central Europe.
During the Communist period, advertising was used as a way to dispose of unwanted
goods. Western firms were initially advised not to advertise, for the risk of associating
their products with inferior quality. Advertising has, in fact been quite successful,
although there is a definite generation gap. It is less effective among the older
generation.82
Almost every branded consumer company investing in Central Europe had done
so as part of its European regional or global strategy. Very few investments had been
made to serve just the country in which the investment was made, simply due to the
78 Klaus E. Meyer. "Foreign direct investment in the early years of economic transition: a survey,"
pp. 301-320.
79 Carol Holmes, "Global strategies in the transition," p. 472.
80 Carol Holmes, "Global strategies in the transition," p. 475.
81 Carol Holmes, "Global strategies in the transition," p. 476.
82 Carol Holmes, "Global strategies in the transition," p. 484.
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relatively small size of the countries® Hungary, 10.2 million, Czech Republic, 10.3,
Poland, 38.3.84
FDI m the automotive component and systems supplier industry happened for
similar reasons, despite differences with the branded consumer industry. Automotive
component and systems providers went into the Eastern European markets by
following their customers, the major original equipment manufacturers (OEM's) such as
Volkswagen. Some of them were expressly requested by the OEM's to move in, others
invested because they wanted to strengthen their relationships and show commitment
to the OEM.85 This process of following OEM's by automotive component and systems
suppliers is part of a global consolidation trend in the automotive industry.86
These two very different industries show a trend of investment to capture
market share as a part of a global strategy, even if investment plans are conducted on a
regional basis.
b. Portfolio Investment
By world standards. Central European stock markets are small and
underdeveloped. To put these markets in perspective, the size of the capital markets in
Central Europe is roughly equivalent to the rounding error in American national
accounts.87 Citicorp, for example, has a market capitalization about six times the entire
financial markets of the Czech Republic.88 The small size of the markets makes them
less stable, because they are more easily subject to volatility on low volumes.89 Table 8
shows the size of capital markets with Citicorp added to give additional perspective on
the size of the markets. It should be noted that all stock markets in Central Europe have
grown since 1994, but 1994 was the latest available information at the time of
83 Carol Holmes, "Global strategies in the transition," p. 476.
84 The Economist, Pocket World in Figures, 1997 Edition . London: Economist Books, Ltd, 1996.
85 Carol Holmes, "Global strategies in the transition," p. 480.
86 Daniel Carter, from experience at Citicorp Mergers & Acquisitions, December, 1996.
87 Gerhard Fink and Peter Haiss, "Finanzmarktreform in Osteuropa Teil 1: Erbschaft und
organisatorischer Aufbau."
88 Gerhard Fink and Peter Haiss, "Finanzmarktreform in Osteuropa Teil 1: Erbschaft und
organisatorischer Aufbau."
89 Gerhard Fink and Peter Haiss, "Finanzmarktreform in Osteuropa Teil 1: Erbschaft und
organisatorischer Aufbau."
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publication of this thesis. Another common measure for the size of stock markets is
market capitalization. Market capitalization is the market value of all stocks in a
particular company or market.
Table 8: Size of selected financial markets, 1994.90
Country, in order of Aggregate net As a
volumes of financial. assets of banks in percentage of
intermediation USD billions the USA.
USA 8,955.30 100.00%
Germany 3,374.45 37.68%
Citicorp 250.50 2.80%
Czech Republic 41.74 0.47%
Poland 36.19 0.40%
Hungary 21.02 0.23% 91
Regardless of its size, portfolio investment is the quickest growing class of
capital flows in Central and Eastern Europe. It has been driven by the desire of the US
and UK institutional investors (pension funds, insurance companies, mutual funds, etc.)
to diversify their portfolios. The growth of emerging market funds have been a boon for
Central European securities. At mid-1996, there were over 900 emerging market funds.
Today, virtually all emerging market funds have holdings in Central Europe, compared
with 68% in 1991.92 Portfolio flows have just begun in Central Europe. Activity has
been in the bond market, though institutional investors in the emerging markets as a
whole weigh equity more heavily than bonds. 93 Ninety percent of all Eastern European
portfolio investment flows have come in the form of bonds. 94 In contrast to other
emerging market regions, where the mix of private and sovereign bond issues is more
even, issues in Central and Eastern Europe have been almost exclusively sovereign
debt.95 As firms continue to restructure, equity investment is projected to grow.
90 Fink & Haiss, "Finanzmarktreform in Osteuropa Teil 2: Erbschaft und organisatorischer
Aufbau." Bankarchiv, Zeitschrift fur das Gesamte Bank-und Borsenwesen . Vol 44. July, 1996. p.
439.
91 Gerhard Fink and Peter Haiss, "Finanzmarktreform in Osteuropa Teil 2: Erbschaft und
organisatorischer Aufbau," p. 438.
92 Dorothy M. Sobol, "Central and Eastern Europe: Financial Markets and Private Capital Flows."
93 Dorothy M. Sobol, "Central and Eastern Europe: Financial Markets and Private Capital Flows."
94 Dorothy M. Sobol, "Central and Eastern Europe: Financial Markets and Private Capital Flows.
95 Dorothy M. Sobol, "Central and Eastern Europe: Financial Markets and Private Capital Flows."
46
Table 9: International Equity Issues
by Selected Countries and Regions96
(USD millions)
1
.• ? A
V]
: :
.
'' '
'
1993 1994 1995 1996
Europe 186 641 570 283
Czech Republic - 10 32 _
Hungary 8 200 274 55
Poland - - 70 17
The primary problem facing Eastern European stock markets has been achieving
a comfortable level of transparency. The challenges vary. While Poland has effective
regulations governing broker conduct, corporate insider trading and company
reporting, the rules in Prague are ineffective, and unreported dealing is rampant. The
Budapest market transparency is comparable to Poland.97 Improvements in
transparency of Eastern European markets are attributed primarily to financial media
and investment analysts with Nomura and Daiwa of Japan credited with the leadership.
Table 10: Value of New Equity Issues
198
1992 1993 1994 1995
Hungary 274.1 93.8 387.9 959.0
Poland 125.0 23.9 787.7 125.4
Additionally, the fact that the World Bank has included Central European
countries in emerging market indices has given a boost to Central European equity
markets. 99 These improvements'have helped attracting the attention of American and
other mutual funds, allowing for accelerated investment in the future. While there was
no net growth in portfolio investment in 1995, Daiwa Europe anticipates $400m in 1996,
and in excess of $1.25 billion in 1997! 00
96 International Monetary Fund, International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects, and Key
Policy Issues, Washington: IMF, September, 1996. p. 101. Original source: IMF staff estimates
based on Euromoney Bondware .
97
"Central Europe's stockmarkets. No Bears In Sight." The Economist, September 28, 1996.
98 Includes only new issues in exchange for cash. International Monetary Fund, International
Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects, and Key Policy Issues, p. 95.
99 Dorothy M. Sobol, "Central and Eastern Europe: Financial Markets and Private Capital Flows."
100
"Central Europe's Stockmarkets. No Bears In Sight." The Economist .
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Table 11: International Bond Issues
by CurrencyoflDenomination (in USD millions!™*
1VB8 1994 mill19%,
or
U.S* dollar 1,155 1,155 1,155 75
Deutsche mark 3,301 425 896 347
Japanese yen 4,314 1,562 4,018 95
Other 887 441 514 _
Table 12: International Bond
Issues in USD millions102
1993 1994 1995
Europe1113 | 9,658 3,543 6,583
Czech Republic 694 400 -
Hungary | 4,801 1,729 3,311
Poland | - 250
The second problem facing Eastern European stock markets is liquidity. Eastern
European stock markets are relatively tiny blips by world standards. Although Prague
lists the greatest number of stocks (approx. 1,600), it is a distant third in terms of trading
volumes compared to Poland which is most active, and Budapest which has an active
market in the most popular stocks. 104 Further listings of companies through
privatizations should help improve liquidity in the near future. A large boost in
liquidity will happen if Central European pension and social-security system are
reformed, because huge amounts of local savings can then become available through
pension and mutual funds. 105
At this point, securities markets are in their first stages, but are developing due
to internal and foreign investment pressures.
101 Includes Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Russia, Slovak
Republic, and Turkey. Source International Monetary Fund, International CapPa! Markets:
Developments, Prospects, and Key Policy Issues, p. 95. Original source: IMF staff estimates based
on Euromoney Bondware.
102 Including note isssues under European medium-term notes (EMTN) programs. Source
International Monetary Fund, International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects, and Key
Policy Issues, p. 93. Original source: IMF staff estimates based on Euromoney Bondware.
103 Includes Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Russia, Slovak
Republic, and Turkey. Much of the additional European developing markets bond activity
originate in Turkey.
104
"Central Europe's stockmarkets. No Bears In Sight." The Economist .
105
"Central Europe's stockmarkets. No Bears In Sight." The Economist .
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c. Commercial Bank Lending
Banks lent to the region throughout the 1980's and the 1990's, hut bank financing
became very thin shortly after the 1989 revolution. The most dramatic example was
Poland, where new lending net of amortization (net loans-repayments on loans +
interest) plunged from $2.1 billion in 1990 to -$900 million in 1993. io6
Table 13: Credit Ratings at Tune 1996:107
This trend changed in the mid-1990's when for example, the Czech Republic's
private foreign borrowing rose by $1.7 billion. Most of these were short-term credits
taken because of they were cheaper than offers by domestic banks. 108 Investment in
1994 collapsed due to the collapse in international bond markets and Poland's
agreement to write off a portion of its bank debt with commercial bank creditors. 109
Both the Czech Republic and Hungary adopted prudential regulations and
appropriate supervisory framework to qualify for membership in the European Union,
although some former state banks have been having difficulties in the area of capital
adequacy. 110
Having provided an overview of FDI, portfolio investment, and bank lending in
Central Europe, I will now provide detailed information on capital flows in the Czech
Republic, Poland, and Hungary, especially focusing on FDI and portfolio investment.
106 Dorothy M. Sobol, "Central and Eastern Europe: Financial Markets and Private Capital Flows.
107 Creditanstalt/'Credit Ratings," Central European Quarterly, 11/96, p. 6. Moody's and S&P are
sovereign long term rates. Institutional Investor is on a scare of 0-100, where 100 is the best.
108 Dorothy M. Sobol, "Central and Eastern Europe: Financial Markets and Private Capital Flows.
109 Dorothy M. Sobol, "Central and Eastern Europe: Financial Markets and Private Capital Flows.
110 International Monetary Fund, International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects, and
Key Policy Issues, p. 42.
Czech Republic
Hungary
Poland
Baal A
Bal BB+
Baa3 BB
60.1
43.6
40.2
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1. Financial Flows
A. Czech Republic
In terms of total capital flows, Germany has clearly been the dominant investor
in the Czech Republic, largely due to its almost $1 billion acquisition of Skoda
Automobilova by Volkswagen. Figure 6 shows the distribution of total foreign
investment by nationality.
a. Foreign Direct Investment
Figure 6: Foreign Investment in the Czech Republic111
The largest investor to date in the Czech Republic has been Germany, followed
by the Netherlands and the United States. Since 1989, FDI in the Czech Republic has
totaled $6.7 billion. 112 In terms of recent investment, the biggest investor in the Czech
Republic was the Netherlands, with 25.9% of the total, followed by the USA with 23.9%
and Germany with 20.3%. In the first nine months of 1996, 30.2% of FDI was directed
toward the chemicals industry. The second largest destination of capital was the
transportation and communication industries, drawing 18.9% of all FDI, according to
111 IMF, World Bank.
112
"Czech Direct Foreign Investment Totals $972.4 Million in Nine Months." Bloomberg News
Wire, November 21, 1996.
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the Czech central bank spokesman.™ But overall, Germany is clearly the largest
investor in the country. The drop in FDI in 1993 was a result of uncertainty regarding
the breakup of Czechoslovakia. By 1995, FDI flows had recovered, such that 40% of the
$6 billion in FDI the Czech Republic had gathered from 1990-1995 occurred in 1 995.111
The Czech Republic does not offer tax incentives, as Poland and Hungary do . 1 '5
Table 14: Composition of Private Capital Flows to the Czech Republic
1990 1991 1992 1993: 1994 1995
Bank loam 995 -656
-652
-163 1,953 1,746
Net Foreign Direct Investment 187 586 1,073 564 762 2,525
International Equity Investment 0 0 0 0 10 32 Jun-95
International Bond Investment 375 277 129 697 396 0 Jun-95
Consumer
Trade: 443
8%
Engineering:
481
8%
Telecom:
1,414
24%
Goods: 843
15%
Transport:
1,064
19%
Food: 424
7%
Other: 1,066
19%
Figure 7: FDI by Sector, Czech Republic116
113
"Czech Direct Foreign Investment Totals $972.4 Million in Nine Months." Bloomberg News
Wire.
114 Dorothy M. Sobol, "Central and Eastern Europe: Financial Markets and Private Capital Flows.
115 Dorothy M. Sobol, "Central and Eastern Europe: Financial Markets and Private Capital Flows.
116 Dorothy M. Sobol, "Central and Eastern Europe: Financial Markets and Private Capital
Flows." As discussed in the theory section on FDI, there are some discrepancies. The
Economist breaks FDI down slightly differently for the same period. Since no information on
methodology is available, I can make no claim to the superiority of either set of data. The
Economist reports FDI as follows: transport/ telecom, 24.4%; automotive, 18.4%; consumer
goods/ tobacco, 14.5%; construction, 8.3%; banks/ insurance, 7.6%; food, 7.3%; trade, 5.7%;
others, 14.3%. Business Central Europe, April, 1995.
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In the Czech Republic, early FDI was primarily in transport, beverages, and
construction. German and Austrian mvestment was important early, with larger
American investment coming only later. The breakdown of FDI by industry in the
Czech Republic is shown in figure 7 as follows:
FDI has been related to the country's privatization program. The privatization
program was a direct auction in which Czech citizens could bid in the first round, and
foreigners could bid in the second round if there were no Czech takers. This restricted access
strongly and slowed FDI at the beginning of the transition. Because Czech industry was less
competitive than that of Poland, the former GDR or Hungary, the privatization had to be
executed differently. U7 Privatization had three stages:
^ privatization : This included smaller businesses, shops, and services which
were sold. In less than three years, the state had managed to sell 90% of the state-
owned small businesses, usually through an auction process. Citizens were often
able to buy these businesses at below market costs, because the government
wanted to divest their property quickly. 118
2) P^ect sale or joint venture with foreign firm: As a way to gain foreign exchange
and western know-how, the Czech Republic sold $1,863 million (CSK 53.7 billion)
of state-owned companies and assets from 1990-1993. In this privatization, the
top three investors were 1) Germany ($600.5 million or 32.2%), 2) the USA ($550.2
million or 29.5%) and 3) France ($256.6 million or 13.8%).u9
3) Voucher Privatization: To dispose of most of the rest of the state-held companies,
Vaclav Klaus and Tomas Jezek devised the "coupon” or "voucher" privatization
plan. In this scheme, each adult Czech or Slovak would receive coupons
nominally valued at $1,000 for $35 which could be used to purchase shares in
hundreds of different Czech and Slovak companies. In this sort of massive initial
U/ Hynek Jerabek, "Internationalization through Investment Partnership or Dependency of
Czechia: Two Case Studies of Transformation," Prague: Institute of Sociological Studies, Charles
University. April, 1995.
118 Hynek Jerabek, "Internationalization through Investment Partnership or Dependency of
Czechia: Two Case Studies of Transformation."
119 Hynek Jerabek, "Internationalization through Investment Partnership or Dependency of
Czechia: Two Case Studies of Transformation."
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public offering (IPO), more than 1,000 companies were sold at a nominal value of
$10 billion. 120
It was one of the quickest and most comprehensive privatization programs in the
region. FDI is directly related to the privatization process. As foreigners are given
access to this process, FDI increases.
Still three areas are not yet privatized: banking, utilities, and heavy
engineering. 121 This is because of the sensitivity of these sectors and the Czechs' fear of
being bought out by their West European neighbors. Banking is a key industry to any
economy. It is becoming privatized, but very slowly. Utilities were held back from the
privatization process because when privatized, utilities would charge world prices for
energy, drastically raising the currently subsidized rates. This would impact the
economy strongly and is therefore sensitive. Nevertheless, privatization in the energy
sector has begun, leading with oil companies. A consortium of Shell (Dutch-English),
Conoco, and Agip (Italian) took a 51% stake in two refineries for $173 million. 122 Heavy
engineering is sensitive because of the number of Czechs employed in it. The
metalworking industry is key, as it employs approximately 1 million, and accounts for
27% of the GDP. 123 Other than these key industries, privatization has largely been
completed, offering few easy opportunities for quick acquisitions by foreigners from the
government. The largest investments in the Czech Republic are listed in table 17:
120 Hynek Jerabek, “Internationalization through Investment Partnership or Dependency of
Czechia: Two Case Studies of Transformation."
121
"Investment Funds: Empire Builders" Central European Business, July, 1996. p. 46.
122 Dorothy M. Sobol, "Central and Eastern Europe: Financial Markets and Private Capital Flows."
123
"Investment Funds: Empire Builders" Central European Business, p. 46.
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Tablel5: Top Ten Investors in the Czech Republic,
Investor Country Target Commitment ii
USD min.
Telsource NL, CH SPT Telecom 1,423
Volkswagen D Skoda Auto 96'>
International Oil
Co.
NL, USA,
I
Unipetrol 615
Phillip Morris USA Tabak 500
Steyr / Daewoo A, K Avia 384
IFC Kaiser USA Nova Hut 231
Linde D Technoplyn 154
Energy Consortium USA Energeticke
Centrum Kladno
154
Pepsi Cola USA Greenfield
Investment
120
Glaverbel B Glavunion 115
as at Ql, 1996
telecoms
automotive
petroleum
tobacco
automotive
steel
industrial gases
energy
soft drinks
glass
To give some color to table 16 above, I would like to explain the fairly typical
process by which a large investment by a multinational affects the economy by
explaining briefly Volkswagen's acquisition experience with Skoda Automobilovy.
Skoda is an interesting case study, since it represents the largest single German
investment in the Czech Republic. In 1990, Skoda had 20,000 workers and a deficit of
CSK 3.6-3.7 billion ($150 million) with no hopes of profitability in sight. Skoda clearly
needed a partner who would bring it back to profitability by injecting capital and
bringing western technology, management, and marketing skills. Price Waterhouse
Privatization Services had been hired to locate an appropriate partner. Since
Volkswagen acquired Skoda, the supplier chain has changed from being 35% German to
71% German-owned. It has introduced "just-in-time" manufacturing, which requires a
high level of cooperation with the supplying firms to Skoda. This forces suppliers, not
owned by Volkswagen, to adopt management policies that will support this
coordination. To do this, many suppliers have looked to international joint-venture
partners or have become acquired by global automotive suppliers. This way, they can
effectively compete for VW- Skoda contracts. Thus, the already large investment had
ripple effects throughout the manufacturing sector and ultimately the entire economy to
bring it up to world manufacturing standards.
It is interesting to note that while there is no doubt that Germany is the lead
investor in the country, it has only two of the top ten investments. This is because a
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large portion of Germany's investment comes from smaller privately-held companies,
such as Skoda's suppliers.
b. Portfolio Investment
Portfolio investment in the Czech Republic is a very recent event. The Prague
Stock exchange never took off for foreign investors like the Warsaw or Budapest
exchanges, largely due to lack of transparency. Because of awkward and time-
consuming procedures for trading, foreign investors prefer to do Czech stock
transactions through Vienna or Munich
.
124 This is because all trades have to be
registered with the finance ministry, but the ministry does not have the capacity to
handle large volumes . 125
Foreign portfolio investment activity has been in bonds. The biggest buyers of
Czech Eurobonds are Germans and Austrians, who, in the words of Jan Pudil, CEO of
WoodCommerz (a joint venture of Wood & Co. brokerage and Commerzbank) said that
"the Germans and the Austrians consider the Czech Republic a Central European
neighbor with a stable political and economic situation with transparency in
investment, and not a risky East European investment zone ." 126
As yet, foreign investors have been a comparatively small part of the
development of capital markets in the Czech Republic. This may change if stronger
regulations on capital markets are actually effectively implemented.
c. Bank Loans
Due to the strong economic growth and the low aggregate debt levels, the Czech
Republic has earned an investment grade credit rating from Moody's (Baal) and
Standard & Poors (A). Commercial bank claims on the Czech Republic are not reported
by the IMF's Financial Flows and the Developing World statistical publication. Aggregate
124 Silvia M. Cambie, "Prager Borse vor neuer Belastung," Die Bank, 1/1995, pp. 54-55.
125 Silvia M. Cambie, "Prager Borse vor neuer Belastung," pp. 54-55.
126 Silvia M. Cambie, "Grofies Kaufinteresse bei den deutschen Anlegern." Handelsblatt, 9
October 1996, p. B8. "Die Deutschen und die Osterreicher empfinden Tsechien nicht mehr als ein
risikoreiches osteuropaisches Investitionsgebiet, sondern als ein mitteleuropaisches Nachbarland
mit einer stabilen politischen Lage und durchschaubaren Anlagebedingungen."
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information on debt stocks is available through national accounts information as
follows:
Table 16: Debt Stocks Ex-Czechoslovakia U.S. $ millions
Long-term debt
B
I. OECD countries &
capital markets 2,400 3,398 3,936 4,164 4,389 5,094 8,193 8,859 6,111 6,014 6,899
Official/supported 929 1,105 1,487 1,621 1,505 1,439 2,344 2,059 2,108 1,919 1,934
Financial markets 1,471 2,296 2,448 2,544 3,184 3,655 5,850 6,801 4,003 4,105 4,965
Banks 1,471 2,293 2,448 2,544 3,044 3,455 5,374 6,045 3,255 2,751 2,726
Bonds - - - - 140 200 476 756 748 1,354 2,239
II. Multilateral - - 263 268 268 268 2,030 2,587 1,984 2,088
III. Non-OECD
Creditor countries 2 - - - 13 43 47 16 21 30 24
CEEC's127 - -
-
-
-
- 6 9 6
Other countries
and unspecified 2 - - - 13 43 47 16 14 21 18
Sub-total:
Long-term debt 2,402 3,398 3,936 4,428 4,971 5,406 8,508 10,915 8,719 8,028 9,011
Short-term debt
Banks 556 707 1,309 2,039 1,948 2,263 1,727 1,244 984 1,119 3,011
Export credits 94 200 159 160 109 131 184 155 212 189 221
Sub-total:
Short-term debt 650 907 1,467 2,199 2,057 2,393 1,910 1,399 1,106 1,308 3,232
Total identified debt 3,052 4.305 5.403 6,627 7,027 7,799 10.419 1 2.304 9,825 9,336 12.106
To sum up the character of foreign financial flows as publicly available into the
Czech Republic, although flows are somewhat diversified, Germany is the largest
contributor of funds and the European Union constitutes an absolute majority in terms
of investment. This supports the regionalization of financial flows hypothesis.
2. Business practices
Having provided a brief overview of financial flows in the Czech Republic, I will
now enter a discussion on business practices. The investigation to determine whether
there is a tendency toward a shareholder or a stakeholder value model will be based on
127 Central and Eastern European Countries.
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the three major criteria laid out in the methodology: the economy, firms, and the
banking system.
a. The Economy
The transition to a market economy is largely completed in the Czech Republic
and the economy is doing very well. On 21 December 1995, the Czech Republic was the
first Central European country to be accepted into the OECD. 123 Unemployment runs at
2.9% and virtually zero for the city of Prague. 129 Fiscal policy has been managed
prudently m past years, with a budget surplus since 1993. Inflation is relatively low (8%
at December 31, 1995). The economy has become "internationalized." Proof of this are
the facts that exports account for 40% of GDP, mostly in trade with the European Union,
and capital inflows totaled more than 10% of GDP in 1995, a striking amount by any
measure. 130
After the revolution the ruling coalition, the Civic Forum, made a commitment
to the transformation of the Czech political economy. They encouraged price
liberalization, low inflation, foreign investment, and technology transfer. 131 In order to
stabilize prices and ensure a lack of inflation, the Czech government pursued a tight
monetary and fiscal policy after the revolution. As a part of this, the Korun (Crown)
was devalued. At the same time, the government went into a massive privatization
program that transferred 70-80% of the economy into the private sector from 1990-1995.
132
The Prague Stock Exchange opened in April, 1993, later than Poland or
Hungary. 133 By the end of 1994, the Prague exchange had more than 1,000 companies
128 OECD. Press Release (95) 84. OECD Website . December 22, 1995.
129 The low unemployment rate in the Czech Republic, according to American central banker
Sobol, may be due to the lack of restructuring. This lack may be due to the conflict of interest
problems arising from ownership structures. Dorothy M. Sobol, "Central and Eastern Europe:
Financial Markets and Private Capital Flows."
130 OECD. Press Release (95) 84. OECD Website . December 22, 1995.
131 Hynek Jerabek, "Internationalization through Investment Partnership or Dependency of
Czechia: Two Case Studies of Transformation."
132 Hynek Jerabek, "Internationalization through Investment Partnership or Dependency of
Czechia: Two Case Studies of Transformation."
133 Dorothy M. Sobol, "Central and Eastern Europe: Financial Markets and Private Capital Flows."
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With a capitalization of $14 billion making it by far the largest stock exchange in Central
Europe. 134 Capital market development was directly related to privatization.
Privatization was very quick; now the value of shares in private companies is
comparable or higher than that in many countries!3* 1,500 companies were privatized
by being put on capital markets through initial public offerings. 138 The consequence of
the coupon privatization is that holdings have been consolidated in larger investment
funds, which are able to offer larger packets to outside investors. 137 The other
consequence is that there is a lack of smaller private investors in the Czech equity
market, because the funds have been so successful!3* In the secondary markets, 75
percent of the adult population became investors directly or through funds!39
1994 1995
.
1
Number of Listed Companies
Market Capitalization
(USD millions)
% change
International Equity Issues
(USD millions)
Trading Value
(USD millions)
Turnover ratio
1,024 1,635
5,938 15,664
163.8
10 32
1,328 3,630
24.9
The Czech Republic has three stock markets, the Prague Stock Exchange, the
RM-system, and the RTP. The RMS electronic trading system in which people could
directly trade privatization vouchers on-line accounts for 5-6% of all transactions.
134 Gehard Pohl, Gregory T. Jedrzejczak, and Robert E. Anderson, Creating Capital Markets in
Central and Eastern Europe, World Bank Technical Paper No. 295. Washington: The World
Bank, 1995. p. 28.
135 Gehard Pohl, Gregory T. Jedrzejczak, and Robert E. Anderson, Creating Capital Markets in
Central and Eastern Europe, p. 27.
136 Gehard Pohl, Gregory T. Jedrzejczak, and Robert E. Anderson, Creating Capital Markets in
Central and Eastern Europe, p. 27.
137 Cambie, Silvia M. "Prager Borse vor neuer Belastung," pp. 54-55.
138 Cambie, Silvia M. "Prager Borse vor neuer Belastung," pp. 54-55.
139 Gehard Pohl, Gregory T. Jedrzejczak, and Robert E. Anderson, p. 27.
58
Additionally, trading takes place largely privately between private parties. Czech
authorities estimate this type of trading at two-thirds of all transactions and 50% in
value terms. At 1996, market capitalization was approximately 60% of GDP, similar to
market capitalizations in France or Austria. The market has grown quickly and if it
continues to grow through new issues and listings, it could resemble an "Anglo" type of
exchange. Currently, however, the Czech stock exchange does not fulfill the two major
functions of a stock exchange, namely an efficient place to raise capital and an
instrument for corporate governance. This is because it is young and developing.
Because of the youth of the market, foreigners have been hesitant to become involved.
The one large portfolio investment, valued at $237 million, had the purpose of changing
the structure of corporate governance. 140 The Czech money market, on the other hand,
appears to be quite developed.
In Czech capital markets, financial reporting standards are low, which provides
investors with inadequate information on companies, thus increasing uncertainty about
the companies. Further, the trading systems are not policed well. Trading occurs off or
on-market, largely between the investment funds. About 80% of trading is off-market
or conducted privately between two parties without disclosure.141 This interferes with
an efficient and open price-signaling mechanism that has made foreign investors wary
of investing in the country. Many foreign investors in the market were leaving or
preparing to leave because of the lack of regulation.
To address this issue, Vaclav Klaus, the Czech Prime Minister, announced that
the Czech authorities will introduce legislation that will improve capital market
regulation by:
1) publishing daily transactions and prices,
2) "transform[ing] the current Ministry of Finance capital market oversight
division into a new office for securities,"
140 OECD, OECD Survey of the Czech Republic . Paris: OECD, 1996. p. 63.
141 Gehard Pohl, Gregory T. Jedrzejczak, and Robert E. Anderson, Creating Capital Markets in
Central and Eastern Europe, p. 28.
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3) and the oversight division will step up control over investment funds and
dMs
P
ion "i^
and CO°Perate With^ Central bank ' s baking oversight
This has not yet been implemented but should take shape in early 1997. Still, the
opinion of foreigners is taking an up-turn. Larry Travers, Managing Director at
Ballmaier & Schultz in Prague said that “next year looks more promising as the
government begins getting serious about regulating the markets." 143 Nevertheless,
foreign participation in Czech equity markets has been less than that of Poland and
Hungary. The Czech market remained the laggard in the region for 1996. The PX50
index is now up about 18% in dollar terms for 1996, compared with very large gains in
Poland and Hungary. The stock market has great potential for development, if better
regulation and higher transparency is implemented in 1997. This would greatly reduce
insider trading that has been notorious in the Czech market and therefore attract more
capital from foreign sources. Foreign investment banks have already improved the level
of research available on companies, as in Hungary and Poland, adding to the quality of
information upon which financial markets depend. So while capital markets are not yet
developed, they appear to be on a major threshold, and if proper regulation is enforced,
show serious signs of moving toward a shareholder model. Presently, however, the
markets more resemble a stakeholder value system. This is largely attributable to the
needs of corporate governance during the transition, which will be discussed in the next
section.
b. Firms
My research has yielded conflicting information on the structure and operations
of firms in the Czech Republic, indicating tendencies toward both the stakeholder and
shareholder models. I will first present the argument in support of the shareholder
model.
142 Lucie Bradacova, "Czech Government to Step Up Capital Market Control, Klaus Says."
Prague: Bloomberg News, December 20, 1996, 10:28 am.
143
"Poland, Hungary See Rise: Eastern European Markets (Updatel)" Bloombere News, Warsaw:
Bloomberg News, December 13, 1996.
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During privatization, the majority of companies were converted to public limited
compames
(P lc.). The board of directors were composed of management and the
supervisory board, as well as initial membership by the National Property Fund. The
board of directors was granted the power to govern the concern. This stands in sharp
distinction to the German model in which the supervisory board has stronger control.
This difference makes the Czech system of corporate governance much more similar to
the American model than the German one. The reason for this is simple: according to
Czech law, one third of the supervisory board must be employees of the plc. If the
supervisory board were given control, employees could have a voice in corporate
governance. To avoid this and give clear control to management, the board of directors
was given the power of corporate governance. This structure was set up due to the
demands of the ultimate owners of Czech industry, investment funds (domestic and
foreign). So even though the legal structures of firms quite resemble German pic's due
to a historical legacy dating back before the first world war, the practical
implementation is quite different. Generally, employees have very little rights
compared to German (or Polish) employees. 144 This is strong supporting evidence for
the thesis of convergence to a shareholder value model. This research was done by Jiri
Havel, a Czech economist.
Further supporting evidence for a shareholder value system can be found in one
of the biggest foreign investments in the Czech Republic, SPT Telecoms. The Dutch and
Swiss consortium TelSource paid $1.45 billion for a 27% stake in SPT, the Czech
telecommunications company, and “despite a legal challenge from die-hard proponents
of the 'Czech way' of privatization, which would exclude foreign investors," seems to be
doing very well. 145 It needs technology, marketing and financial assistance from the
West and can give Telsource access to a new market. Though Telsource only has 27%, it
is more or less in control of SPT. The executive board has been changed to include a
Dutch vice-CEO, a Swiss finance director, and an American director for marketing and
144 Jiri Havel, “Changes in Governance Structure of Czech Enterprises: 1989-1995." Prague
Economic Papers, 2, 1996. pp. 131.
145
“Companies and Finance: Europe." Financial Times, September 3, 1996.
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trade. The chief of staff is British
.
1* The concern receives technical help and free-
competition know-how through side agreements with AT&T. 147 Through this
experience, the company is being (slowly) transformed into a firm with global standards
that will compete in the global telecoms marketplace.
The counter evidence in favor of a stakeholder model comes from an OECD
report on the progress of privatization in the Czech Republic. The report draws upon a
stud) b\ Coopers & Lybrand, a major accounting and business services firm. Coopers
& Lybrand agreed with Havel that the influence of trade unions and employees on
management as practically negligible." It went on, however, to note that management
incentives and shareholding structures were not in line with a shareholder value model.
The survey of joint stock companies shows that only 1 in 6 managing boards had
salaries linked to enterprise performance (The Czech Ministry of Trade, in a survey of
its own, reported a 1 in 3 ratio).
In terms of shareholder structures, state shareholdings in "privatized"
enterprises remain high, though the government plans to sell off non-strategic holdings
through open market transactions by the end of 1997. Managers did not report
interference by the state from their minority position holding. However, according to an
OECD survey of the Czech Republic, "if the Coopers & Lybrand survey can be taken as
reasonably representative, the 'Anglo-Saxon' model of corporate governance, in which
the threat of take-over causes management to take good care to maximize returns to
shareholders, has not been adopted." 148 Information on companies' performance is not
always reflected in share prices, indicating market inefficiency or strategic holding
strategies. A small number of banks and investment funds have come to control a large
portion of the Czech economy. Particularly, Motoinvest, backed by a large Czech bank,
and Stratton Investments/ Harvard Group, a Bahamas-based fund run by Michael
Dingman and Viktor Kozeny have come to play a dominating role in the market.
Funds, led by Harvard, have begun converting into holding companies, in order to be
146
"Companies and Finance: Europe." Financial Times, September 3, 1996.
147 Vincent Boland, "SPT seeks humility to cope with privatisation." Financial Times, September
3, 1996. p. 17.
148 OECD, OECD Survey of the Czech Republic, p. 73.
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able to control their investments even more firmly. Generally, as in the stakeholder
model, firms are more likely to finance their activities through debt to raise capital
instead of issumg equity. This is in part because current shareholders do not want to
dilute ownership control. Whether this trend develops into a Germanic cross-holding
system or is a vehicle to create value by forcing firms to restructure is still an open
question. 149 A parallel case of "shareholder activism" in which the institutional investor
intervenes in the operation and strategy of their investments will be discussed in the
Previ pension fund in Brazil in the Latin American section of this thesis.
It must be noted that though there are the requisite traits of a stakeholder system
with respect to debt financing, and long term concentrated shareholdings by banks, this
has not been the case in the financial services sector. In fact, a "corporate raider" culture
has developed among banks and investment firms in which banks or investment firms
have taken over undervalued portfolios or firms from each other. The most famous case
of this was Victor Kozeny's firm Motolnvest, which took over a fund run by the
country s largest bank, Komercni Banka. This threat of takeover from competitors
forces the banks and funds to manage their portfolios for maximum return. Thus,
indirectly, there is a somewhat of a shareholder value system of corporate governance,
at least among the financial services sector. Whether that may be felt in at the company
level remains to be investigated.
In sum, Czech firms could be interpreted to fit into either the shareholder or the
stakeholder system. Corporate governance and the competitive culture among banks
support a shareholder system, while bank and fund domination of the economy as well
as non-shareholder value remuneration plans favor a stakeholder value system. The
results are at this point inconclusive.
c. Banks
The Czech banking system is in a state of crisis. Like the German banking
system, the Czech banks are undergoing a strong consolidation and restructuring. 150 A
few important banks failed during 1996 and even the largest banks, such as Komercni
149
"Investment Funds: Empire Builders" Central European Business, July, 1996. p. 46.
150 Dorothy M. Sobol, "Central and Eastern Europe: Financial Markets and Private Capital Flows."
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Banka, are considered to be unhealthy.*1 Komercni Banka, along with Ceska
Sponteina, CSOSB and Investicni a Postovni Bank, control 68% of all loans and deposits
in the country. 152 Komercni knows that it is losing market share to foreign banks. From
1994 to 1995, the assets of foreign banks grew by 38.9% while large Czech banks shrunk
by 7.1%. In response, the bank hired foreign consultants in 1996 and has announced
restructuring to make it look more like an Anglo-American bank, complete with stock-
options and performance incentives for senior directors. So a gradual change is in
sight. 133 Komercm Banka has been characterized as a "bad German bank" by Business
Central Europe, the Economist publication specializing in the region. Even with rapid
growth since 1991, banking remains a relatively oligopolistic industry. 15*1
The Czech banking sector presently strongly resembles the German banking
sector. Banks provide universal services and take equity positions in industry. There
are cross-holdings. During the privatization program, citizens transferred their share
rights to a few large funds. Banks began to set up funds, and funds in turn began to buy
up the banks that set them up. Like in the "stakeholder" system, fund members often
sit on boards of companies in which they invest and in banks. 155 At this point, there is a
concentration of shares in a few banks, similar to the German universal banking system.
Furthermore, the government owned 27% of the banking system assets at the end of
1995. 156
A banker at ING, the large Dutch bank, complains that since many companies
have board members from Komercni Banka, the boards of these companies often refuse
to meet with ING, thus taking away value, by shutting out competition and potentially
losing innovative solutions. Instead, the companies with Komercni participation are
151 Disscussion with Peter Briggs, Director of Citicorp Global Relationship Banking for Eastern
Europe, at Citibank in Prague, August, 1996.
152
"Sponsored section: Czech Republic" in Institutional Investor, July, 1996. p. 6.
153
"Komercni Banka: German Wannabe" Central European Business
,
July, 1996. p. 46.
154 International Monetary Fund, International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects, and
Key Policy Issues, p. 118.
155 Gehard Pohl, Gregory T. Jedrzejczak, and Robert E. Anderson, Creating Capital Markets in
Central and Eastern Europe, p. 27.
156 International Monetary Fund, International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects, and
Key Policy Issues, p. 44.
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forced to take overpriced loans from Komercnr. Estimates put Komercni's poss.ble
direct and indirect participation in industry at 20%.
As far as tire banking system is concerned, the resemblance to the stakeholder
system is striking and the poor condition of the banks also stand out. It will be
interesting to see what happens after this crisis sorts itself out, though it would be hard
to imagine that the Czech Republic would not adopt a "stakeholder" oriented universal
bank structure.
So while corporate governance appears to be moving strongly toward a
shareholder value model, the capital markets are still too underdeveloped to make a
strong claim about the shareholder value model in the Czech Republic. This, combined
with a banking system in crisis and transition makes it difficult to say with confidence
whether the economy is moving toward a shareholder or stakeholder value model of
economic organization and has prompted one analyst to write that
"For all the Thatcherite rhetoric of Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, the
Czech economy and society have been restructured in a way that
resembles — even parodies -- Germany, not the US or UK. Leaving aside
generous welfare benefits - actually extended from those of pre-1989
Czechoslovakia — the central feature of the Czech economies is four big
banks and a few interlocking funds, which together dominate ownership
and management." 157
If the Czech government and market successfully implement stock market reforms,
which it will have to do if it wishes to remain competitive with the ever growing Polish
and Hungarian stock markets, the picture in the Czech Republic may dramatically
change in the direction of a shareholder value system.
157 Mark Almond, "Is Germany a Threat? Yes, But Not for the Reason You Think." Central
European Economic Review, October 1996, p. 6.
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1. Financial Flows
C. Poland
1990 1991 1992 199amuliill
Bank Loans
j
2,138 1,061 -882
-891
-4,929 324
Net Foreign Direct Investment 89 298 665 1,697 1,846 2,511
International Equity Investment 0 0 0 1 0 14 Jun-95
International Bond Investment 0 0 0 0 -624 250 Jun-95
a. Foreign Direct Investment
Bureaucratic issues relating to FDI has led to lower flows than might otherwise
be expected. In spite of this, flows have been accelerating dramatically in past years,
with $3.3 billion in fresh FDI reported in the first half of 1996. Poland is the only
country in Central Europe in which Germany plays a secondary investment role. With
25 ^ of total FDI, the United States is clearly the lead investor in the region, followed by
a wide mixture of European countries. A study commissioned by the Polish Agency for
Foreign Investment and undertaken by the Research Institute for Democracy and
Private Enterprise directly links 39% of Polish GDP growth from 1991 to 1995 to foreign
direct investment, placing it at the center of the Polish transformation. 158 The same
study notes the importance of foreign firms for transfer of Western business practices.
Over 605 foreign firms have training programs and around 80% of all training is for
Polish employees and management. 159
158
"Der EinfluG auslandischer Investitionen," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November 19,
1996, p. B4.
159
"Der EinfluG auslandischer Investitionen," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, p. B4.
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Other Industry:
$1,888
27%
Food Industry:
$1,358
19%
Financial: $1,279
18%
Trade: $364
5%
Telecom: $290
4%
Other: $380
5%
Construction:
$496
7%
Engineering:
$1,080
15%
Figure 8: Cumulative FDI in Poland, 1990 - 1995160
In terms of industry focus, electrical engineering, consumer goods, and the
financial sector have attracted the most investment. FDI in Poland by industry and
originating country are illustrated in figures 8 and 9.
As in the Czech Republic and Hungary, FDI is directly related to privatization.
Privatization has gone relatively slowly in Poland. Prior to 1995, privatization was
largely voluntary, and mostly small to medium sized companies. It was delayed in
large part because of political considerations in a shifting unstable series of
governments. Of 8,400 state-owned firms at August 1990, only 2,290 small to medium
sized firms and 135 had been privatized by December, 1994. 161 The privatization
strategy changed in mid-1995.
160 Dorothy M. Sobol, "Central and Eastern Europe: Financial Markets and Private Capital
Flows." Business Central Europe breaks out investment by industry slightly differently for the
same period. It is as follows: Food processing, 19.9%; Finance, 18.7%; Electro-machinery,
15.8%; Chemicals 7.8%; Construction 7.3%; Wood/paper 6.5%; Other, 24%. Business Central
Europe, April 1996.
161 Dorothy M. Sobol, "Central and Eastern Europe: Financial Markets and Private Capital Flows."
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United Australia Austria
Kingdom 4% 4% Other
Figure 9: Investment in Poland by Country of Origin at Dec. 31 1995162
The top investors in Poland at 1995 are detailed in table 17. It is interesting to
note that Germany does appear here at all. Part of the reason that the breakdown of
investment by country is more diversified in Poland is the size of the country.
Multinationals, particularly American and British multinationals that start investing in
the region for primarily the access to the Central European markets are attracted to
Poland's large size as compared with the Czech Republic or Hungary. This matches the
general trend of American and British firms to treat Central and Eastern Europe as a
single region, thus investing in key regions first. America and Britain have
proportionally larger shares of investment in the former Soviet Union than Germany for
this reason.
Although this is unconfirmed, strong ties with the large Polish diaspora
community in the United States might also be a contributing factor to the strong
American investment in Poland. From personal business experience in the region,
quite a number of American multinationals' Polish activities are partially staffed by
162 Business Central Europe, April, 1996.
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Polish-American former ex-patriots returning after having lived for quite some time in
North America.
b. Portfolio Investment
Table 19: Top 10 Investors in Poland
Investor Country Commitment in Sector
USD mio.
International Paper USA 293 paper
IFC - 277 various
Coca-Cola Amatil Australia
(USA)
275 soft drinks
EBRD - 264 various
Fiat I 260 automotive
PAEF USA 252 various
Thomson F 185 TV tubes
Pilkington UK 166 glass
ABB S/CH 161 engineering
ING NL 140 banking
Portfolio investment in Poland has been small because of the nature of the privatization
program discussed and because of Poland's external debt difficulties. Poland was able
to complete debt restructuring by 1994, allowing it access to international capital
markets. Still, bonds have not been extremely active.
The stock markets, however, are progressing rapidly. There are no statistics on
foreign holdings of equities in Central Europe. Estimates of foreign holdings in Poland
are 20% of market capitalization and 25% of turnover. 163 Warsaw stock exchange
opened in mid-1992. 164
Foreign investors in Eastern Europe prefer the Polish stock markets. Warsaw's
benchmark WIG Index is up 55.9% for 1996. "Next year, the region still will be very
successful, especially Poland again, and more and more important will be Russia," said
Gunther Mandl, investment adviser in Vienna for the $20 million Central Europe Stock
Fund. 165
163 Dorothy M. Sobol, "Central and Eastern Europe: Financial Markets and Private Capital Flows."
164 Dorothy M. Sobol, "Central and Eastern Europe: Financial Markets and Private Capital Flows."
165
"Poland, Hungary See Rise: Eastern European Markets (Updatel)" Bloomberg News .
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c. Bank Loans
Table 20: Poland’s Credit Ratings
at June 1996:166
pf v/ y-
7
*: '
"
$j }
Institutional
Moody's S&P Investor
Baa3 BB 40.2
In 1994, Poland wrote off half of the net present value of its sovereign debt and
afterwards was able to access foreign capital markets. The US and British commercial
banks have both around $1 billion in outstanding claims. France has approximately $1.3
billion m claims and German commercial banks, with by far the largest claim, had
approximately $2.2 billion in claims at the first quarter of 1996467 Banks have been
retrieving funding and have only recently begun issuing new loans, as illustrated in the
table below.
166 Creditanstalt/'Credit Ratings," Central European Quarterly, 11/96, p. 6. Moody's and S&P are
sovereign long term rates. Institutional Investor is on a scare of 0-100, where 100 is the best.
167
"Statistical Appendix: Commercial Bank Claims on Developing Countries, by Country of
Origin," Financial Flows and the Developing World, August, 1996. pp. 30-33.
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Table 21: Polish Debt Stocks in U.S. $ millions
Long-term
1991 1992 im 1994
L OECD countries
& capital markets
ODA
Officiayoff.
supported
Financial
markets
7,061
9,690
13,363
5,854
12,446
7,289
68
13,872
8,133
68
10,015
8,348
84
13,437
7,858
ZD
,
85 /
111
16,429
9,317
29,558
82
21,814
7,662
26,939
6,087
13,254
7,598
21,993
5,546
10,182
6,264
20,084
6,176
8,330
5,577
Banks
Bonds
9,557
133
5,741
113
7,204
85
8,071
63
8,293
55
7,858 9,317 7,662 7,598 6,264 5,577
II. Multilateral " - 924 749 496 1,032 1,731 1,988 2,155 3,298
III. Non-OECD
Creditor
countries
2,273 5,206 6,087 6,300 4,103 2,756 2,719 3,474 3,121 4,653 4,485
CEECs
Other countries
and
unspecified
2,273 2,300
2,906
2,500
3,587
2,500
3,800
2,631
1,470
1,355
1,399
1,350
1,369
1,272
2,201
730
2,391
736
3,918
602
3,884
Sub-total: Long-
term debt
19,023 24,422 25,822 29,297 23,282 24,627 29,608 34,763 32,047 28,801 27,867
Short-term
Banks
Export credits
1,427
2,951
1,325
2,769
1,707
3,611
1,906
7,393
800
10,518
2,096
10,891
2,900
11,647
3,442
11,206
3,729
4,605
3,595
4,884
1,453
6,535
sub-total: Short-
term debt
4,378 4,094 5,317 9,300 11,318 12,988 14,548 14,648 8,634 8,479 7,989
Total 23.402 28.516 31.139 38.597 34.600 37.615 44.156 49.411 40.681 37.281 35.856
identified debt
Commercial bank claims on Poland are fairly evenly distributed by country of
origin. France averaged roughly $1.3 billion, Germany $2 billion, the U.S. $1 billion and
the UK $1 billion in claims while Netherlands had around $500 million and Switzerland
$200 million in claims on average during 1991-1995.
Based on information available on FDI, portfolio investment, and commercial
bank lending, there is a fairly wide distribution of sources of foreign capital. Though
Germany is strong in lending, it is comparatively weaker in FDI. Poland is a possible
exception to the regionalization of financial flows in Central Europe.
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2. Business Practices
Poland is larger in terms of population and territory than the Czech Republic
Slovakia, and Hungary combined. Since by these measures, it counts as virtually half of
the Visegrad countries, it will play an especially prominent role in determining which is
model is being accepted in the region.
a. The Economy
Economic integration into the OECD has proceeded rapidly. Inflation has been
stabilized at 20% annually and will continue to sink as the government adopted a
macroeconomic stabilization policy. Poland completed its foreign debt restructuring in
1994. Since that time, FDI has increased dramatically and Poland has renewed access to
international bond markets. Poland is now a member of the OECD. Here are some
basic economic data on the country:
Tablej2: Poland: Selected macroeconomic indicators168
GDP {$ billion)
GDP per capita in $ at market exchange rate
GDP growth
Consumer price inflation
84 86 93 118
2,199 2,236 2,402 3,057
2.6% 3.8% 5.2% 7.0%
44.3% 37.6% 29.5% 21.6%
Though the Polish stock market is among the most active in Central Europe, the
authors of a World Bank report on capital markets developments claim that a
combination of slow privatization and overly ambitious disclosure and fiduciary
standards keep the Polish stock market smaller than it could be. 169 This is because the
monthly reporting requirement is more rigorous then, for example the quarterly
reporting requirements on the New York Stock Exchange. As a portion of the total
economy, Poland's stock market is still quite small. This is set to change in early 1997,
though. The fifteen national investment funds are scheduled to be traded on the
Warsaw Stock Exchange, effectively indirectly privatizing one quarter of Polish industry
168
“Poland." OECD Website . SG/COM/NEWS(96)69, 1996.
lf,q Gehard Pohl, Gregory T. Jedrzejczak, and Robert E. Anderson, Creating Capital Markets in
Central and Eastern Europe, p. 29.
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m one move and increasing the stock market capitalization by that amount..™ The
Warsaw stock exchange is the most active and liquid in Central Europe. Although it is
smaller than that of Prague, it will grow quickly and increase liquidity through the
listing of the NIF's. This push could attract a great deal of foreign portfolio investment
m the near future. Further, Deputy Finance Minister of Poland, Krysztof Kalicki,
announced an easing of restrictions on portfolio investment in Poland to come into
effect on January 1, 1997. This will allow Poles to purchase foreign real estate and stocks
and would allow fore.gners to repatriate capital more easily,.?. This will stimulate the
growth of foreign portfolio investment. Though the market is small compared to the
size of the economy, the growth of the market, its transparency and the use of Anglo
investment banks to manage state assets all point toward an acceptance of a shareholder
model.
Table 23: Warsaw Stock Exchange
mm m IH vm 1993 1994 lliiil
Number of Listed Companies 9 16 22 44 65
Market Capitalization
(USD millions)
144 222 2,706 3,057 4,564
Value ofNew Equity Issues 125.0 23.9 787.7 125.4
International Equity Issues - -
_ 70
Trading Value (USD millions) 28 167 2,170 5,134 2,770
Turnover ratio 89.7 129.1 176.7 71.5
Local Index
'Change in index {%) 13.2% 1,095.3% -39.9% 1.5%
b. Firms
Though in terms of legal structure, Polish firms resemble German firms, my
research indicates a shareholder-value oriented focus. Poland virtually copied Weimar
Germany s legislation on commercial activity in the 1930 , s. 172 Nevertheless, employees
10 Gehard Pohl, Gregory T. Jedrzejczak, and Robert E. Anderson, Creating Capital Markets in
Central and Eastern Europe, p. 29.
17
1
"Poland to Ease Capital Flows", Financial Times, March 28, 1996.
172 Daniel Michaels, "Strange Bedfellows, the Polish State is an Unpredictable Shareholder."
Central European Economic Review
. October, 1996. p. 17.
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and workers do not actively participate in shareholder assemblies, often selimg off their
stakes, since they have little chance of influencing management. Though workers do
play a role, firms are able to fire employees and liquidate unprofitable operations
The State Treasury has influence in corporate governance insofar as it steps in to enforce
privatization agreements (mostly mvestment and employment commitments). A Polish
government study found that among listed companies on the Warsaw Stock Exchange,
half of the organizational changes reported include the creation of profit centers,
allowing for effective measurement of economic value added to the firm, a method
increasingly in use to help measure and therefore create shareholder value. Further,
half of all companies surveyed increased its capital by issuing new shares, indicating
that the stock market does appropriately function as a means to raise capital.™ Further,
most management board members were remunerated according to company profits.
Share, profit and bonus incentives were used more frequently than higher wages as a
reward for performance.™ When firms file bankruptcy, the Enterprise and Bank
Restructuring Programme allows them to involve creditors to convert debt into
equity. 1 ' 6 These factors indicate a growing acceptance of a shareholder value model,
though it must be noted that during privatization, numerous strong conditions
regarding minimum employment and wage levels, as well as other social commitments
were quite often part of the agreements.
c. Banks
Fifteen National Investment Funds (NIF's) were set up to manage portfolios of
state companies. The NIF's are 85% owned by adult Poles and are partially managed by
foreigners. 1 " The actual privatization was a bit complicated. The mass-privatization
173 Ronald W. Anderson, Erik Bergloef, and Kalman Mizsei, Banking Sector Development in
Central and Eastern Europe, New York and Warsaw: Institute for EastWest Studies, 1996. p.19.
1/4 Marek Mazur, "Assessment of the Situation of Privatized Enterprises and Banks in Poland," in
Trends and Policies in Privatization. Vol III. No. 1. October, 1996. Washington: OECD, 1996. pp.
102-103.
175 Marek Mazur, "Assessment of the Situation of Privatized Enterprises and Banks in Poland," p.
107.
176 Ronald W. Anderson, Erik Bergloef, and Kalman Mizsei, Banking Sector Development in
Central and Eastern Europe, p. 22.
177 Dorothy M. Sobol, "Central and Eastern Europe: Financial Markets and Private Capital Flows."
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program in Poland transferred equity in 444 state-owned companies to 15 closed-end
investment funds, which will be managed for 10 years by local and foreign managers™
State-owned companies are transformed into companies owned by the State Treasury
The State Treasury then brings 60% of the shares of these companies into the NIF's and
issues share certificates to adult Poles. 15% of the shares go to employees. NIF
companies are owned by the following parties: the leading NIF claims 33%, the
remaining 14 NIF's divide a 27% stake, the State Treasury has 25%, and employees are
given 15%. NIF's sign agreements with management firms which allow NIF's to better
1) access international capital markets, 2) introduce modern management techniques,
and 3) develop marketing strategy. 179 Management is listed in table 29. The number of
foreign "Anglo" banks participating is striking, including Barclays de Zoete Wedd,
Charterhouse Development Capital, Chase Manhattan Bank, Kleinwort Benson, Lazard
Freres, Murray Johnstone, New England Investment Companies, and Paine Webber.
NIF s selected the companies they wanted to manage based on a lottery system. The
NIF's then were effectively transformed into something similar to holding companies
and were listed in a special category on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) in July, 1996.
The funds will be individually listed as stocks on the WSE in 1997380 Like the coupon
privatization program in Czechoslovakia, the Polish program allowed a quick sale of
state assets in a capital poor country without surrendering control to foreign
companies. 181 The creative twist was that although the companies are still owned by the
government, they are managed by western investment bankers who are given
straightforward profit incentives. Thus although privatization has not kept pace with
Hungary or the Czech Republic, Poland s strategy is to bring Anglo investment banking
practices into the market through the NIF's, helping to shape future business practices.
178
"FDI and Privatization." Developing Countries and Financial Flows, May, 1995. p. 15.
179
"Mass Privatization Program in Poland," Citibank internal presentation, 1995.
180 Dorothy M. Sobol, "Central and Eastern Europe: Financial Markets and Private Capital Flows."
181 Dorothy M. Sobol, "Central and Eastern Europe: Financial Markets and Private Capital Flows."
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182
LI l li lll Management Firm Participants {% Ownership)
GiroCredit Management Sp. zo. o
Hevehus Management Sp. zo. o.
Bank Rozwoju EksportuSA{51%)
GiroCredit Mergers & Acquisition, Inc (49%)
UNP International Holding Ltd. (65%)
Bank Gdanski SA (25%)
Murray Johnstone (Poland) Ltd H 0%)
Trinity Management Sp. zo. o.
Konsorcjum Raiffeisen Atkins
.
-Zarz'dzanie Funduszami SA
—Barclays de Zoete Weaq international Holdings
Raiffeisen Investment AG (26%)
Raiffeisen Centrobank SA (25%)
WS Atkins Limited (25%) Idea Sp. zo. o. (9.5%)
WIL Consulting House Ltd. Sp. zo. o. (9.5%)
Adin Sp. zo. o. (5%]^
1 olskieTowarzystwo
Prywatyzacyjne - Kleinwort
Benson Sp. zo. o.
BV (Sr^f
BenS°n Investment Management Overseas
Polska Gru pa Zarz’dzania FunduszamiSp zo o
(49%)
' •
Chase Gemina Polska Chase Gemma Italia (60%)
VVielkopolski Bank Kredvtowv SA 14%)
LG Fund Management Co. AG CIGG Capital Corporation (33.3%)
Lazard Freres et Cie. (33.3%)
Bank Gospodarstwa Krajoweeo 133 3%)
KP Konsorcjum Sp. zo. o. KP International Ltd. (60%)
Bank Handlowy w Warszawie SA (20%)
Paine Webber (20%)
Fidea Management Sp. zo. o. Banque Arjil (60%)
Agencja Rozwoju Przemysu SA (18%)
Warszawska Grupa Konsultingowa Sp. zo. o. (18%)
Bank Inicjatyw Spoeczno-Ekonomicznvch SA (4 %)KNK New England Investment
Companies Sp. zo. o.
New England Investment Companies L.P. (50%)
KNK Finance & Investment Sp. zo. o 150%)
Pallas Stem-PBI Eurofund
Management Polska Sp. zo. o.
Pallas Stern International BV (80%)
Yamaichi Regent Special Projects
Limited
Yamaichi International (Europe) Ltd. (54%)
Regent Pacific Group Limited (36%)
Consulting ABC Sp. zo. o. (10%)
International Westfund Holdings
Limited
Bank Zachodni SA (33 2/3%)
Central Europe Trust Co. Limited (33%)
Charterhouse Development Capital Ltd. (22 2/9%)
Credit Commercial de France (111 /9%
Creditanstalt SCG Investment
Fund Management SA
Creditanstalt Investment Bank AG (40%)
Creditanstalt Financial Advisors (10%)
SCG St. Gallen Investment Holding AG (50%)
1K:
"Mass Privatization Program in Poland," Citibank internal presentation, 1995.
76
On the whole, Poland appears to be on its way toward a shareholder value
model of economic organization, though not an unrelated laissez-faire version The
blossoming of the stock market and new reforms and policy set for the beginning of
1997 will stimulate this pattern as foreign investors enter the market even more
vigorously and bring with them investment practices and know-how. Financing is done
through capital markets and there is comparatively high transparency. In terms of FDI
America along with other Anglo countries such as the UK and Australia are playing a
_
large role. Companies from these countries often choose to locate here because of the
market size, relative stability and as a launch-pad to the rest of Central Europe. From
the FDI point of view, Poland is moving toward a shareholder value model. In terms of
bank debt, forced debt restructuring also put Poland on a track toward the shareholder
value model. Although still undergoing an uncertain transition process, this country
appears to be moving more toward the shareholder value model than the stakeholder
model, albeit slowly.
1. Financial Flows
D. Hungary
Table 25: Composition of Private Capital Flows to Hungary
1990 1991 1992 1993 ^994 ^995
Bank Loans iw
-vm -lm t.m 411
Net Foreign Direct investment 334 1/162 1,479 2339 xmi iiih
International Equity Investment m m ' 3> 17 214 IWi~95
International Bond Investment m 1.186 1,242 4
,
7% 11111
a. Foreign Direct Investment
Hungary has attracted by far the largest amount of FDI on a per capita basis,
double the FDI per capita of its closest Central European competitor for FDI, the Czech
Republic. Hungary's FDI per capita from 1989 to 1995 is $1,113 as opposed to the Czech
Republic's $532. i® The EBRD estimates that $11.5 billion has flowed into Hungary,
181 Virginia Marsh and Kevin Done, "Financial Times Survey: Hungary, Price to Pay for a
Balanced Economy," Financial Times. December 16, 1996.
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making Hungary the location for one third of all FDI in Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union. Total FDI for the region from 1989 to 1995 is estimated at 30.2 billion*
Unlike the other two countries in this study, the Hungarian privatization
program was run on the basis of sales for cash. Additionally, generous tax incentives
were used to lure foreign capital. As in other transition economies, FDI was driven by
privatization. Hungary's method allowed for outright sale of companies to foreigners.
This helped the country raise necessary capital and ensure a quick transition to a market
economy. At 1995, the GDP was 60% private. It should be raised to 85% by 1996.w
In Hungary, manufacturing accounts for a major portion of FDI. FDI in the
automotive sector in Hungary exceeds $1 billion.™ The services sector has also been
booming, at one point reaching almost three out of four FDI projects in Hungary.
184 Virginia Marsh and Kevin Done, "Financial Times Survey: Hungary, Price to Pay for a
Balanced Economy."
185
"Horn will verlorene Zeit aufholen." Handelsblatt, December 11, 1995, p. 8.
186 Virginia Marsh and Kevin Done, "Financial Times Survey: Hungary, Target for Investment."
Financial Times, December 16, 1996.
78
Financial: $1,227
12%
Construction: $438
4%
Transport: $204
2%
Wholesale/Retail:
$1,347
13%
Hotel/Restaurant:
$351
3%
Other: $456
4%
Manufacturing: $6,165
61%
Agricultural: $90
1%
Figure 10: Cumulative FDI Flows into Hungary
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Large acquisitions were made by companies such as GE, Unilever, and Electrolux Ford
and GM opted to build greerdteld operadons. The sell-off was largely completed (with
a notable exception in the energy sector, which is slated for sale sometime in 1997) by
1993 with 30% privatization of the state telephone company, MATAV for $875 million.
This represents the second largest privatization behind SPT Telecom in the Czech
Republic. It also “skews" investment statistics as this single acquisition accounts for one
half of all FD1 in Hungary in 1993. Major investors in Hungary include the following
companies:
Table 26: Top 10 Investors in Hungary
Investor
MagyarCom
General Electric
Audi
General Motors
Suzuki
Douwe Egberts
Unilever
Alcoa
Pepsi-Cola
Aegon International
Country Target Commitment in Sector
USD min.
D, USA Matav 875 telecoms
USA Tungsram 600 lighting
D greenfield 530 automotive
USA greenfield 283 automotive
J greenfield 280 automotive
NL Compack 150 food
NL, UK greenfield 150 branded consumer
USA Kofem 146 aluminum
USA greenfield 135 soft drinks
NL AB-Aegon 134 insurance
An interesting case study of the impact of foreign direct investment on local economic
development is the Hungarian town of Szekefehervar. Videoton Holding the eastern
European electronics giant, was based in this town. It was destroyed by western
competition. The work force plunged from 20,000 to 4,000. This created a large pool of
unemployed high-tech workers. This highly skilled labor pool, coupled with the fact
that there was an abandoned Soviet air-base in town which could easily be converted
into production facilities, made Szekehervar a focal point for FDI, attracting over $1
billion to date. Companies such as Phillips, Ford Motor Co., Matsushitsa, Akai Electric,
and Aluminum Co. of America have all invested in this town 45 minutes south of
Budapest. The Wall Street Journal wrote that "the local phone book reads like a who's
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who of international manufacturers The success of the town has helped Videoton
get back into shape. Transfer of skills and capital has brought the company back to
profitability and increased the work force from 4,000 to 10,000 and made the town a
high-tech center for Central Europe. 188
A detailed listing of FDI stocks is provided by the OECD as follows:
Table 27: FDI Position at year-end
Hungary by Sector
in $U.S. millions
1992 1993 1994
i Primary 78 148 170
Agriculture 24 68 90
(Mining & Quarrying 53 80 80
Secondary WM. mm 3,583
Food, beverages & tobacco 654 964 1,192
Textiles, leather & clothing ' 125 149
Paper, printing & publishing 116 189 235
Chemical products 161 265 wm
[Coal & Petroleum products 85 45 56
Non-mefaliic products 174 237 300
[Metal products 117 202 231
Mechanical equipment 111 86 117 140
Electric & electronic
equipment
106 426 536
Motor vehicles !!!!!!liill 286
[Other transport equipment 28 39 43
Tertiary 1,516 2,782 3,637
Construction 147 233 354
Wholesale and retail trade m ! 793 1,032
Transport & storage 52 126 155
Finance, insurance &
business services
m iii 1,294
Communication 8 394 441
Other services •1 170 319 361
Unallocated 22 44 50
Total 3,383 5,814 Wm
18 Kimberley A. Strassel, "Technopolis East: Skills, land and tax breaks draw big names and big
investsments to a former Soviet base." Wall Street Journal Europe's Central European Economic
Review, Vol IV, Nr. 9, November 1996.
188 Kimberley A. Strassel, "Technopolis East: Skills, land and tax breaks draw big names and big
investsments to a former Soviet base."
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Table 28: FDI position at
year-end Hungary by source
| in US. § tttillion# nisi: mm WM
OECD area 3,130 5,570 7,073
Europe 2,539 4,086 5,794
|
EC 1,496 3,000 3,929
Belgium- 103 250 289
Luxembourg
Denmark io 15 43
France 171 276 387
Germany 627 1,654 1,660
Greece 3 9 6
i Ireland
r WWVAV.VAVW.VAV.V.V>:*X-111 9 •:
'
24
Italy 110 225 347
Netherlands f 300 328 828
Spain 1 5 10
United Kingdom mm 229 334
Other Europe 1,042 1,086 1,865
Austria 1 850 921 1,481
Finland 9 10 16
Sweden 36 40 82
Switzerland 147 114 286
i
North America 441 1,257 1,127
Canada 22 35 65
...
.USA •• lllil: 1,222. 1,062
Other OECD 151 227 154
countries
Australia; 1 H 77 13'
Japan 87 149 140
Non OECD area IHII 244. 364
Central and Eastern 189 112 174
Europe
Middle East 111 sm 2o.:
Israel 8 18 20
South and South- 38 liil iso :
East Asia
DAEs 35 22 29
Korea mill 35 22 |:29
Other countries 206 201 314
Total(I) I 5,814 7;489
b. Portfolio Investment
Brokers estimate that foreign investors account for two thirds of the equity
markets. This is changing as domestic investors become more educated and aware of
financial markets. Private pension plans grew to Forint 20 billion from zero three years
ago. Liquidity has been steadily improving as more companies have been listed and
new stock issues have come from companies such as Mol, the Hungarian stock
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company. Matav, the Hungarian telecoms company is scheduled to be brought on the
Budapest stock exchange with an initial public offering of a non-majority of shares
(majority is held by Deutsche Telekom and Ameritech) estimated at $500 million,
making it the largest offering ever in Eastern Europe. 1*1
According to analysts, the growth potential for foreigners in the Hungarian
equities markets is limited. Peter Mayer, Vice President at CS First Boston in London
for Eastern Europe equity sales said that “There's going to continue to be a lot of IPOs
in Poland and that will attract significant new money into that market. That is not the
case in Czech Republic or Hungary,".*. Arpad Pongracz, fund manager of the Vontobel
Eastern European Equity Fund, said prices in both the Polish and Hungarian markets
remain attractive, especially in comparison with Asian markets. Some investors said the
Hungarian market has become too expensive. Another fund manager has a different
opinion, "In the long term (we have) a positive outlook for Hungary," the manager
remarked. "For the short term, it's a little bit overvalued,".’. Eastern European markets
are trading at between 7.5 and 8.5 time estimated earnings for 1997, while many Asian
markets trade at twice that. Pongracz said he will continue to keep two-thirds of his
fund in Hungary and Poland. 192
In terms of bonds, Hungary has by far, been the biggest borrower in Central
Europe. Some estimates put 83% of all international bonds issued from 1989-1994 as
Hungarian. It has raised on average $1 billion per year with stunning $4.8 billion in
1993 to finance fiscal and current account deficits. 193 An austerity plan in March 1995 cut
government spending and devalued an overvalued currency, stimulating exports and
reassuring nervous foreign creditors. This was accompanied by significant
privatizations in the energy and banking sectors. Net foreign debt had fallen from $22
billion in June, 1995 to $13.2 billion in September 1996.
184 Virginia Marsh and Kevin Done, "Financial Times Survey: Hungary, Funds Await New
Flotations." Financial Times, December 16, 1996.
140
"Poland, Hungary See Rise: Eastern European Markets (Updatel)" Bloomberg News
.
191
"Poland, Hungary See Rise: Eastern European Markets (Updatel)" Bloomberg News .
192
"Poland, Hungary See Rise: Eastern European Markets (Updatel)" Bloomberg News .
193 Dorothy M. Sobol, "Central and Eastern Europe: Financial Markets and Private Capital Flows."
83
c. Bank Loans
Foreign commercial bank claims on Hungary are overwhelmingly German. At
the beginning of 1996, claims were at approximately $4 billion. Commercial bank claims
from other countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands,
France and Switzerland are all between $200 million and $500 million.™ A detailed
aggregate information on Hungary's debt position is as follows:
Table 29: Hungary: Debt Stocks
U.S. $ millions 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Long-term
I. OECD
countries &
Capital Markets
6,436 7,915 9,411 12,505 12,717 14,026 16,565 17,162 14,655 17,032 20,680
ODA - - - _
. 1
Official/off.
supported
797 1,164 18,851 1,721 1,392 1,146 1,257 1,585 1,736
z
1,837 2,078
Financial
markets
5,638 6,751 7,560 10,784 11,325 12,880 15,308 15,557 12,918 15,193 18,599
Banks 5,474 6,222 6,668 9,148 8,936 9,689 10,605 9,591 6,339 4,802 5,041
Bonds 164 538 892 1,636 2,389 3,191 4,703 5,986 6,578 10,391 13,558
II. Multilateral 1,127 1,132 1,686 2,043 2,313 2,298 2,885 4,596 4,430 4,450 4,606
III. Non-OECD - 2,450 3,606 3,298 639 122 157 136 121 116 111
Creditor
countries
CEEC's . 1,150 1,021 947 583
Other
countries
and
unspecified
1,300 2,585 2,351 30 102 137 126 212 116 111
Sub-total: 7,563 11,497 14,703 17,846 15,669 16,446 19,606 21,893 19,205 21,598 25,398
Long-term debt
Short-term
Banks
Export credits
1,938
176
2,442
538
2,449
240
2,556
185
2,396
146
2,149
175
1,593
167
1,257
158
1,108
201
1,090
189
1,618
188
Sub-total:
Short-term debt
2,114 2,980 2,689 2,741 2,542 2,324 1,760 1,415 1,309 1,279 1,806
Total 9.677 14.477 17.392 20.587 18,211 18.770 21 .366 23.309 20.514 22.877 27,204
identified debt
194
"Statistical Appendix: Commercial Bank Claims on Developing Countries, by Country of
Origin," pp. 30-33.
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Based on mformation available on FDI, portfolio investment, and commercial
lending, Germany appears to be the lead investor, thus supportmg the hypothesis of the
regionalization of capital flows.
2. Business Practices
a. Economy
Known as one of the most market-oriented economies before the transition,
Hungary has maintained the lead in attracting foreign capital and know-how to help
transform its economy. As a testament to its progress, Hungary was admitted to the
OECD in May, 1995.
Table 30: Budapest Stock Exchange195
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
” tH § , Ip: j
.
**
- : V- r.
1
.* r :rv |.V -* * 1
Number of Listed Companies 21 23 28 40 42
Market Capitalization 505 562 812 1,604 2,399
(USD millions)
% change 11.3% 44.5% 97.5% 49.6%
Trading Value (USD millions)
Turnover ratio
Local Index (BSE BUX)
Change in index (%)
117 38 99 270 355
6.3 14.2 21.6 17.3
6.4% 41.9% 19.6% 4%
Economic Data
Gross domestic product (US$) 30,888 35,448 36,084 39,308
The stock market is a key aspect in examining the move toward a shareholder
value model. The Budapest stock exchange opened in June, 1990. 196 By August, 1996,
there were 46 stocks listed on the Hungarian stock exchange, a small number in
comparison to the Prague or Warsaw exchanges. Market capitalization rose as a direct
195 Note: Hungary replaced the BSE Index with the BSE BUX Index (Jan. 2, 1992=1,000) in January
1995. This time series has been adjusted to reflect the new index. World Bank / International
Finance Corporation, Emerging Stock Markets Factbook, Washington: World Bank, 1996. p. 149
196 Dorothy M. Sobol, "Central and Eastern Europe: Financial Markets and Private Capital Flows."
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result of privatization: as privatizations proceeded, the capitalization rose. In October,
1995, the market capitalizations were $2.6 billion. By February, 1996 it had reached $3.3
billion and by May, 1996 it stood at $3.8 billion. At the same time, the market became
much more liquid. Still, liquidity is hampered by the number of companies on the
exchange. As a consequence of its privatization strategy of locating strategic foreign
investors, many of the best medium and large companies were purchased. This
indirectly retards the development of the stock market, as some of the best companies
are closely held or have been assimilated into multinational enterprises and will not be
listed. 197
Turnover quadrupled from 1995 to 1996 to average about $6 million a day. Still,
the market is small, even by Central European standards, and the turnover is minuscule
when compared to countries such as Germany, which turns over DM 5 billion per 24
hour day. 198 Nonetheless, the exchange is growing rapidly. Budapest's BUX Index has
climbed 117.6 percent in dollar terms this year and can be taken as a sign of developing
into a capital market along the lines of a shareholder value model. 199
The market has gained confidence due to steps taken by the government. In
1994, a fully-operational clearinghouse and share depository was put into place. This
has reduced settlement times, which provides more market transparency. With this
transparency, the market can be more easily regulated, thus generating confidence
among investors. Further steps have also been taken. In March 1995, an over-the-
counter (OTC) after hours trading market was opened, which is self-regulated by the
thirty three stock exchange members. Further, the government has allowed the
Budapest stock exchange to trade a limited number of derivatives. 200 In January, 1997 a
new act on stock market regulations will come into effect. This act represents a large
improvement on disclosure rules and insider trading and should make for a more
transparent system. The law could have included a takeover code as well, and the
197 Virginia Marsh and Kevin Done, "Financial Times Survey: Hungary, Funds Await New
Flotations."
198 Dorothy M. Sobol, "Central and Eastern Europe: Financial Markets and Private Capital Flows."
199
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exchange needs to improve its information technology, but on the whole has been
improving greatly. 201
The market has shown signs of accepting a shareholder value model, with
corporate takeovers as a way of enforcing profitability. For example, in December 1996,
the hotel company, Danubius, purchased an 85% stake in Hungaria Szallodak, another
hotel chain. 202 The recent flurry of corporate takeovers in the Hungarian market may be
a positive sign of rationalizing the economy, but at the same time is destroying the
liquidity and size of the Budapest Bourse by the de-listing of companies that have been
acquired. Mergers and acquisitions activities include a combination of domestic and
cross-border activities. Recent examples are the acquisition of the textiles company
Pannon-flax by a consortium of Hungarian investors, Globus, a food producer, taken
over by Nemet, a Hungarian investment house, and Pharmavit, the Phamaceutical
company, taken over by the UK's Bristol Meyers. 203 In addition to mergers and
acquisitions, share-buybacks, another common strategy in an Anglo model, are being
undertaken. For example, Tiszai Vegyi Kombinat Rt., Hungary's biggest chemical
maker, said it will buy 3 million of its own shares on Budapest's over-the-counter
market.204
The Socialist victory in the 1994 elections has caused some hesitation among
foreign investors. For example, the Hungarian government stopped the sale of a chain
of Hungarian hotels to an American company because the purchase price was too low
for the left wing of the government to accept, even though the contract had already been
signed by both buyer and seller.205 This cancellation behavior adds uncertainty to
foreign investors. Nevertheless, the willingness to privatize to foreigners in principle is
accepted by Socialists, and privatization did pick up in late 1995.
201 Virginia Marsh and Kevin Done, "Financial Times Survey: Hungary, Funds Await New
Flotations."
2°2
“Poland, Hungary See Rise: Eastern European Markets (Updatel)" Bloomberg News Warsaw:
Bloomberg News, December 13, 1996.
203 Sheryl Lee "Hungary's Corporate Takeovers: Stock Take." Business Central Europe, June,
1996. pp. 56-57.
204 Rodney Jefferson, "Hungary's TVK Buys 3 Million of its Own Shares on OTC Market."
Bloomberg News, Budapest: Bloomberg News, December 6, 1996.
205
"Horn will verlorene Zeit aufholen." Handelsblatt, December 11, 1995, p. 8.
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Overall, the development of capital markets could be interpreted as a sign
toward the adoption of a shareholder value model.
b. Firms
In Hungary, there are no restrictions to interfere with corporate governance by
investment funds, as there are in Poland and the Czech Republic. This is due to a
difference m busmess culture m which Hungarian managers are pleased to have a
group of strategic investors, according to ING Securities managing director, Lofti
Farbod. 206
Foreign companies play an essential role in export production, which helps keep
the national accounts stable. Mr. Andras Inotai estimates that “more than 70 percent of
the exports of manufactured goods from Hungary now come from partially or wholly
foreign-owned companies, which are both drawing the country into a European
production network and using it as a regional export base." 207 Moody's, an
international credit ratings agency noted that significant foreign presence in a
significant number of Hungarian enterprises, “technological and managerial
restructuring should occur faster than in other privatization variants and result in lower
comparative unit labor costs." 208
Foreign investment and the activities of western firms in Hungary are helping
Hungary to achieve world market standards. Investors in Hungary have an interest in
having Hungary join the EU, because it would provide them with tariff and other
benefits, in some ways comparable to trade benefits that foreign firms in Mexico receive
through NAFTA to access the U.S. market. The Hungarian government is aware of this
and hopes to channel the energy of foreign investors into helping Hungary join the EU.
Mr. Andras Inotai, the economist who heads the prime minister's task force on EU
integration, says that the presence of multinational companies in Hungary is of
206 Sheryl Lee "Hungary's Corporate Takeovers: Stock Take." Business Central Europe, June,
1996. pp. 56-57.
207 Virginia Marsh and Kevin Done, "Financial Times Survey: Hungary, Price to Pay for a
Balanced Economy."
208 Virginia Marsh and Kevin Done, "Financial Times Survey: Hungary, Price to Pay for a
Balanced Economy."
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enormous importance m Hungary's EU integration efforts. “Many western companies
are already working here to EU standards, training our people to do so too. We hope
they will also lobby for Hungary in Brussels. Their activities are more effective than
anything the government can do from the top down." 209 The fact that some firms may
be helping Hungary's efforts to join the EU does not mean that these companies are in
favor of a regionalization of the world economy, as most of the large investors are
investing in Hungary and Central Europe as a part of a global and not a regional
strategy.
Although there is a great deal of hesitation among Hungarians to accept Russian
foreign investment, Hungary has been opening its doors to its one-time occupier. 210 The
Russians are a significant, but not major player, in the Hungarian market. The pattern
among Russian business people is to start smaller businesses, rather than acquiring
larger recently privatized ones. Russians started 289 businesses in 1995, 8% of
Hungary's new business starts. In absolute terms, however, they are dwarfed by the
Americans and Germans. Since 1990, Russians have invested approximately $30m,
while the Americans have pumped in close to $1 billion and the Germans spent almost
$2 billion. 211
Nonetheless, the Russians have notable business presence in Hungary. There is
concern that the money that is being brought in from Russia is from the Mafia. The
style in which the companies are run does not improve the business climate, “Russia
brings old attitudes," remarked Karoly Fefete of GJW, a consultancy. There is a feeling
that Russian companies do not bring in useful technical, marketing and management
experience. Yet, on the other hand, the mere presence of Russian business in Hungary is
useful as well for Hungarians gain access to the Russian markets through a network of
personal contacts. 212 The Hungarian pharmaceuticals industry has been taking
advantage of such contacts to expand, for example.
209 Virginia Marsh and Kevin Done, "Financial Times Survey: Hungary, Tough Reforms Bring
Rewards." Financial Times, December 16, 1996.
210 Theresa Agovino and Ron Laurenzo, "It's Started," Business Central Europe, July/ August,
1996.
211 Theresa Agovino and Ron Laurenzo, "It’s Started."
212 Theresa Agovino and Ron Laurenzo, "It’s Started."
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The Russians have gained a poor reputation in the Hungarian markets as
numerous prominent acquisitions or strategic alliances have failed. In 1991, the Soviet
government bought a 31% stake in Ikarus, a major Eastern European bus supplier. It
has subsequently failed, registering a loss of $20m in 1995. Another failure example is
the Orion television concern. A few years back, the Russian oh company,
Yuganskneftegaz bought Orion after it had failed during privatization, “a very old
business partner decided to help out its old friend." The company had been incurring
heavy losses ever since, except for 1995, when it barely broke events
Though the Russian influence is small, but visible, the influence of global
multinationals is far larger. Gabor Hunya of the Vienna-based WIIW research institute
conducted a comparative study of performance of muntinationals and local companies
in Hungary. He found that though the foreign sector accounts for 10% GDP, they
delivered 50% of all exports in 1993 and the number was growing to an estimated 70%
of exports in 1995. On all other indicators, profitability, productivity, R&D spending,
and so forth, multinationals are far ahead of their counterparts in Hungary. 214
Mutinationals could also be to blame in part for the poor macroeconomic situation in
Hungary
,
as they initiated massive and wide-scale layoffs, and have tended to import
more than they export, in terms of capital and consumer goods.215 Certainly, foreign
investment in Hungary cannot be considered negative, as it has brought about broad
and deep restructuring. The Hungarian strategy of integration into multinational.216
The participation of Hungarians in MNC's should lead to a transference of best
competitive practices that, at least in the case of global competitors that measure their
success by the value they return to their owners, propagate a shareholder value system,
c. Banks
Three of the six large banks can be considered universal, but they do not hold
equity stakes in industry, as banks in the stakeholder value model. 217 By the end of
213 Theresa Agovino and Ron Laurenzo, "It's Started."
214
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42.
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1996, 8o% of the banking industry in Hungary was privatized. This was because the
banking sector was so weak, it needed to inject massive amounts of capital to bring it
back to health. After having tried to do this at a $3.5 billion expense to the Hungarian
taxpayers, the government realized that this was not enough and that the only
alternative to keeping the financial services industry viable was to allow foreign banks
in to purchase Hungarian banks. Today, only one bank remains and it is scheduled to
be sold in early 1997.™ European Union standards for banking regulation is contained
in proposed amendments to a Hungarian banking act. The new act will apply to both
credit institutions and non-bank financial services and will upgrade prudential
regulations and strengthen the supervisory powers of the State Banking Supervision.219
In Hungary 44 commercial banks held total assets equal to approximately 70 percent of
1994 GDP at which time the government, directly or indirectly, owned 60 percent of
bank assets. While the six largest banks (all majority state-owned) dominate the
industry, the government has reduced its share of total bank capital to below 25% by
1996 in its drive toward privatization. 220 The fact that the large Hungarian banks do not
own equity in industry and are largely privatized, indicates acceptance of the
shareholder value model of business practices.
Overall, with its extensive experience with global multinational corporations and
the slow but steady development of capital markets, and partially segmented banking
system, a broad movement toward the shareholder value model is occurring.
218 Virginia Marsh and Kevin Done, "Financial Times Survey: Hungary, Funds Await New
Flotations."
219 International Monetary Fund, International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects, and
Key Policy Issues, p. 42.
220 International Monetary Fund, International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects, and
Key Policy Issues, p. 117.
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Chapter IV
Latin America
A. Overview of Financial Flows in Latin America
Latin America, up until the 1990's, had become ever more marginalized in the
world economy. Latin America had experienced a decline in the share of world exports,
down from 10.9% in 1950 to 5.43% in 1985. As a share of total world direct foreign
investment, Latin America dropped from 15.3% in 1975 to 9.1% in 1985.^ In past
decades, strict controls in the financial sector were commonplace throughout Latin
America. Restrictions on interest rates, credit allocation, and the creation of new
financial institutions were used to block speculative activities. There was a strong
distrust for market mechanisms among politicians starting in the 1940's. After the
publication of Raul Prebisch's book, Introducion a Keynes
,
Keynesian financial controls
were popular through the 1950's, 60' s, and 1970's. In the early 70' s, a contending view
was presented by McKinnon and Shaw (1973), who argued that growth required
deregulated financial policies, including market-determined interest rates, low reserve
requirements for banks, and sophisticated financial intermediaries, including stock
markets.222
These ideas gained support in the 1980's as a part of structural reform programs.
The idea was that better financial intermediation would allow firms to finance their
activities more easily and efficiently, and that increased transparency would help insure
sound credit allocation, ensuring quicker growth. In addition to more efficient
allocation of investment capital, a transparent financial system would encourage higher
savings rates by renewed trust in financial intermediaries. Further theoretical
developments by King and Levine of the argument for the liberalization of financial
221 Andrew Hurrell, "Latin America in the New World Order: a regional bloc of the Americas?"
International Affairs, 68:1 (1992), p. 126.
222 Sebastian Edwards, Crisis and Reform in Latin America, From Despair to Hope, p. 201
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markets stress the importance of the fmancial intermediaries to process information.
namely to discriminate and allocate capital to the most innovative and productive
projects. 223
A powerful perception grew in Latin America that it is necessary to
internationalize the economy for the economy to become robust, and this depends on
full participation in the world economy.™ Latin Americans saw themselves as
competing with Eastern Europeans for scarce capital, foreign aid, and technology. This
fear that the third world would lose out to Eastern Europe was heightened by the fear of
the expansion of the European Union, which, some thought, would lead to European
introspection.225 The flow of net capital into Latin America increased for four years from
1990, reaching $64.1 billion by 1993, due to the recovery of foreign investors' trust in
this region and a decline in international interest rates. 226
The 1982 debt crisis prompted serious discussions on the viability of the
economic organization of Latin American economies and led to a revolutionary change.
Between 1982 and 1993, Latin America underwent serious market oriented reform.
Chile, then Mexico and Argentina turned around policy choices by opting for stable
democratic governments, privatization, liberalized capital flow regulations, and fiscal
responsibility.227 The 1994 Mexican peso crisis has put these reforms in question.
Traditional consensus was that countries should respond to payments crises bv
imposing capital controls to limit capital flight and protect trade in order to deal with
balance of payment issues. This was the case for Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela in
1982-83. This pattern had changed by the rrud-1980 , s and 1990 s. Policy responses had
changed to liberalization efforts. As of December 1996, most economies in Latin
America, with the exception of Argentina, have recovered surprisingly quickly and
223 Sebastian Edwards, Crisis and Reform in Latin America, From Despair to Hope, p. 201
224 Andrew Hurrell, "Latin America in the New World Order: a regional bloc of the Americas?" p.
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225 Andrew Hurrell, "Latin America in the New World Order: a regional bloc of the Americas?" p.
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have gained broad approval by global capital markets,
many reforms put into place by mid-1993
.
The following table details
94
Country Interest rate
determination
Directed
Credit
Reserve
requirements
Barriers to
entry
•
Securities
markets
Institutional
investors
Supervisory
Argentina Market
determined
Eliminate
d, except
for
multilater
al
institution
’s credit
Lowered Free entry;
foreign-
owned
banks
allowed
Deregulated Expected to
increase in
importance
with pension
fund reform
Strengthened
in 1992
when
Comisibn
Nacionai de
Valores
given more
responsibilit
y.Brazil Mostly market-
determined,
but some
sectors still
borrow at
subsidized
rates.
Several
niches still
remain;
state-
owned
enterprise
s can
borrow at
below-
market
rates
Not
completely
rationalized
yet
Reduced
after 1991
with the
elimination
of “carta
patentes"
(licenses)
Still subject
to
substantial
distortions.
Very minor
role.
Not very
efficient to
date; it needs
reform
Mexico Freely Eliminate Reserve In Increasingly Pension fund Reformed;
determined, d in requirements principle. dynamic; reform banks
after 1988-89; commerci eliminated for new law of affected by expected to subject to
development al banks; peso- 1991 foreign have an Basle
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below market
rates
directed
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ding to
multilater
al lines.
deposits entry;
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restrictions
for
foreign-
owned
banks
(30%
maximum)
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fluctuating
in 1991-92;
additional
reforms
required
short run;
foreign
institutional
investors
playing
growing role
theory;
portfolio risk
analysis
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overall
supervision
still weak,
however
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determined d except across institutions expanding; important mid-1980’s;
since mid- for deposits and encourage low degree role of modem and
1970’s;
spreads
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sectoral
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al
institution
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institutions d; number
of banks
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domestic
and
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foreign
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n
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1981
efficient;
risk
classification
of portfolios
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determined;
agriculture and
housing rates
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for foreign
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Whether there has been a real process of regionalization has become a matter for
debate. The Economist argues that there is no evidence of a long-term trend that would
place preference on Latin American regionalism.^ On the other hand, Andrew Hurrell
points out that the mutual recognition of "spheres of influence" in the debt crisis (the
US m Latin America, Japan in Asia, and Germany in Eastern Europe) stood out. 2^
Regionalism has had two meanings in the context of Latin America, either intra-
regional cooperation within South and Central America or inter-American/ hemispheric
cooperation, including North America. During the 1980's, the intra-regional version
was revived, at least in political affairs. Two major examples of this in the political
sphere are the Contadora Group and the Contadora Support Group. The Contadora
group was formed in 1983 to promote negotiated settlements of conflicts in Central
America by Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama. Argentina, Brazil, Peru,
Uruguay, and Venezuela later formed the "Contadora Support Group." Previously,
there were efforts to coordinate economic activity regionally: The Central American
Common Market was formed in 1960, the Andean Pact in 1969. Brazil and Argentina
made a formal commitment in 1990 to create a common market. This commitment was
extended to Paraguay and Uruguay with the creation of Mercosur in 1991. The
Mercosur group (Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) subsequently agreed
to form a free trade area by 1995.231
Trade tariffs have been reduced and almost all investment taxes have been
eliminated. The UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
estimates that 31 agreements to liberalize trade in Latin America have been signed since
1990.252 Trade barriers among Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay are being
progressively dismantled through Mercosur, a common market agreement started in
229 Andrew Hurrell, "Latin America in the New World Order: a regional bloc of the Americas?" p.
133.
230 Andrew Hurrell, "Latin America in the New World Order: a regional bloc of the Americas?" p.
125.
231 Andrew Hurrell, "Latin America in the New World Order: a regional bloc of the Americas?" p.
122 .
232 Economist Survey of Mercosur, 1996.
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1994.™ Intra-regional trade has grown from $4 billion in 1990 to $14.5 billion in 1995
Intra-group trade amounted for 1.6% of Mercosur's GDP, as compared with 4.5% for
NAFTA and 14% for the European Union. 234
This has led to a growing trend in Latin America toward intra-regional
investment. For example, Chile had invested approximately $2 billion abroad, a large
portion of that m Argentina. Chilean firms have more experience with privatization
and thus are able to transfer management skills to Argentina. Further, as Mercosur
takes off, many MNC's are regionalizing their investment strategies.
The mter-American regionalism has a fairly extensive institutional history, as
well. In 1948, the Organization of American States was formed. In economic affairs, the
United States committed in 1979 to the foundation of NAFTA. In the 1980's, it became
clear to Latin American states that Latin America could not achieve its economic goals
under the rubric of the "third world." The creation of regional affiliations would serve
the state s aims more usefully. European involvement in Latin America during the
1980 s was low, as the economically stagnant Europe was willing to follow the US lead
m managing the debt crisis. Japanese involvement grew, but not to the degree that
Latin American governments had desired. 235
In terms of financial flows, the United States is still the dominant partner, but
other countries have been increasingly active in investment in Latin America, especially
in bonds and bank lending. In terms of business practices, a widespread growing
tendency toward acceptance of the American "shareholder value" model is noticeable.
The causality for this is complex, including both foreign and domestic drivers of this
process, but there is no doubt that foreign activity and global competition has played a
significant role in this process.
233 Guillermo Harteneck, "Privatization as a Catalyst for FDI: The Case of Argentina" in OECD,
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Table 32: National Financial Accounts, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.**
(in USD millions)
1971- I9S1- 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993®
80 90
1994 1995
Argentina
DIA»
FDI23*
Port. Inv.
1,319 9,613
.239
919 574 (19) 1,147
Port. Inv. Liab.^i
Other Inv. Assets
Other inv. Liab.
Financial
Account
Brazil
DIA
7 - (126) (155)
1,028 1,836 2,439 2,555 3,482 603 1,319
(241) (8,261) (80) (2,037) (185) 64
(1,098) (1,105) 8,227 795 19,992 3,847 4,637
(399) 661 426 4,038 399 2,853 (10,458)
(7,539) (7,001) (2,671) (348) (11,880) 1,689 4,760
(8,008) (5,850) 160 6,967 9,956 8,681 167
FDI
Port inv. Assets
Port. Inv. Liab.
Other Inv. Assets
Other inv. Liab.
Financial
Account
Mexico
DIA
FDI
Port. Inv. Assets
Port, fnv, Liab.
Other Inv. Assets
Other Inv, Liab.
Financial
Account
14,865 18,298 1,348 320 1,225 2,969 (523) (665) (1,014) (137) (491) (1,037) (L384)
~ 1,131 989 1,103 2,061 1,292 3,072 4,859
- - -
~
(30) (67) - - (606) (3,052) (936)
~ ~ (391) 579 3,808 7,366 12,928 47,784 10,171
-
~
- (894) (2,864) (3,140) (99) (2,696) (4,368) (1,783)
'
~ (11,818) (3,539) (4,886) (2,675) (2,823) (34,434) 18,383
(12,525) (5,567) (4,129) 6,516 7,604 7,965 29,310
7,848 23,626 491 1,523 3,246 2,594 - - - _ _
-
-
-
- 2,785 2,549 4,742 4,393 4,389 10,972 6,963
~ _
-
-
- (56) (7,354) (603) 1,165 (564) (615) (663)
"
-
- 354 3,369 12,741 18,041 28,919 8,185 (10,140)
“
-
- (1,114) (1,345) (395) 4,387 (3,038) (5,057) (5,296)
“
-
- (859) 11,222 8,654 (947) 4,054 2,302 (2,645)
1,110 8,441 25,139 27,039 33,760 15,787 (11,781)
23b Direct investment abroad represents flows of direct investment capital in and out of the
economy. Direct investmen capital includes equity capital, reinvested earnings, and other capital
associated with various intercompany transactions between affiliate enterprises, excluded are
flows of direct investment capital into the reporting economy for exceptional financing, such as
debt-for-equity swaps. Portfolio investment assets-liabilities include transactions with
nonresidents in financial securities of any maturity other than those included in direct
investment, exceptional financing LCFARs and reserve assets. Financial account is the net sum of
the balance of direct investment, portfolio investment, and other investment transactions. 1971-88
Sources:OECD/DAF and UNCTAD, based on official national statistics from the balance of
payments converted in US$ at daily average exchange rates. 1989-95 source: IMF, International
Financial Statistics, Washington: IMF/World Bank. December, 1996. pp. 100, 150, 428.
237 DIA = Direct Investment Abroad (outbound)
238 FDI = Foreign Direct Investment (inbound)
239 Negligible value or no data available.
240 Portfolio Investment Assets are outbound flows.
241 Portfolio Investment Liabilites are inbound flows.
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1- Foreign Direct Investment
In recent years, FDI has become a relatively more important component of total
capital flows to Latin America. Privatization and joint ventures rather than new projects
have been the focus of direct foreign investment with Brazil, Argentina and Mexico
being the largest markets with aggressive privatization plans.2« Nicholas Brady, CEO
and Chairman of Darby Overseas Investments, regards direct foreign investment as the
main economic driver for Latm America. His expectation is that investment will
increase from the U.S. and from Europe and Asia as well.® As in Central Europe and
other areas, Latin America benefits from foreign direct investment, technology
transference, and access to international markets that multinational corporations
provide. 244
During the 1970's, FDI played a small role in Latin America. This is due to the
highly restrictive inward-looking policies adapted at that time. Most notably,
Resolution 24 of the Cartagena Accord restricted the rights of foreigners to control
manufacturing operations and repatriate profits. Further restrictions were placed on
certain sectors deemed to be strategic. 243 After the debt crisis, the expectation is that
foreign funds will not be so likely to come in the form of bonds or bank debt. Rather,
Cardoso and Dornbusch concluded in 1989, the obvious source would be foreign direct
investment, which was at that point not very significant. 246
Some countries in Latin America had no choice but to reform policies toward
FDI. After the 1981-82 debt crisis, banks were highly reluctant to lend. As commodity
prices and then oil prices fell, the ISI strategy was naturally weakened. FDI was a way
to bring in foreign capital and market access that would not otherwise have been
available. The changing positive view of multinational FDI was reinforced by bad
experiences with the international finance community. Given a choice between a loss of
242 Victoria Griffith, "Direct benefits," LatinFinance, June 1995 n.68 p. 22.
243 Victoria Griffith, "LatinFinance Interview: Nichols Brady on the Future of Capital Flows to
Latin America." LatinFinance, Nov 1995 n. 72, p. 16.
244 Geoffrey Bannister, C.A. Primo Braga, Joe Petry."Transnational corporations, the neo-liberal
agenda and regional integration: establishing a policy framework." Quarterly Review of
Economics and Finance, 1994 v.34. p. 77.
245 Sebastian Edwards, Crisis and Reform in Latin America, From Despair to Elope, p. 247.
246 Sebastian Edwards, Crisis and Reform in Latin America, From Despair to Hope
,
p. 247.
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control due to multinational FDI or loss of control due to the extraction of foreign
exchange by the internahonal finance community, multinationals were far more
attractive. 247 FDI flows are also considered more stable, long-term investments than
portfolio investment, sometimes known as "hot money."
^
Between 1987 and 1994, total FDI into the region grew at an average armual rate
of 15%, an unprecedented level in the area's history
,
24» FDI in Latin America reached
$14 billion in 1991, $16 billion in 1992 and $17.3 billion by 1994. Latin American
investors accounted for almost half of those flows. 249 At the same time as FDI
regulations were relaxed, some Latin American countries strengthened their restrictions
on short-term capital influx. 250 In Latin America liberalization in FDI policies has
encouraged new growth. A description of FDI regulations through 1994 is provided in
the following table.
Charles Oman, Emerging Policy Issures for the Dynamic Non-Member Economies; Trends in
Global FDI and Latin America," in OECD Foreign Direct Investment: OECD Countries and the
Dynamic Countries of Asia and Latin America. Paris: OECD 1995. pp. 59-80.
248 Keith Miceli, "Latin America: A Region of Opportunities and Challenges for American
Business" Speech delivered to the National Technological University's meeting on management
of technology on January 5, 1996. Center for International Private Enterprise Home Page.
cipe@cipe.org.
249 OECD, Foreign Direct Investment: OECD Countries and Dynamic Economies of Asia and
Latin America . Paris: OECD, 1995.
250
"Foreign Direct Investment," JETRO (Japan External Trade Organization) Home Page.
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Table 33: Regulations on FDI in Selected Countries of Latin America through 1994.251
Argentina None
Brazil Oil, gas. Banking, Computers
transportation,
media, health
Transport, Some sectors
media
None
None
Yes
Yestelecommunications
Mexico Petroleum,
None Nohydrocarbons,
nuclear energy
Chile None None None None No, canceled
Colombia Alcoholic beverages Defense, toxic
materials
disposal
None
None
in 1993
None Up to No
registered
limit
None Yes
None
Peru
Venezuela
None
None
None
None
The sectors drawing new investment in the region are, above all, natural
resources and services, as opposed to the manufacturing sectors. Services such as
tourism, banking, and telecommunications represents a large share of the FDI in
Mexico, for example.252 According to the OECD, the FDI decision is based primarily on
legal and macroeconomic frameworks and not special incentives, like short-term tax
breaks. 253 Labor costs were less important than the growing importance of the
markets. 254
An important feature of FDI in the 1980's and early 1990's is the regionalization
of investment flows. Trade agreements have encouraged this activity. 255 Investment
kept pace with the integration of regional economies. There is what is called the "triad
pattern" in which one triad member is the dominant investor in its "own" region,
followed relatively closely by the other two. In Latin America, the United States has a
251 Sebastian Edwards, Crisis and Reform in Latin America, From Despair to Hope, modified.
252 Charles Oman, “Emerging Policy Issures for the Dynamic Non-Member Economies; Trends in
Global FDI and Latin America," pp. 59-80.
233 OECD, Foreign Direct Investment: OECD Countries and Dynamic Economies of Asia and
Latin America . Paris: OECD, 1995.
254 OECD, Foreign Direct Investment: OECD Countries and Dynamic Economies of Asia and
Latin America . Paris: OECD, 1995.
255 OECD, Foreign Direct Investment: OECD Countries and Dynamic Economies of Asia and
Latin America . Paris: OECD, 1995.
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dominant position. In Central and Eastern Europe, the EU is the dominant investor
and in Asia. Japan has the most FDI.* It is mteresting to note that in the early 19Ws
,72% of US manufacturing investment in the developing world was in Latin America*
This is roughly equivalent to Germany's position in Central Europe, where around 70%
of its developing world manufacturing FDI is concentrated.
It is important to stress the European source of the FDI flows. The European
share of FDI has been growing in Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Panama. The US position mcreased in Argentina, Chile, and
Colombia. 258 Western Europe accounted for almost one third of the FDI flows that Latin
America attracted durmg the 1990s and now accounts for 35% of the cumulative FDI to
the region. 259 From 1985-90, the largest flows from Europe were to Mexico. These flows
amounted to $4.4 billion and the second largest recipient of FDI was Brazil, registering
$3.7 for the same period.**) The biggest investors in Mexico and Brazil were the United
Kingdom with $1.5 billion invested in Mexico from 1985-1990 (Germany invested $831)
and almost $1 billion in Brazil for the same period. European flows to Mexico amounted
to $4.4 billion (85-90) and the second largest flow was to Brazil, with $3.7 bilhon. 261
Germany is an important commercial partner to Latin America behind the United States
in a similar way that the United States is Central Europe's largest partner behind
Germany. 202 Two-thirds of European investment is concentrated in the Southern part of
256 Susan Kaufmann Prucell & Francoise Simon, "Introduction," in Susan Kaufmann Prucell &
Francoise Simon, Europe and Latin America in the World Economy
. Boulder- Lynne Rienner
1995. pp. 18-21.
257 Andrew Hurrell, "Latin America in the New World Order: a regional bloc of the Americas2"
p. 132.
A. Blake Friscia and Francoise Simon, The Economic Relationship between Europe and Latin
America," in Susan Kaufmann Prucell and Francoise Simon, eds. Europe and Latin America in
the World Economy . Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995. p. 21.
2°q Keith Miceli, "Latin America: A Region of Opportunities and Challenges for American
Business" Speech delivered to the National Technological University's meeting on management
of technology on January 5, 1996. Center for International Private Enterprise Home Page.
cipe@cipe.org.
260 A. Blake Friscia and Francoise Simon, "The Economic Relationship between Europe and Latin
America," p. 19.
261 Susan Kaufmann Prucell & Francoise Simon, "Introduction," pp. 18-21.
262 Wolf Grabendorff, "Germany and Latin America" in Susan Kaufmann Prucell and Francoise
Simon, eds. Europe and Latin America in the World Economy . Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1995. p. 85 and 108.
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Lata America, while the US is clearly the leading investor in Mexico. In Brazil and
Argentina, Europe's investment stock was higher than America's. Europe's investment
from 1985-90 is detailed in the following table. It is interesting to note that the United
Kingdom is far and away the largest single contributor of FDI from Europe.
Table 34: European Investment in Latin America, 1985-90263
fin USD millinntO
Brazil 207 998 731 255 458 490 28 159 365Mexico 831 1,518 709 a 253 19 295 120 699
Argentina 264 26 0 5 30 12 4 12 2 5D
Venezuela 67 154 133 23 88 73 29 48
JU
179Colombia 24 -32 14 16 24 -1 10 15 62
Chile 19 201 36 56 101 3 42 11 5
Total 1,174 2,839 1,628 380 936 588 416 355 1,340
ci: together with Netherlands. D=Germany, UK=Great Britain, F=France, B=Belguim
NL=Netherlands, I=Italy, ES=Spain, S=Sweden, CH=Switzerland.
3,691
4,444
121
794
132
474
9,656
Japan has also become a major investor in the region. FDI by Japan in Latin
America amounted to $ 5,230 billion in 1994, an increase of 55.2% over the previous
year. Investment grew to $ 1.23 billion in Brazil and to $ 613 million in Mexico. Japan
accounted for 11.9% of total FDI in the region at 1994.265 Overall, while Latin America
has diversified its investor base substantially in recent years, the dominant foreign
direct investor is still the United States.
Breakdowns of U.S. investment in Latin America by country and industry are
provided in the following tables:
263 A. Blake Friscia and Francoise Simon, "The Economic Relationship between Europe and Latin
America," p. 20.
264 b: Argentina data available includes only 1985, 1986, and 1989
265
"Foreign Direct Investment," JETRO (Japan External Trade Organization) Home Page.
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Table 35: U.S. direct investment in Latin America, 1994-95
Comparative regional trends ($m) 266
Investment
Position267 Total Income268
Country 1994 1995 1994 1995
Latin America
& Caribbean271
112,226 122,765 15,562 14,840
Mexico 15,714 14,037 2,434 1,594
Canada 74,987 81,387 5,550 8,386
Asian NICs272 32,358 54,846 7,462 9,873
Other Asia
Pacific
39,040 31,924 2,815 3,509
Japan 36,677 39,189 2,843 4,504
Europe 310,031 363,527 29,220 40,910
Africa 5,530 6,516 1,413 1,866
Middle East 6,794 7,982 967 1,436
Rate of
Capital Return
Outflows269 in %27o
1994 1995 1994 1995
14,797 14,614 18.1 12.6
3,327 2,114 15.7 10.7
6,287 7,767 7.7 10.7
6,493 7,703 21.3 22.6
2,128 6,714 9.0 9.9
2,523 1,584 8.4 6.3
20,049 52,828 9.8 12.1
172 970 25.7 31.0
598 1,015 14.5 19.4
Clearly from this information, Latin America represents the largest region for
U.S. direct investment in the developing world and is second as a region world-wide
behind Europe. In terms of total income and rate of return, Latin America constitutes
one of the most important regions for United States FDI. The following three tables
show US direct investment abroad by country and industry. It is notable that U.S.
investment is strong across the entire region, if considering the size of investment
relative to the size of the economy.
266 Business Latin America, Sept. 30, 1996, ©The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, 1996.
267 Represents US parent companies' accumulated direct-investment position. Direct-investment
estimates exlude capital gains/ losses. Estimates for 1995 are preliminary.
268 Total earnings (including capital gains/ losses), net of withholding taxes. Also includes net
interest receipts from foreign affiliates.
269 Capital-outflow estimates represent sum of reinvested earnings, intercompany-debt outflows
and equity-capital outflows. (-) designates an inflow.
270 Income dividedby the average of beginning and end-of-year direct-investment position.
271 Includes the Bahamas.
2/2 Includes Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Rupublic of Korea, Singapore,
Taiwan and Thailand.
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Table 36: US Investment trends and
Latin America, in USD millions. 273
earnings by country in
Country
Argentina
Brazil
Mexico
Chile
Columbia
Ecuador
Panama
Peru
Venezuela
Central
America278
Investment Total Income275
Position274
1994 1995 1994 1995
Intercompany
Debt
Outflows276
1994 1995
Equity
Capital
Outflows277
1994 1995
5,945 7,962 939 850 221 719 483 923
18,798 23,590 4,714 3,456 233 2,180 (1241 175
15,714 14,037 2,434 1,594 1,337 244 967 972
4,384 5,510 659 1,029 287 310 486 155
3,282 3,414 324 558 237 67 56 (47)
736 830 41 100 (D) 44 (D) 9
13,538 15,908 1,160 1,332 88 199 32 102
819 1,213 116 366 (D) (D) (D) (D)
2,991 3,372 382 640 395 (D) 19 (D)
1,156 1,463 361 426 29 39 5 (97)
(D) denotes not disclosed, due to confidentiality of information.
Table 37: Non-manufacturing US income in selected categories279
Non-Bank
Petroleum Wholesale
Trades
Country 1994 1995 1994 1995
Argentina 146 166 132 103
Brazil 121 63 113 (9)
Mexico 1 13 (D) (D)
Chile (D) (D) 23 39
Columbia 39 184 23 (24)
Ecuador 13 69 8 14
Panama 20 25 104 89
Peru (D) (D) 3 (6)
Venezuela 35 90 10 17
Central
America280
53 50 288 275
Banking Finance, Services
Insurance and
1994 1995
Real Estate
1994 1995 1994 1995
25 105 49 65 9 12
369 141 401 289 16 46
(D) (D) 304 (21) 14 2
(D) 48 152 158 12 (D)
(D) (D) 10 (D) - 1
1 3 0 - 0 0
(D) (D) 962 1,183 2 -
3 3 (1) - - (D)
8 (D) 22 (D) (6) (8)
126 222 2 2 0 4
(D) Not disclosed to maintain confidentiality of specific company's operations.
= less than $500,000
273 Business Latin America
,
Sept. 30, 1996, ©The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, 1996.
2/4 Represents US parent companies 1 accumulated direct-investment position. Direct-investment
estimates exlude capital gains/ losses. Estimates for 1995 are preliminary.
275 Total earnings (including capital gains/ losses), net of withholding taxes. Also includes net
interest receipts from foreign affiliates.
276 Reflects change in debt position between parent and affiliate.
277 Net capital investment by parent in affiliate.
278 Figures for Central America do not include Panama.
279 Business Latin America, Sept. 30, 1996, ©The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, 1996.
280 Figures for Central America do not include Panama.
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Table 38: US Manufacturing income in selected categories
from Direct Investment Abroad in Latin America281
Total Food and Chemicals Indust.
Related and Allied Machinery
Products Products and
„„„
Equipment
1994_ 1995 1994 1995 1994 1995 1994 1995
205 137 208 177 I (2)
454 653 534 622 618 210
388 137
(D) (D)
276 353 66 87
22 20 5 1
52 46 47
10 24 63
233 444 70 73
105 122 57 67
Coun
Argentina
Brazil
Mexico
Chile
Columbia
Ecuador
Panama
Peru
Venezuela
Central
America282
Manu-
facturing
557 422
3,654 2,966
1,787 1,163
135 284
491 429
19 31
101 105
(D) 4
(D) (D)
- 17
28 36
17 59
65 54
2
* (2)
0
Electronic &
Electrical
Equipment
1994 1995
(D) (D)
(D) (160)
65 24
0
0
11
0
(D) (D)
(D) (D)
Transport
Equipment
1994 1995
10 (7)
798 762
307 (8)
(D) (D)
(D) (D)
(D) (D)
0 0
0 0
48 186
0 0
(D) Not disclosed to maintain confidentiality of specific company's operations
"
- less than $500,000
2. Foreign Direct Investment
In the 1970 s and early 1980's, the level of development of financial markets
varied across countries. Some (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay) were somewhat
developed and others (Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Peru, and
Venezuela) were severely regulated. Markets, because of their small sizes and lack of
liquidity, were easy to manipulate. Market capitalization of Latin American stock
markets declined in the first half of the 1980's. 283 In Brazil during the 1980's, for
example, six stocks comprised 70% of daily trading turnover. Institutional investors
played no role until the early 1990's (except in Chile). 284 Long-term securities were not
issued because of macroeconomic instability. 285 In every country, regulations resulted in
a low level of financial intermediation. 286 As the state deregulated financial
intermediation, high interest rates resulted, which encouraged moral hazard. This in
turn, called for careful oversight and monitoring.
281 Business Latin America, Sept. 30, 1996, ©The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, 1996.
282 Figures for Central America do not include Panama.
283 Sebastian Edwards, Crisis and Reform in Latin America, From Despair to Hope, p. 203.
284 Sebastian Edwards, Crisis and Reform in Latin America, From Despair to Hope, p. 203.
285 Sebastian Edwards, Crisis and Reform in Latin America, From Despair to Hope, p. 203.
286 Sebastian Edwards, Crisis and Reform in Latin America, From Despair to Hope, p. 202.
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As a result of financial reforms, the Latin American stock market has exploded
from 1989 to the first half of 1994 and has since recovered from the Mexican devaluation
cnsis. In spite of the strong takeoff, stock markets are still underdeveloped. One of the
key motivations for financial liberalization is to stimulate an increase in domestic
savings. This is because of widely accepted theory that an increase in savings generally
precedes an increase in economic growth. However, in Latin America, there has not
been as strong a response as economists hoped.2«7
There were two waves of foreign portfolio investment in Latin America. In the mid
to late eighties, there was a wave of sovereign credits in the international debt market. The
early nineties followed with a surge in private equity investment. Indicative of the explosion
of equity markets was the fact that the Mexican equity houses, the Casas de Bolsa, ended up
owning the banks and not the other way around. The real price surge of equities happened
m the early 1990's. As cheap equities became increasingly difficult to find, volatility set in, as
evidenced by the Mexican crisis in the spring of 1994.288 A detailed description of foreign
portfolio equity investment in Latin America is provided in the following table:
287 Sebastian Edwards, Crisis and Reform in Latin America, From Despair to Hope, p. 229.
288 Lorenzo Weisman, "The Advent of Private Equity in Latin America," p. 61.
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Table 39: Equity Flows to Latin America
(in USD billions) 289
Intraregional flows
Portfolio investment
Mergers & acquisitions
Tangible assets
From the United States
Portfolio investment
Mergers & acquisitions
Tangible assets
-2.37
-2.37
9.04
0.40
0.02
8.62
-5.90
-5.90
10.49
1.04
0.71
8.74
4.56
0.15
4.41
8.10
2.35
0.79
4.96
-3.07
0.33
0.18
-3.58
21.00
7.03
0.49
13.48
8.75
4.72
0.57
3.46
19.56
9.27
2.63
7.66
p£2f§|
14.02
3.00
1.10
9.92
18.38
5.00
2.71
10.67
7.50
2.00
0.50
5.00
22.00
7.50
2.50
12.00
Total Intra-American flows 6.67 4.59 12.66 17.93 28.31 32.40 29 50From the rest of world 8.49 12.11 9.84 5.47 7.79 8.40 5 50
Portfolio investment 6.60 8.86 8.70 2.24 6.01 6.90 5 00
Mergers & acquisitions 0.42 4.78 3.05 5.11 2.14 4.46 3 50
Tangible assets 1.47
-1.53
-1.91
-1.88
-0.36
-2.96
-3.00
Total flows 15.16 16.70 22.50 23.40 36.10 40.80 35.00
Distribution in percentage:
Intra-American flows 44.0% 27.5 56.3 76.6 78.4 79.4 84.3%
U.S. flows 59.6% 62.8 36.0 89.7 54.2 45.1 62.9%
Tangible assets 50.9% 7.8 33.2 34.3 29.8 43.2 40.0%
The table shows that intra-American flows have become an increase portion of total flows,
and that U.S. flows constitute a sizable portion of these flows throughout the 1990's.
Difficulties of the Latin American investment climate for foreign investors remained
until the early 1990 s. opaque financial reporting, insider information sharing, and difficult
access to the most profitable deals. However, local financial entrepreneurs began developing
an interest in leveraging their deals with foreign capital and this opened up a window for the
creation of private equity funds. From 1992 to 1996, private unquoted investments in Latin
America grew from almost nothing to $1.5 billion. This sum excludes funds invested in
private Latin American equities by non-Latin American dedicated funds and the $500 million
which U.S. commercial banks have set aside for private equity investment in Latin
America. 290
289 International Monetary Fund, International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects, and
Key Policy Issues, p.108. Original source: Baring Securities.
290 Lorenzo Weisman, "The Advent of Private Equity in Latin America," pp. 62.
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Regional
Argentina
Brazil
Mexico
° 0 ° ° ° ° 0 o 175 380 1,510 2,000 5,200 10,919
° 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 115 105 170 214 212
0 ° 0 0 0 0 63 220 320 165 380 485 625 1,854 1,350
125 150 150 175 175 200 225 300 330 530 780 1,040 1,865 1,783 1,060
As funds began to proliferate in the 1990's, most were based in and managed from
the United States with some sort of local partner. Two early examples are the Darby
Emerging Markets Fund, established by Nicolas Brady, former Secretary of Treasury and
Chairman of Dillon Read, and The Baring Latin America Enterprise Fund, L.P., based in
Miami. Large investment managers such as INVESCO and Templeton are now moving into
the institutional investment market, and both are developing alternative specialty products
to various groups, including newly privatized pension schemes in Latin America.292 Another
set of large equity players came into existence as US commercial banks converted low quality
or bad debt into equity. Examples of these new players are Citicorp, Chemical Banking
Corporation, J.P. Morgan & Co., Bank of Boston, Bankers Trust, and Bank of America.
Although some of the funds in this category were quite large ($300 million or more), they
should not be seen as catalysts for interest in equity. Rather they are a symptom of the
problems of bad debt that had been converted to equity. Nonetheless, after these banks had
291 Figures for 1981-1994, Micropal Directory of Emerging Markets Funds in International Finance
Corporation, Investment Funds in Emerging Markets, p. 13. For 1995, Micropal Inc. In Trends in
International... 1996, p. 102.
292 Ciampi, Thomas, "Argentine market attracts foreign firms," Pensions & Investments , v. 24 n.
22. October 28, 1996. pp. 18, 21.
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made this conversion, they played a key role in the equity markets, even if due to necessity
rather than choice. 293
Table 41: Pan-Latin American Funds
Fund Sponsor Status Target Closed Investec
as at Ql,
1996
AlG-GE Capital Latin
American Infrastructure
Fund, L.P.
Emerging Markets
Partnership
2nd Q 1996 1000
Andean Emerging Growth Cross Border 1st Q 1996 50iund Enterprises, Inc.
Baring Latin American Baring Latin America Jun-95 175 10
Enterprise Fund Capital Ltd.
Baring Latin America Baring Latin America Dec-95 78
Capital Ltd. Capital Ltd.
Darby Emerging Markets Darby Overseas 1994 closing 54 20
Fund, L.P. Limited
Darby Overseas Limited Darby Overseas
Limited
11/95 closing 55
Latin America Capital BEA Associates 8/92, 10/92, 36 no info.
Partners 3/93
Latin America Equity
Partners
Wasserstein Perella 1st Q 1996 300
Latin America Private Advent International Dec-95 150
Equity Fund Corp.
South American Private WestSphere Equity 1st Q 1996 180
Equity Growth Fund, L.P. Investors
TOTAL 1530 548 30
A reason for the boom in equity markets is the peso crash of 1994. Because debt
doubled overnight in peso terms, it has become very expensive in comparison to the cost of
raising capital through equity. Equity became the cheapest and thus preferred way to raise
capital. 294 Although the following figure shows a fall in new equity issues from 1994 to 1995,
the 1995 figures can still be considered high in dollar terms, given the severity of the
devaluation and ensuing recession.
293 Lorenzo Weisman, "The Advent of Private Equity in Latin America," pp. 65.
294 Lorenzo Weisman, "The Advent of Private Equity in Latin America," pp. 68.
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Table 42: Value of New Equity Issues
in Selected Countries (USD millions!**
11
Argentina 4.8 182.5 107.5 9,4397
Brazil
Mexico 293.7 3,091.9
977.4
1,812.2
884.6
2,698.8
2,058.7 236.3
2.590.9 1,820.0
4.011.9 1,899.1
Table 43: Public equity offerings
for Latin American
companies in the USA296
Amount
Year inUSD
billions
' 1991 i $4.5
!' 1992 1 $5.0
' 1993 ! $4.3
;
19941 $4.6
These public equity offerings became increasingly diversified through Latin America. Of
the total, Mexico accounted for 81% in 1991, 62% in 1992, 55% in 1993, and 34% in 1994.297
Table 44: ADR Trading in 1995298
Market ADR trading Home market
Argentina
Mexico
Chile
$15.7 billion
54.5 billion
11.6 billion
approx. 35% of ADR
approx. 65% of ADR
approx. 100% of ADR
Although the equity markets have developed quite a bit in recent years, they are
still not fully developed, as is evidenced by the fact that American Depository Receipt
(ADR) trading frequently exceeds volumes in the home markets. In 1995, for example,
ADR trading as a portion of home market trading is shown in the following table. ADR
trading in some individual stocks easily exceeds the market trading, i.e., Mexico's
Telemex and Argentina's Telefonica. 299
295 Includes only new issues in exchange for cash. International Monetary Fund, International
Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects, and Key Policy Issues, p. 95. Source: International
Finance Corporation, Emerging Markets database.
296 Lorenzo Weisman, "The Advent of Private Equity in Latin America," pp. 68.
297 Lorenzo Weisman, "The Advent of Private Equity in Latin America," pp. 68.
298 World Bank, 1996 Emerging Stock Markets Factbook, p. 9.
299 World Bank, 1996 Emerging Stock Markets Factbook, p. 9.
Derivatives - complex securities used as a hedging and speculative tool- have
been increasingly used to help investors seek to reduce their exposure to volatility in
Latin American markets. The Mexican financial crisis in late 1994 sparked interest in
derivatives. Latin American governments have been quick to allow derivatives trading
where investors demand them. Most derivatives trading is done by big institutional
investors and mutual funds. "The activity helps firms in the region to manage their
exposure to interest rates and currency risks/' said Mark BrickelL managing director at
J.P. Morgan & Co. m New York. "And it helps investors outside the region invest more
easily and manage the risk of their investments more capably." Bricked further
explained that, "When problems occur, the people who are better able to absorb the risk
end up with the losses. It's a safety net."3oo Investors that want the high returns of
emerging markets, but want to limit their risks, are using derivative products to enter
these markets. 301 The growth of derivatives has also opened up larger bigger markets
for some Latin American debt instruments and has helped governments and companies
in the region sell debt, said Bricked. In 1996, over $200 billion in options on Latin
American government bonds have been traded, up from $140 bidion in 1994, according
to Francis Repka, who oversees emerging market operations at Societe Generale.302
Derivatives are allowing investor new access to markets that had formerly been legally
forbidden, such as limits on equity participation. Financial Times correspondent Nick
Reed writes that "by entering into equity swaps - swaps where the investor receives the
gains or losses on certain shares or indices and pays a floating rate of interest - investors
can achieve the equity price exposure they want without actuady owning the
underlying shares, which avoids the ownership limit rules." 303
The location of derivatives trading is not necessarily in Latin America. At
December 6, 1996, more than 31,000 peso futures contracts were outstanding on the
300
"Derivatives Grow in Latin America: Latin Markets (Correct)," Bloomberg Business News,
Miami, December 6, 1996, 16:13.
301 Nick Reed, "Emerging markets: Investors seek wider horizons Nick Reed writes that emerging
market derivatives are the big growth area in banking today," Financial Times, November 22,
1996.
302
"Derivatives Grow in Latin America: Latin Markets (Correct)," Bloomberg Business News .
303 Nick Reed, "Emerging markets: Investors Seek Wider Horizons Nick Reed Writes That
Emerging Market Derivatives are the Big Growth Area in Banking Today."
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Chicago Mercantile Exchange. The Chicago exchange has recently introduced trading
in Brazilian Reals and Brazil's Commodities and Futures Exchange, has begun trading
Argentine bond futures
.
304
Table 45: International Bond Issues
by Currency of Denomination
(in USD millions) 305
1993 1994 liiiill
U.S. Dollar 25,450 16,026 13,080 5,485
Deutsche Mark 1,252 864 4,048 3,069
Japanese Yen 795 715 5,157 1,092
Other 1,297 635 1,110 1,053
In addition to a boom in equities, volumes in bonds have been large. Latin
American nations and some corporations are attracting retail level investors such as
Germans and the Japanese who are getting low interest rates by doing non-dollar bond
issues. The desire for higher profits in debt markets that cannot be achieved in low
mterest rate environments of Germany and Japan attract the attention of European and
Japanese investors in Latin American debt.306 The attraction is higher yields and,
ideally, secured by sovereigns or quasi-sovereigns. Risk management is enhanced for
the issuers of debt, offsetting their predominantly dollar obligations and presenting an
opportunity to extend maturities.307 Retail investors who are normally faced with low
inflation and low interest rates were eager to invest in Latin issues for the incremental
yields. For example, in the 11 months ending February 1996 $5.4 billion in yen-
denomination issues were sold to predominantly Japanese retail investors. 308 The surge
in European interest in Latin America is also due to a lack of big opportunities in its
neighboring Central European countries. 309
304
"Derivatives Grow in Latin America: Latin Markets (Correct)" Bloomberg Business News .
305 Includes Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
Guatamala, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uraguay, and Venezuela.
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects,
and Key Policy Issues, p. 95. Original source: IMF staff estimates based on Euromoney
Bondware.
306 Bill Hinchberger, "Latin America, a Movable Feast," Institutional Investor, July 1996, pp. 69-74.
307 Bill Hinchberger "Latin America," p. 69.
308 Bill Hinchberger "Latin America," p. 70.
309 Bill Hinchberger, "Latin America, a Movable Feast," pp. 69-74.
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Table 46:h^rnational Bond Issues in USD, millions310
1 - ' 1993 1994 ; 1995 199& nti
Western
Hemisphere?11
28,794 18,240 23,395 10,699
Argentina '§ 6,308 5,319 6,354 3,835
[
Brazil 111 6,465 3,998 7,041 2,436
Mexico 11 11,338 6,949 7,646 3,273
Debt issues are back and very strong. In the first quarter of 1996, Latin American
borrowers (mostly sovereigns) placed DM 7 billion, topping the total annual volume for
1995. Non-dollar loans outpaced dollar loans for the first time since the debt crisis of
1994, reachmg 51%. After the debt crisis, Americans were unwilling to lend to Latin
America, which in turn forced Latin America to diversify their funding sources quickly.
However, dollar bond issues have returned since 1994, though, reaching 64.2% of issues
in 1996 to November. 19.3% were in Deutsche Marks, 10.4% in yen and 6.1% in other
currencies. 312 Nevertheless, non-dollar issues are gaining popularity in Latin America,
since they present away to diversify obligations. Solomon Brothers reports that new
issues have inundated the international bond market with new Latin international
issues accounting for 8% ($44 billion) of the total compared with 3.5% ($13.5 billion) in
1995 and 5.1 % in the 1993, which was a record breaking year. Joe Cunningham,
assistant director for new issues at ANZ in London, confirms that Latin markets have
made a huge comeback from the "tequila crisis" of 1994, and 1996 will be regarded as a
banner year. Sovereign-guaranteed and sovereign-supported issues represented 77% of
new Latin issues year-to-date November, out-stripping commercial borrowing.
Colombian Non-private-sector borrowing was 96.1%; Mexican, 83.4%; Argentine,
82.6%.313
Lengths of the terms of bonds have been growing, showing signs of investor
confidence. A new trend developed in 1996 with Mexico's initiative to use new issues to
lengthen maturities, lower coupons and smooth out amortizations instead of solely to
310 Including note isssues under European medium-term notes (EMTN) programs. Source:
International Monetary Fund, International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects, and Key
Policy Issues, p. 93. Original source: IMF staff estimates based on Euromoney Bondware.
311 Includes Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
Guatamala, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uraguay, and Venezuela.
312
“The market likes the Latin look," Euromoney, December 1996, p. 96.
313
"The market likes the Latin look," Euromoney, December 1996, p. 93.
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raise cash. An example is the $6 billion five-year note issued by Mexico, collateralized
by Pemex earnings, which enabled Mexico to pre-pay $8 billion of the $50 billion
international bail-out debt saving $125 million in interest, the note earning a BBB minus
investment-grade rating from Standard & Poors, and gained favor with the U.S.. This
was the first time a Mexican Sovereign gained a non-junk bond rating on an issue.
Many analysts regard this as a move toward asset-backed issues.314
Securitization has also been taking off in Latin America, from virtually just a few
watershed deals in 1995 to at least 20 in the first nine months of 1996. The International
Finance Corporation has been instrumental in introducing this instrument, but local
banks such as Banco Hipotecario Nacional, Argentina's leading mortgage lender, have
further developed these sophisticated financial products. 313 The International Finance
Corporation, for example, organized a $255 million co-financed securitization package
for Argentina s Transportadors de Gas del Norte, a privatized natural gas transportation
company. The deal was the first of this type of deal that has received an investment
grade rating from major credit agencies. 316
3. Bank Loans
In most Latin American countries, banks were the center of the system of
financial intermediation. Securities markets were primitive until the late 1980's. 317
Because of the high inflation environment, savings were low and the need by
governments to collect inflation taxes caused central banks to impose extraordinarily
high reserve requirements, which restricted banks from lending.318
The debt crisis of 1982 had a serious effect on the financial sector. Without
foreign funding, there arose a situation in which many debtors could not pay their loans
or even interest on the loans. A number of financial institutions were liquidated during
this crisis. It was clear that there was a need for domestic savings and that strong policy
314
"The market likes the Latin look," Euromoney, December 1996, p. 94.
315 Jennifer Tierney, "Expansion in Latin America," Global Finance , v. 10 n. 10. October 1996. p.
42-44.
316
"IFC introduces Argentinian securitisation to the market" International Trade Finance
. n269.
Aug 30, 1996. p. 1-2.
317 Sebastian Edwards, Crisis and Reform in Latin America, From Despair to Hope, p. 203
318 Sebastian Edwards, Crisis and Reform in Latin America, From Despair to Hope, p. 202
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changes were necessary to encourage these changes. D.rect allocation of credit was
strongly reduced.
Between 1980 and 1985 in twelve Latin American countries, real interest rates
were mostly negative, which had serious implications for resource allocation and capital
flight. Credit allocation was distorted in a number of ways. First, state run banks gave
credits according to plans to certain sectors. Second, commercial banks were required to
lend certain amounts to specific industries. Third, central banks would rediscount some
of these commercial bank loans to specific sectors. Finally, commercial banks were
subject to varying reserve requirements, depending on the composition of their loan
portfolio. The level of distortion in the early and mid-eighties, according to Sebastian
Edwards, researcher at the World Bank, amounted to 40% of all loans in Argentina,
more than 25% in Mexico, and 80% in Brazil.
Table 47: New Medium- and
Long-Term Commitments. (USD millions) 319
1993 im 199$ 1996,1
Ql
Western Hemisphere 7,618 3,904 9,823 U18
Public sector 4,449 1,101 4,201 1,002
Private sector 3,169 2,802 5,622 616
There was a lack of regulation and oversight. For example, disclosure
requirements were minimal, qualities of loan portfolios were not analyzed,
questionable loans were allowed to be rolled over, unsecured loans (often to firms
partially owned by the banks) were allowed. Additionally, it was understood that
governments would bail out banks in trouble, thus encouraging imprudent behavior, or
as bankers call it, moral hazard. Add to this the fact that provisions for bad loans were
often not required, and the picture becomes dim. In 1985, provisions for non-
performing loans in Mexico and Argentina stood at lest than 25%.
In many instances, deregulation of interest rates was combined with
rationalization of reserve requirements.320 Efforts were made to introduce improved
319 International Monetary Fund, International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects, and
Key Policy Issues, p. 106. Source: IMF staff estimates on Euromoney Loanware.
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regulatory systems. Regulatory reforms included more stringent reporting standards,
and in many cases, harmonization to the Basle Accord standards*. Implementation of
reforms has proven difficult, due to lack of trained personnel and rivalry between
competing government institutions® The currently dominant view in the region is that
the government should have monitoring and supervision functions like that in the
United States, instead of an playing an active role, as in Asia, for example.
Debt stocks for Latin America from 1985 to 1995 were the following:
Table 48: Debt Stocks in Latin America
U.S. $ billion 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Long-term
1. OECD countries & capital
markets
259 272 281 270 260 234 237 248 246 253 265
ODA 10 12 13 13 13 15 14 15 15 16 16
Official/ ott. supported 35 38 47 46 49 57 65 73 80 84 87
Financial markets 214 222 221 211 197 162 157 160 152 153 162
Banks 195 204 203 192 174 138 131 128 102 100
Bonds 18 18 18 19 23 24 26 32 50 53
II. Multilateral 45 57 70 67 68 79 80 77 80 82 97
III. Non-OECD Creditor
countries
29 30 36 35 35 36 40 42 41 41 41
CEEC's 21 22 27 28 28 29 32 35 34 34
Other countries and
unspecified
7 8 9 8 7 7 7 7 7 6
Sub-total:
Long-term debt
333 359 387 372 363 349 357 367 367 433
Short-term
Banks 61 58 60 61 63 67 67 81 95 104 109
Export credits 6 8 11 12 13 16 18 16 13 15 15
Sub-total:
Short-term debt
67 67 71 73 75 83 85 97 108 119 124
Total identified debt 402 429 461 450 442 436 447 470 482 503 565
At the second quarter of 1996, the United States had $62,086 million im
commercial bank claims on Latin America, as against $34,900 million by German
commercial banks. 323 Claims by French commercial banks ran at approximately $17
320 Sebastian Edwards, Crisis and Reform in Latin America, From Despair to Hope, p. 210.
321 Sebastian Edwards, Crisis and Reform in Latin America, From Despair to Hope, p. 211.
322 Sebastian Edwards, Crisis and Reform in Latin America, From Despair to Hope, p. 211.
323
"Statistical Annex," Financial Flows and the Developing Countries . August, 1996, pp. 31-33.
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bUhon during the early 1990's. Canada's claims were between $13 and $14 billion
during the early 1990's. This represented around three-quarters of all Canadian lendrng
to the developing world. UK commercial bank claims on Latin America were also
comparatively large, growing from $17.7 to $20.5 billion from 1991 to 1994. Latin
America was Britain's largest emerging market debtor region. Italy's lending was
steady at around $9 billion, much of which allocated to Argentina. The Netherlands
and Switzerland both increased commercial bank claims on the region from $9.5 to $12
billion each from 1992 to 1995.
1. Financial Flows
B. Argentina
a. Foreign Direct Investment
As far as FDI is concerned, restrictions have been relaxed. Investors are under
no obligation to register investment to the government. Foreign investors have full
access to local credit markets. Prior approval of investment is required only in specific
and limited circumstances, such as defense. Finally, foreign investors may repatriate
profits at will, though there is a three year waiting period for the repatriation of capital
investments. 324 At the same time, foreign investment was encouraged by legislation that
guaranteed equal treatment of foreign and domestic capital. Additionally, the Foreign
Capital Investment Register changed its function from a screening devise into a simple
recording mechanism. As a complimentary part of the program to encourage FDI,
Argentina became a member to the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
of the World Bank in October, 1990. MIGA protects investment from political risk.
Further, Argentina signed investment guarantee agreements with Belgium, France,
Germany, Great Britain, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States.325
324 Guillermo Harteneck, "Privatization as a Catalyst for FDI: The Case of Argentina" pp.89-105.
325 Sebastian Edwards, Crisis and Reform in Latin America, From Despair to Hope, p. 219.
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Argentina
Austria 0
Belgium-Luxembourg 0
France 15
Germany 37
Japan 8
Netherlands 0
Spain 8
Sweden 9
Switzerland 0
United Kingdom 48
United States 2
Table 49: Direct Investment Abroad by Country
into Argentina (USD millions) 326
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1QQ9~
0
0
3
(28)
17
0
6
0
0
69
274
0
(2 )
24
187
15
0
28
3
0
58
-25
0
(24)
12
81
24
0
29
2
0
70
115
0
(15)
20
141
3
0
25
8
0
30
59
0
(1 )
51
(12)
213
0
105
10
0
16
379
0
(12)
20
224
40
1
12
(2)
0
22
367
1
9
31
(84)
18
87
57
28
0
86
558
1993 1994
0 3
(21)
98
53
34
42
26
2
35
161
(34)
322
149
21
271
52
0
36
75
1079 1419
Among major American investors, Chrysler, Lockheed Martin, Mattel, Wal-
Mart, and Warner-Lambert have all invested in long-term FDI in Argentina
.
327 The
United States' Dunkin' Donuts and France's Carrefour have moved in to take advantage
of new markets and auto giants such as General Motors and Toyota have set up shop to
take advantage of the Mercosur trade agreement. Food and agricultural conglomerates
326 Source: Author compiled information from: OECD, International Direct Investment Abroad
Yearbook
,
1996. Paris: OECD, 1996. Drawn from data from the following reporting sources:
Austria,data rom balance of payments statistics, Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Annual Report,
various issues; Belgium-Luxembourg, Banque Nationale de Belgique, Annual Report, various
issues; Denmark, Danmarks Nationalbank; Finland, Suomen Pankki Finlands Bank, Annual
Report, various issues; France, Banque de France, Balance des paiements. Annexes, various
issues; Germany, Joint OECD-Eurostat questionnaire, Deutsche Bundesbank; Italy, until 1991,
Eurostat Questionnaire A: Direct Investsmaent Capital and Income Flows, from 1992, Joint
Eurostat-OECD qestionnaire, Japan, data refer to notifications of investment approved by the
Ministry of Finance per Ministry of Finance, Monthly Finance Review, various issues;
Netherlands, Up to 1993, excluding reinvested earnings, De Nederlandsche Bank; New Zealand,
Statistics New Zealand:; Norway, Norges Bank, Annual DReport, various issues; Portugal, Banco
de Portugal, unpublished data; Spain, Until 1990 data refer to received and approved
applications, from 1991, data refer to BOP statistics outlining actual investment figures, per
Secretaia de Estado de Comercio, Ministerio de Industria, Comercio y Turismo, Annual Report,
various issues; Sweden, Ministry of Finance, Department for Financial Institutions and Markets,
national submissions to the OECD; Switzerland, Schweizerische National Bank; United Kingdom,
Office for National Statistics, Central Statistical Office, Bussines Monitor 1994 MA4, Overseas
Direct Investment; United States, on CSFR table prior to 1993 the amount reported is for
Czechoslovakia, United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey
of Current Business, various issues. Data is direct investment abroad information on outward
investment to Argentina and is probably underreported. Numbers do not add to Argentina's
annual FDI aggregate flows, as reporting cam be assumed to be incomplete. The data was
converted into US Dollars using the year-end 1994 exchange rates as published in the
International Financial Statistics Yearbook published by the International Finance Corporation.
The information represented here has no claim to precision, but should serve the purpose of
illustrating general trends.
327 Carl Fionore, "Another crossroads," Worldbusiness, v2nl, Jan/Feb 1996, pp.46-47.
119
such as Cargill and Nabisco have invested in export-oriented plants and facilities .328
McDonald's (USA) will add 31 new restaurants in Argentina this year to its existing
chain of 65 at a cost of $50m. 329 Coca Cola will invest $1 billion over the next five years
to upgrade bottling plants.33° Kimberly-Clark (USA) has doubled its share in Kimberly-
Clark Argentina to 100%. According to OECD statistics, the US has been the main
foreign direct mvestor m Argentina in recent years, followed by the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands, France and Germany. A rough breakdown of FDI flows is available
through chart 43.
Privatization has driven a great deal of FDI. Through 1993, FDI accounted for
nearly 61 ^ of the shareholdings of newly privatized companies.
b. Portfolio Investment
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Outflows
Inflows (1,098)
(241)
(1,105)
(8,261)
8,227
(80)
795
(2,037)
19,992
(185)
3,847
64
4,637
Foreign investors returned in to the Argentine stock market 1991 after having
been absent for all practical purposes. The return was directly related to the tying of the
currency to the US dollar. Cavallo's convertibility set the Argentinean Peso equal to one
U.S. dollar at January 1, 1992, and prohibited indexing. Government wages were
frozen, while taxes were increased. This plan, combined with privatization led to a
reduction in the government's budget deficit from 13% of GNP in mid-1989 to a slight
surplus. 333 As of 1989, a number of state reforms influenced the stability of the economy.
328 Carl Honore, "Another crossroads," pp.46-47.
329
"Argentina" Business Latin America. July 1, 1996. p. 5.
33°
"Argentina" Business Latin America. July 1, 1996. p. 5.
331
"Argentina" Business Latin America. July 1, 1996. p. 5.
332 1971-88 Sources:OECD/DAF and UNCTAD, based on official national statistics from the
balance of payments converted in US$ at daily average exchange rates. 1989-95 source: IMF,
International Financial Statistics, Washington: IMF/World Bank. December, 1996. pp. 100, 150,
428.
333 Eduardo Tapia,. "Argentina," in Park, Keith K.H. and VanAgtmael, Antoine W. (eds.), The
World's Emerging Stock Markets: Structure, Developments, Regulation & Opportunities .
Chicago and Cambridge, England: Probus Publishing Co., 1993. pp. 326-328.
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In November, 1989, a new foreign investment regime was instated, which treated
foreign and domestic capital equally. Hence, there was no need for prior permission,
and no legal limitations on the size or type of foreign investment. Further, repatriation
of capital investment or dividends was allowed.
Much FDI was achieved through a program by the Argentinean government to
swap debt for equity that had converted $7.3 billion in external debt into equity
investment. This is about 12% of all commercial debt to foreign banks.
American Depository Rights (ADR) or deposit shares that can be traded on
American exchanges, have been a popular way for American and other investors to
access the Argentine equity market. Although few Argentine companies have
approached the U.S. equity market with ADR programs, an Argentine banker
commented that the process is beginning slowly and will accelerate.334 ADR programs
were initiated in 1994 by the following companies:
Table 51: Argentine ADR Programs in 1994
Telefonica de Argentina
Inversiones y
Representaciones IRSA (real
estate)
Capex (electricity generator)
MetroGas (gas distribution)
Baesa (beverages)
Telecom
New York stock exchange, to
supplant its Rule 144A and
Regulation S programs,
converted from Rule 144A to
fully listed shares. New York
Stock Exch.
$163.6 million
$121.5 million
$197 million
Fully listed ADR
registration. New York Stock
Exchange.335
As previously mentioned, Argentina has become a favorite among investors
from low interest rate environments --such as Japan and Germany-- in search of high-
yield debt. Due to the high demand for high-yield debt instruments by Germany, Japan
and other non-U.S. investors, Argentina was able by the second half of 1995 to raise
334 John Barham, "Financial Times Survey, Latin American Finance: Privatisation Winding
Down," Financial Times, April 11, 1994.
335 YVorld Bank, 1995 Emerging Stock Markets Factbook Emereing Markets Data Base,
Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1995. p. 125.
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about $4.8 (about 90 percent of the 1994 total) with 23 bond issues, with half from
foreign investors. The strong trend spilled into the first quarter of 1996 with 15 bond
issues totaling in excess of $3.8.336 There is no reason to expect the trend toward
increased bond issues in Yen or DM denominated debt will slow in the near future.
c. Bank Loans
Argentina's recent external debt position is shown as follows:
Table 52: Argentine Debt Stocks
U.S. $ millions 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Long-term
I. OECD countries & 32,170 35,058 35,643 42,176 40,281 45,305 39,065 40,193 38,493 39,224 40,694
capital markets
ODA 130 151 170 206 266 305 405 536 563 732 792
Official/ off.
supported
2,360 4,064 3,489 6,096 5,923 6,737 7,544 8,235 8,096 9,784 11,492
Financial markets 29,680 30,843 31,983 35,874 34,092 38,264 31,117 31,422 29,835 28,709 28,410
Banks 21,944 21,069 22,256 26,083 24,966 25,469 19,074 20,688 18,215 12,281 11,910
Bonds 7,736 9,774 9,728 9,790 9,127 12,795 12,043 10,733 11,620 16,428 16,500
II. Multilateral 2,538 4,214 5,318 8,082 7,706 7,461 8,090 7,902 7,351 10,632 11,907
III. Non-OECD 457 357 452 521 573 606 745 723 753 486 446
Creditor countries
CEEC's 274 299 397 377 334 350 411 429 458 235 213
Other countries
and unspecified
184 58 55 143 239 256 332 293 294 250 233
Sub-total: 35,166 39,629 41,413 50,778 48,561 53,372 47,900 48,818 46,597 50,343 53,046
Long-term debt
Short-term
Banks 3,710 7,168 8,824 8,158 11,614 6,074 10,506 8,653 13,278 14,484 18,092
Export credits 664 992 1,108 1,359 1,376 1,427 1,420 1,373 1,483 1,120 1,174
sub-total: 4,374 8,161 9,932 9,517 12,990 7,501 11,926 10,026 14,761 15,604 19,267
Short-term debt
Total identified debt 41 .877 50.020 53.875 62.701 64.148 62.426 61 .714 60.844 64.278 69,771 77,429
Commercial bank claims by US banks grew from about $10.9 billion to $11.3
billion from mid-1995 to mid 1996.337 British commercial bank claims also grew from
336 International Monetary Fund, International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects, and
Key Policy Issues, p. 113.
337
"Statistical Appendix," Financial Flows and the Developine Countries, p. 33. Unfortunately,
the publication does not publish commercial bank claims information with a standard time frame
across countries. Thus, I will list available information as presented by the statistical appendix.
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$2.7 to 3.9 billion from 1991 to 1995. Dutch claims rose from $1.4 to $1.7 billion from
1992 to mid-1995, while Swiss claims almost doubled for the same period from $1.6 to
$3.0 billion. Canadian claims hovered between $0.7 and $0.9 billion, while French
claims dropped from $2.3 to $2.1 billion. Between mid-1995 and mid-1996, Germany's
claims remained unchanged at $7.7 billion while Italy's sunk from $3.5 billion to $3.1
billion. The levels among commercial banks have been relatively steady given the
disturbance of the Mexican peso crisis.
An interesting lender to Argentina has been Italy. This may be due to cultural
factors, as a large portion of the Argentinean population traces its heritage to Italy.
Further, both economies have high interest rate environments and in this respect, there
would be little economic reason for such strong Italian interest in Argentina. 338
The IMF stepped in with a program to help bridge the liquidity crisis brought
about by the Mexican peso crisis. But foreign investor confidence has not strongly
returned, in large part because of hesitation to continue economic reforms. Part of this
also has to do with political infighting that further fuels skepticism. The minister of
economy, Domingo Cavallo, is on poor terms with the legislatures, key members of the
cabinet, and Menem. 339 Carlos Rivas, chief economist at the Center for Latin American
Studies, a think tank in Buenos Aires, commented that, “this recession has dragged on
because we have dithered and sent the wrong signals." 348 Only 60 percent of the cash
that exited Argentina due to the “tequila effect" had returned by September of 1996.341
Although capital flows in Argentina are more diverse than some other Latin
American countries, the pattern is still regional, with large flows originating in the USA.
338 Bill Hinchberger, “Latin America, a Movable Feast," pp. 69-74.
339 Carl Honore, "Another crossroads," pp.46-47.
340 Carl Honore, "Another crossroads," pp.46-47.
341 Carl Honore, "Another crossroads," pp.46-47.
123
2. Business Practices
a. The Economy
Smce the remtroduction of democracy in Argentina in 1983, the country has been
undergoing profound transformation in the economic sphere as well. Since 1983, the
country has successfully faced three presidential and almost a dozen legislative
elections and a Constitutional Reform. The Alfonsin government started to deregulate
the fmancial sector in 1987, when interest rates were liberalized. Efforts were also made
to monitor and improve the portfolio quality of the National Mortgage Bank and the
National Development Bank. In 1988, the government still had a dominant role in the
banking system. It owned 36 banks, representing 45% of all deposits and 71% of all
credits. As the situation deteriorated in 1989, the government freed the exchange rate,
which heightened instability and precipitated the hyper-inflation of 1989. 342 During
President Raul Alfonsin'
s government (1983-88), the stock market performed poorly,
though democracy was reinstated. At that point, market capitalization was between $1-
2 billion and daily trade volumes were a mere $1.5 million. Lack of liquidity was due to
undervalued prices and the fact that most big companies were held by family groups
that controlled 70% or more of the company's market capitalization.
President Carlos Menem assumed office in July, 1989. His government proposed
a plan to turn around the declining economy. The key aspects of the program were the
privatization of state-owned companies combined with the introduction of competitive
markets.343 The Convertibility Plan launched by President Menem and Economy
Minister Cavallo on March 20, 1991, set Argentina in a virtuous circle of economic
growth, low inflation, foreign investment and economic stability that the country had
not experienced since the beginning of the century. With the Convertibility Plan,
financial deregulation took off. The exchange rate was fixed to the dollar, restricting the
government's ability to finance a government deficit. President Menem signed an
omnibus decree on October 31, 1991 ordering broad economic and financial reform.
Concrete measures included in the decree were the following:
342 Sebastian Edwards, Crisis and Reform in Latin America, From Despair to Hope, p. 218.
343 Guillermo Harteneck, "Privatization as a Catalyst for FDI: The Case of Argentina" pp.89-105.
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1. Securities issues became exempt from the stamp tax.
2. The tax on transfer of securities was abolished.
3. The minimum investment period was abolished.
4. Stock, bond, and securities transactions became exempt from income tax.
5. Banks were allowed to act as brokers.
6. Brokerage houses could freely set their own fees and commissions.
7. The Securities and Exchange Commission was authorized to allow trading of
derivative instruments.
8. Capital and exchange controls were fully lifted.
9. Reserve requirements were rationalized, eliminating different levels for
different loan categories.344
Stocks
in %
Public
Bonds
in %
1987 12% 88%
1988 27% 73%
1989 51% 49%
1990 54% 46%
1991 80% 20% 345
Further, the corporate bonds law was reformed. Investment was considered a bit of a
casino affair before the economic reforms, with the investor-base very limited and
research sparse. With the entrance of new regulation and foreign investors, the market
became more sophisticated. In the early 1990's the market capitalization soared from a
volatile $1-2 billion in the eighties to $18.5 billion in 1992 to $44 billion in 1994. This was
in response to the government tying the currency to the dollar, which boosted
confidence in a lasting economic restructuring.346 Although the capital markets were
previously dominated by public bonds, the stock markets have been growing rapidly
344 Eduardo Tapia, "Argentina," and Sebastian Edwards, Crisis and Reform in Latin America,
From Despair to Hope, p. 219.
345 Eduardo Tapia, "Argentina," pp. 332.
346 Eduardo Tapia, "Argentina," pp. 321.
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from 12% of the trading volume to 80% from 1987 to 1991. See the table for
documentation on the change in trading volumes.
Below is a table with key figures on the Argentine Stock Market. It should be
noted that as of the second quarter of 1996, the market capitalization (total value of the
market based on current pricing) had recovered and hit a new high at $44,108 million.
Trading value remained roughly the same as in 1995
.
347
Table 54: Buenos Aires Stock Exchange348
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Number of Listed
Companies
217 206 186 178 179 174 175 180 156 149
Market
Capitalization
(USD mio.)
1,591 1,519 2,025 4,225 3,268 18,509 18,633 43,967 36,864 37,783
% change -4.5 33.3 108.6 -22.7 466.4 0.7 136.0 - 16.2 2.5
Trading Value
(USD mio.)
309 251 593 1,916 852 4,824 15,679 10,339 11,372 4,594
Turnover ratio 16.1 14.7 28.9 24.5 33.6 45.3 83.9 33 28.1 12.3
Change in Local
Index (%)
19.3 164.5 526.3 17231
.
8
207.1 710.6 -24.8 53.5 -23.1 2.4
Gross domestic
product (US$)
78,801 82,635 83,808 68,997 105,440 189,216 228,512 255,377 281,600
Although the stock market recovered quicker than might be expected, the
Mexican devaluation of December 1994 hit Argentina extremely hard. It was perceived
by foreign investors that the country shared many of the symptoms of the Mexican
economy. Argentina faced a liquidity crisis that turned into deep recession. In 1995
lending stopped, domestic demand contracted, GDP plummeted 3.9% and
unemployment skyrocketed to a record 18.4% in May 1995. The recession is
highlighting deeper economic and political problems. Constant confrontations between
President Menem and Minister Cavallo ended in July 26, 1996, when the President
347
"Statistical Annex," Financial Flows and the Developing Countries, pp. 31-33.
348 Note: The base date for the Bolsa Indice General is Dec. 29, 1977=0.00001. The Argentinian
Stock Exchange of Buenos Aires is the oldest in Latin America. It was founded in 1854 and was
the first to establish a securities commission in 1937. Its highpoint was in the 1930's when it
played a strong role in the Argentinian economy and was comparable in size to many European
stock exchanges. Eduardo Tapia, "Argentina," p. 321. Source: IFC, Emerging Stock Markets
Factbook, 1996 .
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decided to sack Cavallo. Roque Fernandez, president of the Central Bank, was
appointed new Economy Minister.*’ Despite this turbulence and strikes in 1996, the
government has stood, by its economic reform plan.
Like some other Latin American countries, Argentina has liberalized its pension
plan, allowing funds paid into AFJP (Administradoras de Fondos de Jubilacion y
Pensiones), a pension fund which will be permitted to invest up to 50% in equities.350
This plan came into effect in mid-1994 and has helped the stock market to develop.
Already the government has introduced changes in the health insurance system that
provide for competition through private health organizations.35! This movement
represents part of a larger move away from a stakeholder value toward a shareholder
value model of economic organization.
Evaluating the government's economic policy and development of capital
markets over the past five years leads to the clear conclusion that as far as these points
are concerned, the country is moving toward a shareholder value model of business
practices. This is reaffirmed by the willingness of financial markets to step in relatively
quickly after the peso crisis, the government's steadfast adherence to its policy, even in
face of protest by its Peronist base of workers, and the move toward privatization of the
pension plan.
b. Firms
In Argentina, there has been a real growth in investment and merchant banking
culture since the reforms starting in 1987. New financial shops are opening to take
advantage to changing market conditions, while old ones are struggling to adapt. One
of the new shops is Buenos Aires Capital Partners which was set up by former JP
Morgan executives and has started out as financial advisor to the government and to
buyers of privatized companies.352
349
"Mexico Back in Favor With Global Investors: Latin Markets" Bloomberg News Wire, Mexico
City, August 23 1996 18:17.
350 World Bank, 1994 Emerging Stock Markets Factbook, Emerging Markets Data Base,
Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994. p. 125.
351 Stephen Fidler and David Pilling, "Argentina: Labour reform puts Menem on the line."
Financial Times, Wednesday, December 18, 1996.
352 John Barham, "Financial Times Survey, Latin American Finance: Privatisation Winding Down.
127
Mergers and acquisitions activity is at an all-time high in Argentina. Like
Germany, many sellers are family-owned, medium-size companies that lack the
technology, capital, and management to compete globally. These companies did quite
well while protected from foreign competition. The opening of the market affords
foreign buyers supplemental opportunities to enter Argentina and the Mercosur
market. 333 Mr. Timothy Gibbs, president of Buenos Aires Capital Partners, notes that as
investors become more comfortable with Argentina mergers and acquisitions will
probably mcrease with a corresponding increase in investment banking.354 Acquisitions
have been made by multinationals such as Cadbury-Schweppes and Procter and
Gamble and companies from Brazil, Chile and Venezuela.355
This trend in mergers and acquisition is rationalizing management. Coupled
with increased competition, the consolidation and transformation of the Argentine
economy is forcing change. 336 This change should not be painted overly dramatically, as
many families are hesitant to sell their companies and even though investors are eager
to buy stocks at a premium, few companies have gone public. Nonetheless, a
rationalization of management through mergers and acquisitions driven by foreigners
and Anglo-style investment banks is gradually changing the business environment to
reflect a more shareholder-value oriented model. The goals of investors change to
return on equity as companies are encorporated into larger publicly listed enterprises or
become publicly listed themselves.
c. Banks
Before the late 1980's, the government often relied on the financial sector to
finance its budget. The most common form was for the government to borrow money
by raising the compulsory reserve requirements. The reserve requirement reached an
353 Pablo Maas, "Argentina: Fire sale," Business Latin America , v. 31 n. 16. April 22, 1996. p. 6.
354 John Barham, "Financial Times Survey, Latin American Finance: Privatisation Winding
Down."
355 John Barham, "Financial Times Survey, Latin American Finance: Privatisation Winding
Down."
356 John Barham, "Financial Times Survey, Latin American Finance: Privatisation Winding
Down."
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absurd 65% by December 1988. To allow this to continue, the government paid interest
on the reserves.
Argentine banks and brokerage firms (about 170 total each) are generally under-
capitalized and in precarious condition exposing the wider market to uncertainty.357
The banking system continues to be highly segmented and concentrated with 60 percent
of total assets and deposits held by private banks. During 1996, total assets of the
largest 20 banks, including five public sector banks, increased from 64 percent to 75
percent. 338 If banks go the way of the Mexican banking, adopting American generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP), they will restructure and perform according to
principles of Anglo banks.
Given the strong development of capital markets and relative resilience, the
emerging corporate culture of mergers and acquisitions changing from family to
professional management, the commitment of the government to stand behind market
reforms, and the strong foreign direct investment position of America and Great Britain,
it is fair to say that Argentina is tending toward a shareholder value model of economic
practices.
C. Brazil
1. Financial Flows
a. Foreign Direct Investment
Brazil relaxed FDI restrictions in mid-1990. 359 Foreign direct investment has
soared to an expected $7 billion in 1996 since the introduction of the Real.360 It is
important to note that 50-60% of Brazil's investments were debt-to-equity conversions.
357 John Barham, "Financial Times Survey, Latin American Finance: Privatisation Winding
Down."
358 International Monetary Fund, International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects, and
Key Policy Issues, p. 113.
359 Sebastian Edwards, Crisis and Reform in Latin America, From Despair to Hope, p.247.
360 Andrew Shores, "Brazil: Still a Big Challenge, But With Big Rewards," Institutional Investor,
v. 30 n. 10, October, 1996. pp. IB3-IB4.
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Mexico was a different story, with as most of it has been "fresh" as opposed to debt-
equity swap activity. 361
Brazilian mergers and acquisitions activity has grown throughout the decade
and is surging toward a new record in 1996, largely due to growing involvement of
foreign companies. 36- Foreign companies' share of acquisitions has increased from 34%
m to 48% in 1996. Foreign investors share in joint ventures grew from 62% to
78%.363 Foreign firms are becoming more comfortable with risk as they increase
investment in Brazil. Price Waterhouse reports transactions increased from 185 in 1991
to 318 in 1995. The transactions in the first five months of the current year jumped from
100 to 154 from the same period in 1995, while foreign companies increased their share
of acquisitions from 34% in 1993 to 48% in 1996. In the same period their share of joint
ventures increased from 62% to 78%.364 KPMG Peat Marwick reports that the number of
deals has risen 396% since 1992.365
While concentration is presently on Brazil's food companies and consolidating
bank sectors, and will continue to attract investors, the pharmaceutical and software
sectors, which have received new patent protection, should see increased activity.366 For
example, Microsoft CEO Bill Gates has closed agreements with two Brazilian
companies, Itautec and Procomp, to jointly develop bank automation, commercial
software applications and home banking. Microsoft also made an arrangement with
Brazil's largest privately owned bank, Bradesco. Gates said, "I've always been
impressed with the technology in the banking system here and I'm hopeful about
broader PC distribution. There is incredible potential here, and we're taking a long-term
approach to making this happen." 367
361 Susan Kaufmann Prucell & Francoise Simon, "Introduction" in Susan Kaufmann Prucell &
Francoise Simon, Europe and Latin America in the World Economy . Boulder: Lynne Rienner,
1995. pp. 18-21.
362 Jonathan Wheatley, "Buying Brazil," Business Latin America , July 22, 1996. p. 1-2.
363 Jonathan Wheatley, "Buying Brazil." p. 1-2.
364 Jonathan Wheatley, "Buying Brazil." p. 1.
365 Jonathan Wheatley, "Buying Brazil." p. 1.
366 Jonathan Wheatley, "Buying Brazil." p. 1.
367
"The Real Thing," World Trade, v. 9 n. 11, November, 1996, pp.50-54.
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The potential Gates may have been talking about could be Brazil's market of 159
million people.368 Ernest McCrary argues that reforms and increased stability in Brazil
is not drawing investment as much as the demographics of the country. With such a
large market and a growmg middle class, as well access to Argentina, Uruguay, and
Paraguay through Mercosur, he claims that it is no wonder that Brazil attracted some
$45 billion in foreign direct investment in the past two decades.36* For similar reasons to
Microsoft, McDonald's plans to invest $500 million in Brazil by 2000. 37°
Table 55: Some of the main acquisitions in Brazil during 1996
Local asset Foreign company Sector
Chocolates Lacta Philip Morris (USA) Food
Edisa Hewlett Packard (USA) IT
Supergasbras Calor Group PLC (UK)
SHV Holding
(Netherlands)
Cooking gas
Drogasil Westag & Gelalit
(Germany)
Chemist Shops
Mercatic Chick Point Systems (USA) Check-out systems
Tinas Coral ICI (UK) Food
Vick product Line Procter & Gamble (USA) Health care
J. Macedo Alimentos United Biscuits (USA/UK) Food
Diversey Unilever (USA) Cleaning products
Refripar Electrolux (Sweden) White goods
Heads Propaganda Young & Rubicam (USA) Advertising
Ind.C.Fabrini NHK Spring Co. (Japan) Car parts
Rassini Autopartes (Mexico)
Sources: KPMG, EIU371
368 The Economist, The Economist Pocket World in Figures, 1997 edition, p. 100.
369 Ernest S McCrary, "Targeting Investment to: Brazil," Global Finance , v. 9 n. 11. November,
1995. pp. 20-21.
37°
“The Real Thing," World Trade, pp. 50-54.
371 Jonathan Wheatley, "Buying Brazil." p. 1.
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The following table provides a rough breakdown of direct investment abroad by
OECD countries into Brazil:
Table 56: Direct Investment Abroad to Brazil372
Austria
Belgium-Luxembourg
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Japan
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
0
(2)
0
0
0
0
0
24 36 (16)
326 (17) 130
314 270 229
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0
65
0
0
58
173
510
0
0
0
0
64
0
0
(21)
101
349
0
0
0
6
0
39
0
0
83
113
615
0
0
0
7
Spain 5 2 11 13 6 61
Sweden (4) (30) 15 4 (16) 4
Switzerland 0 0 0 0 0 0
United Kingdom 183 400 472 406 420 328
United States 134 261 911 2189 3014 876
0 3 4 18
(17) 10 (18) (119)
0 0 0 9
0 16 13 27
(85) 41 46 38
207 184 (131) 473
171 464 419 1235
218 46 449 557
2 (1) (1) 0
0 0 0 31
1 -1 3
39 12 1 28
5 (9) 10 14
0 0 235 (69)
139 189 64 455
890 2054 3263 3303
3
- Source: Author compiled from information from: OECD, International Direct Investment
Abroad Yearbook, 1996. Paris: OECD, 1996. Drawn from data from the following reporting
sources: Austria,data rom balance of payments statistics, Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Annual
Report, various issues; Belgium-Luxembourg, Banque Nationale de Belgique, Annual Report,
various issues, Denmark, Danmarks Nationalbank; Finland, Suomen Pankki Finlands Bank,
Annual Report, various issues; France, Banque de France, Balance des paiements. Annexes,
various issues; Germany, Joint OECD-Eurostat questionnaire, Deutsche Bundesbank; Italy, until
1991, Eurostat Questionnaire A: Direct Investsmaent Capital and Income Flows, from 1992, Joint
Eurostat-OECD questionnaire; Japan, data refer to notifications of investment approved by the
Ministry of Finance per Ministry of Finance, Monthly Finance Review, various issues;
Netherlands, Up to 1993, excluding reinvested earnings, De Nederlandsche Bank; New Zealand,
Statistics New Zealand:; Norway, Norges Bank, Annual DReport, various issues; Portugal, Banco
de Portugal, unpublished data; Spain, Until 1990 data refer to received and approved
applications, from 1991, data refer to BOP statistics outlining actual investment figures, per
Secretaia de Estado de Comercio, Ministerio de Industria, Comercio y Turismo, Annual Report,
various issues; Sweden, Ministry of Finance, Department for Financial Institutions and Markets,
national submissions to the OECD; Switzerland, Schweizerische National Bank; United Kingdom,
Office for National Statistics, Central Statistical Office, Bussines Monitor 1994 MA4, Overseas
Direct Investment; United States, on CSFR table prior to 1993 the amount reported is for
Czechoslovakia, United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey
of Current Business, various issues. Data is direct investment abroad information on outward
investment to Argentina and is probably underreported. Numbers do not add to Argentina's
annual FDI aggregate flows, as reporting cam be assumed to be incomplete. The data was
converted into US Dollars using the year-end 1994 exchange rates as published in the
International Financial Statistics Yearbook published by the International Finance Corporation.
The information represented here has no claim to precision, but should serve the purpose of
illustrating general trends.
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Tariff barriers have also encouraged investment. For example, barriers in the
Brazilian automotive industry have encouraged direct foreign investment. Whereas
imported autos face a duty of 70%, domestic producers need pay only 3% tariff for
imported parts. Thus, the incentive has been strong for foreign producers to set up shop
m Brazil, one of the world's booming auto markets. Auto manufacturers are in the
forefront investing in Brazil and Mercosur with recent commitments by Honda (Japan)
for a $100 million plant; Chrysler (USA) a $315 million truck plant as well as a joint
venture with BMW (Germany) to produce engines; Hyundai (South Korea) - seeking a
Brazilian partnership to produce cars; Skoda (Czech Republic) plans a plant to produce
500 small trucks annually.373 Auto manufacturing has been a particularly important
destination for FDI in Brazil. 374
b. Portfolio Investment in Brazil
In the spring of 1995, the president of Brazil came for a visit of state. He made
two stops. First he visited Wall Street, only afterwards, he visited the White House. His
priorities were clear, and the first priority was to reassure foreign investors. In
retrospect, Brazil was able to deal quite well with the uncertainty that the peso crisis
caused. As a testament to financial markets' confidence in the country, Brazil set a new
record for itself in 1996 as it rose $13.6 billion in local debt abroad.375
373
"Brazil," Business Latin America, October 28, 1996. p. 5.
374
"Fine For Some." The Economist . September 28, 1996.
375
"Brazil: Portfolio investment into the country is in high gear," Crossborder Monitor , v. 4 n. 38,
September 25, 1996, p. 2.
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Table 57: Brazil: Financial Account 1989-94
Direct invest
Abroad
FDI
Portfolio
Outflows
Portfolio
Inflows
Other Ouflows
Other inflows
Financial
Account
•1989 1990 1991 1992 199£ ! 1994 1995
(523) (665) (1 ,014) (137) (491 ) (1 ,037) ( 1 ,384 )
1,131
(30)
989
(67)
1,103 2,061 1,292 3,072
(606) (3 ,052)
4,859
(936)
(391 ) 579 3,808 7,366 12,928 47,784 10,171
(894 ) (2,864) (3 ,140 ) (99)
(11 ,818 ) (3 ,539) (4 ,886) (2,675)
(2,696) (4 ,368) (1 ,783)
(2,823) (34 ,434) 18,383
(12,525) (5 ,567) (4 ,129 ) 6,516 7,604 7,965 29,310
The 1995 Mexican crisis had repercussions in Brazil when the IFCI index
dropped 32.5 ^ due primarily to investors who wanted to realize their Brazilian profits
to cover their Mexican losses.376 To cope with the high capital outflows in the first
quarter of 1995 the Brazilian government discontinued the 1% tax on inflows of foreign
equity investment. The tax did not slacken foreign investment because of high local
interest rates which continued to attract foreign investment which in turn increased
inflationary pressure.377 By the third quarter, with inflation appearing to be under
control, the stock market bounded upward with speculation by foreign investors. The
government increased the financial tax on foreign investments from 5% to 7%, and
restrictions were placed on foreign participation in futures and options markets in order
to inhibit foreign speculators.378 Brazil has reached a new high for international funding
of portfolio investment- $13 billion as of September 1996 as against $12.9 billion for all of
1995. Sovereign debt is minimal in this kind of investment in Brazil (3.7%), compared to
Mexico(44.1%) and Argentina (63.6%)379
376 The IFCI index is an index published by the IFC that measures stock performance in various
emerging markets. World Bank, 1996 Emerging Stock Markets Factbook . p. 131.
377 World Bank, 1995 Emerging Stock Markets Factbook Emerging Markets Data Base ,
Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1995. p. 129.
378 World Bank, 1996 Emerging Stock Markets Factbook, p. 131.
379
"Finance - Brazil," Crossborder Monitor, September 25, 1996, p. 2.
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Long-term
I. OECD &
capital markets
81,738 80,780 80,750 80,465 82,292 76,219 72,070 74,454 82,366 84,132 80,589
ODA
Official/ off.
supported
Financial
markets
Banks
Bonds
1,567
11,887
68,284
66,586
1,698
1,784
11,490
67,507
65,690
1,816
2,428
12,829
65,699
63,911
1,787
2,083
15,189
62,840
61,324
1,516
1,927
14,355
65,854
64,308
1,546
1,995
17,051
57,241
55,058
2,183
1,875
18,968
51,108
48,769
2,339
2,238
20,271
52,312
50,780
1,532
2,471
21,994
58,124
54,003
4,131
2,416
23,270
58,391
49,682
8,709
22,134
56,039
46,532
9,507
II. Multilateral 9,807 11,978 14,528 16,260 14,731 13,507 13,212 12,311 10,867 9,735 9,458
III. Non-OECD 1,051 810 700 566 141 184 185 285 317 197 166
CEEC’s 161 138 145 176 99 143 131 128 109 143 127
Other
countries &
unspecified
598 439 382 280 17 17 37 120 199 45 32
Sub-total:
Long-term debt:
Short-term
92,595 93,568 95,978 97,291 97,164 89,910 85,468 87,050 93,550 94,064 90,213
Banks 5,779 6,871 11,886 14,305 8,216 11,902 13,184 7,278 6,019 12,810 8,673
Export credits 1,373 1,363 2,716 3,086 3,551 3,461 4,938 6,193 5,657 4,576 5,320
Sub-total:
Short-term debt:
7,152 8,234 14,603 17,391 11,767 15,363 18,121 13,471 11,676 17,386 13,994
Total
identified
debt: 380
99,747 101.802 110.581 114.682 108.931 105.273 103589 100.521 105.227 111.450 104.207
Maria Clara Soares, an economist with the Brazilian think tank IBASE (Brazilian
Institute for Social and Economic Affairs), stated that from 1983 to 1992, Brazil sent $123
billion out of the country, an amount that nearly represents Brazil's entire debt burden
today. Nonetheless, according to financial accounts published by the World Bank, total
identified debt has hovered constantly between $100 billion and $110 billion between
1984 and 1994. Necessarily, Brazil had been going through a period of negative resource
transfer to service and amortize its debt. In 1979, when interest rates soared, the
government allowed the private sector to pay the debts in national currency and
transfer the debt in foreign currency to state. Through this transfer, a significant portion
380 Total owed, both private and public.
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of Brazil's private sector loans were converted to the public sector. By the end of the
1980s, 90% of Brazil's debt belonged to the public sector. 38^ Starting with President
Collor, a number of agreements were concluded to help manage this incredible sum.
The primary agreement with private commercial banks was concluded through the
Brady Plan (masterminded by then U.S. Treasury secretary James Brady) in April 1994.
Using seven different kinds of bonds, the Brady plan restructured the $49 billion debt
owed to commercial banks. 382 This securitization allowed debt to be traded and valued
by markets, and though commercial banks had to write off large amounts, this plan
helped Brazil recover from serious debt problems. Recent private debt activities have
been similar to the Brady Plan, insofar as securitization is being employed on an
increasing basis. In Brazil, bankers sold $1 billion worth of new Eurobonds backed by
outstanding government loans. Investors buying the new security were able to capture
higher yields than offered on comparable Brazilian government debt.
American commercial banks held the largest share of Brazilian debt, growing
from $11 to $16 billion from 1995 to 1996. UK and German commercial banks increased
exposure from $4 to $5 billion and from $10 to $11 billion during the same period,
respectively. Canada, Switzerland and Netherlands's claims were all approximately $2
billion. France's commercial bank claims on Brazil fluctuated from $7 to $8 billion
during the early nineties.
2. Business Practices
a. Economy
"Chile and Argentina achieved stability well before, but Latin America without
Brazil is like Hamlet without a prince," said Winston Fritsch, a former member of the
Real Plan brain trust, now president of Kleinwort Benson Brasil, the Brazilian branch of
the London-based investment bank. 383 The Plano Real, that called for a new currency,
381 Michael Shellenberger, "Brazil's Debt Debacle: An Interview with Maria Clara Soares," Dollars
and Sense, May/June 1995 pp. 22-25.
382 Michael Shellenberger, "Brazil's Debt Debacle: An Interview with Maria Clara Soares," pp. 22-
25.
383 "The Real Thing," World Trade, pp.50-54.
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the real, initiated on July 1 as part of the anti-inflation campaign, was pegged at one real
per dollar, but quickly became valued at 0.85 real per U.S. dollar.** But restored foreign
confidence in the economy and brought widespread popularity to one of its engineers,
Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Cardoso began his term as president on January 1
,
1995
promising to act on deregulation and decentralization matters and to promote health,
education, housing, and agriculture projects.385 Gustavo Franco, director of
international affairs at the Brazilian Central Bank emphasized the irreversibility of the
reforms w.th an interesting comparison, "It takes time, but the change is inevitable
-like
the abolition of slavery in the last century." 385 Market participants view this change
optimistically, but are impatient for further reform. "The reforms are moving more
slowly than I'd have hoped, but more quickly than I would have expected a few years
ago, said Henrique de Campos Meirelles, president of the Banco de Boston, Brazilian
subsidiary of the First National Bank of Boston.383 The new currency combined with
privatizations, securitization of government debt, and the creation of private pension
plans indicate that the Brazilian government is oriented toward creating a shareholder
value type of economy.
In investigating the change of business practices, the stock markets play a key
role. A brief overview of the Brazilian stock markets also reveals a tendency to evolve
toward a shareholder system. The Brazilian stock market began in 1877 with the Bolsa
de Valores do Rio de Janeiro. Until 1940, government bonds represented the majority of
the trading activity on the exchange. After 1956, with the increasing industrialisation
under Juscelino Kubitschek, stock trading volumes increased. During the 1960's and
1970 s there was a trend to set up stock markets as national symbols of prestige for
leaders of developing countries. At the same time, there was a general consensus
among economists and government financial officials that financial markets had no
384 World Bank, 1995 Emerging Stock Markets Factbook Emerging Markets Data Base, p. 129.
385 World Bank, 1995 Emerging Stock Markets Factbook Emerging Markets Data Base, p. 129.
386
“The Real Thing," World Trade, pp.50-54.
387
"The real thing," World Trade, pp. 50-54.
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serious role in economic developments In 1980, the exchange, by that time self-
regulated, began massive investments in creating an data dissemination network. In
June of 1990, the exchange introduced a Computer Assisted Tradmg System, licensed by
the Toronto Stock Exchange.389
Foreign access to stock markets was still relatively limited at 1991. Before July,
1991, foreign portfolio mvestors could only invest through the Brazil Fund, listed on the
New York Stock Exchange or through 24 locally administered targeted funds. After
July, 1991, foreign institutional investors were allowed to invest in "omnibus accounts."
which are portfolios administered by local fund managers. Direct investment was not
allowed. The minimum holding period of 90 days was eliminated for institutional
investors. 390
An overview of the impressive growth of the stock markets in Brazil is provided
in the following table.
388 David Gill, "Two Decades of Change in Emerging Markets" in Park, Keith K.H. and
VanAgtmael, Antoine W. (eds.). The World's Emerging Stock Markets: Structure, Developments,
Regulation & Opportunities
. Chicago and Cambridge, England: Probus Publishing Co., 1993.
pp. 49.
389 Andre Pires de Oliveira Dias, "Brazil," in Park, Keith K.H. and VanAgtmael, Antoine W.
(eds.), The World's Emerging Stock Markets: Structure, Developments, Regulation &
Opportunities . Chicago and Cambridge, England: Probus Publishing Co., 1993. pp. 293-303.
390 Andre Pires de Oliveira Dias, "Brazil," pp. 293-303.
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Number of Listed
Companies
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Rio de Janeiro
Bolsa de Valores
658 650 630 629 612 598 593 577 576 570
Sao Paulo Bolsa de
Valores
592 590 589 592 581 570 565 550 544 543
Market
Capitalization
(USD mio)
42,096 16,900 32,149 44,368 16,354 42,759 45,261 99,430 189,281 147,636
trading Value •
In U.S. dollars 28,912 9,608 17,979 16,762 5,598 13,373 20,525 57,409 109,498 79,186
Local index
Change in index
(%)
41.3 34.9 2549.5 1762.5 308.3 2316 1015.6 5437.2 1059.6 -1.3
Economic Data
Gross domestic
product (US$)
268,185 294,083 331,517 452,268 490,514 406,714 385,741 419,475 556,440
Still, the stock market is underdeveloped by world standards and does not play
the central role in corporate governance and capital raising that it does in Anglo
economies. Trading volume has concentrated on a small number of stocks. The
Bovespa has historically been dominated trading in one stock. Since the early 1990's,
this company has been Telebras. 391 Nevertheless, the stock market is growing rapidly.
In 1996, the index was up 38.22 percent in dollar terms.392 The market capitalization
rose to a new high of $191,287 million by the second quarter of 1996, and the value of
stock traded recovered as well.393
A major boost in the market is expected to come in early to mid-1997. The
Brazilian government is preparing to sell as much as a $3 billion stake in the world's
largest iron ore exporters, Cia. Vale do Rio Doce SA. This would be the largest Latin
American privatization behind Argentina's YPF SA in 1993. "CVRD could be another
YPF, opening up the market for big investors," said Edward Koliver, head of Latin
American equities investment at ABN Amro Hoare Govett. "Unless you have a big
391
"Brazil's CVRD Sale Could Spark Market Surge: Latin Markets," Bloomberg Business News,
Miami. December 13, 1996, 19:28
392
"Mexico Back in Favor With Global Investors: Latin Markets" Bloomberg Business News .
393
"Statistical Appendix," Financial Flows and the Developing Countries, August, 1996, pp. 31-
33 .
139
statement, investors will not flock to Latin America. You want people to say, 'I missed
the boat on CVRD. What's next?’" 394 CVRD's sale could boost the Brazilian stock
market. Alternatively, if it is canceled, could disrupt the Brazilian stock indices.
Accordmg to Bloomberg Busmess News, Brazilian state-run companies are notoriously
ill-managed. While CVRD is one of the better-run companies yet to be sold by the
government, analysts believe a foreign buyer could improve on its efficiency. Unlike
most large privatizations in Latin America, CVRD's stock is already among the most
actively traded in Brazil. Depending on how large the privatization will be, it could
replace Telebras as the most actively traded stock, especially if the government executes
plans to split up the telephone company late in 1997.395 As equity markets account for
larger and larger portions of the economy, and develop through higher levels of
liquidity, a move toward a shareholder value system is foreseeable.
b. Firms
If anywhere change is occurring, it is at the level of the firm and corporate
governance. According to Institutional Investor's Andrew Shores, "The past of shrouded
accounts, family companies, and 'founders' shares' is anathema to the new, more
discriminating Brazilian market." 396
This is largely due to the new role of institutional investors in Brazil.
Institutional investors are bringing forward corporate governance and managerial
guidelines into the Brazilian economy that are helping companies return to
profitability.397 Brazil's biggest pension fund, Previ, controlling $14.9 billion in assets,
has begun a strategy to revolutionize corporate governance and thereby improve
returns. It is buying companies and forcing corporate governance measures on them.
A few years ago
,
Previ was much in control of the government. Until 1994, the
Brazilian government required that pension funds swallow its debt, no matter what the
394
"Brazil's CVRD Sale Could Spark Market Surge: Latin Markets," Bloomberg Business News,
Miami. December 13, 1996, 19:28
395
"Brazil's CVRD Sale Could Spark Market Surge: Latin Markets," Bloomberg Business News .
396 Andrew Shores, "Brazil: Still a Big Challenge, But With Big Rewards," pp. IB3-IB4.
397 Michael Kepp, "How pension funds are turning companies around," Global Finance , vol. 10 n.
9. September, 1996. p. 148-150.
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quality. Former economy mimster Zelia Cardoso de Mello, for example, allegedly
forced Previ to bail out the engineering company Sade Engenharia by buying up its
shares
.
398 This is reminiscent of Deutsche Bank's propping up Metallgesellschaft due to
the pressures of a stakeholder value system. The same government also obliged pension
funds to buy worthless debt or non-voting shares in state-owned companies
.
399
The pension funds' opportunity for shareholder activism really came with
President Collor's privatization program in 1990. The funds were able to use their
virtually worthless government bonds as a part of the debt for equity conversion
privatization plan to pay for shares in companies that did have voting rights attached to
them. 400
The breakthrough came when Previ purchased the steel maker, Acesita, in
October 1992. Previ quickly replaced the management and brought the company back
to profitability within two years. With this breakthrough experience, one financier
remarked, the funds ''made their potential felt with Acesita. That was more than just
plain-vanilla portfolio investment." After another few similar transactions helped to
improve profitability, an investment banking culture assisting pension funds began to
blossom.401
The former director of Previ, Jose Valdir Ribeiro dos Reis, said, "We're looking
for dividends, and to make sure we get them we want a seat on the board of directors."
Previ has secured seats on the boards of 35 companies in which it participates.402 Like
the California Employees' Retirement System in the USA, Previ is the shareholder
activist of Brazil. But the two go about their activism in necessarily different ways. This
is because according to Paulo Ferraz, president of Banco Bozano Simonsen, "here the
concept of the corporation doesn't exist." 403 Brazil has had two sorts of companies:
state-run giant concerns controlled by bureaucrats and political cronies, and closely-
held family firms.
398 Bill Hinchberger, "Guess who owns the company?" Institutional Investor, v. 30 n. 5, May
1996, pp. 107-111.
399 Bill Hinchberger, "Guess who owns the company?" pp. 107-111.
400 Bill Hinchberger, "Guess who owns the company?" pp. 107-111.
401 Bill Hinchberger, "Guess who owns the company?" pp. 107-111.
402 Bill Hinchberger, "Guess who owns the company?" pp. 107-111.
403 Bill Hinchberger, "Guess who owns the company?" pp. 107-111.
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Even though over 500 companies are traded on the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange,
minority investors are disenfranchised by rules that permit companies to issue two-
thirds of their stock in non-voting shares. This means that the right 17% of the stock
allows uncontested control of the company. This led to a grim situation for outside
investors interested m improving corporate governance. According to Nelson Rogieri,
president of the Brazilian Association of Private Pension Funds, "Minority shareholders
are the last to be allowed to speak and the first to take a beating." Walter Appel, director
of Banco Fator, reinforced Rogieri's message, "Pension funds were at the mercy of the
companies. 404 For this reason, Brazilian pension funds have been taking over
companies to secure the necessary control to turn companies around. "Given the
structure of Brazilian capital, the pension funds believe that unless they take control,
they won't have a say. It is kind of a crusade," remarks Eduardo Faria. Pension fund
activism is making a difference. Rogieri of the private-pension fund association adds.
The corporation law in Brazil is archaic, but only now are you hearing proposals for
change. Now there is a serious debate among business people and investors." It is
changing the business culture toward an explicitly shareholder-value oriented model.405
Unheard of five years ago, CEO s at pension-fund-controlled companies are
happy with the relationship. Wilson Bruner, CEO of Acesita remarked, "I would rather
pay dividends than interest. Nildemar Seches of Perdigao echoes BrunePs message.
Institutional investors want to see dividends and an appreciation in the value of their
[investments], profits and the capacity to generate more in the future. Our relationship
with them is excellent." 406 Many family-owned companies are facing succession
problems as the patriarch grows old and no willing or able family members will take
over. This affords foreign investors and pension funds great opportunities to acquire
these businesses and transform corporate governance. This, coupled with stable and
open macroeconomic policy that forces competitiveness, is the perfect backdrop for a
transformation of Brazilian business culture.407 Other pension funds such as Pestros and
404 Bill Hinchberger, "Guess who owns the company?" pp. 107-111.
405 Bill Hinchberger, "Guess who owns the company?" pp. 107-111.
406 Bill Hinchberger, "Guess who owns the company?" pp. 107-111.
407 Bill Hinchberger, "Guess who owns the company?" pp. 107-111.
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Sistel, the fund for workers at Telebras, the telecommunications company, have also
joined in the crusade for shareholder activism 4^8
Acquisitions by pension funds are a new aspect of the Brazilian finance scene.
The funds have over $60 billion in assets and thus according to the Brazilian mergers
and acquisitions specialist, Eduardo Faria of Banco Icatu, "are really the only source of
long-term capital m Brazil. The pension funds are just as important to Brazilian capital
markets as foreign mvestors. They have the capital, and other people want it."«9 This
movement by the pension funds could become truly significant if the funds continue to
grow to the size of U.S. or Chilean pension funds (around 50% of GDP). «o
After a new president was appointed for Previ, Luiz Augusto de Barross e
Vasconcellos, the strategy has shifted toward investing more broadly in stocks instead
of putting more money into the firms it owns. This may be an indication of a change in
the corporate governance in the Brazilian market "i The new president said about the
change in strategy, "Previ, with an eye on globalization, must adapt to international
market trends set by foreign institutional investors, like U.S. pension funds, who tend to
invest heavily in the stock market. Previ intends, as an investment strategy, to follow
that trend and boost its stock market investments." Mr. Barros e Vasconcellos
mentioned increased market transparency as a reason for this change in strategy. Previ
has $17.4 billion in assets and represents 26% of all Brazilian pension fund assets. 412
Klaus Buckman, director of a Rio de Janeiro based brokerage firm reinforced Barros e
Vasconcellos' position, "Previ appears to be investing more heavily in the stock market,
as opposed to buying control of firms which have a significant market share, as a way
to become a more active player in the stock market and to increase the liquidity of its
investments." 413
Other funds are asserting shareholder rights in different ways. Funds such as
Funcef, the $5.2 billion retirement fund for the bank Caixa Economica Federal, are
408 Bill Hinchberger, "Guess who owns the company?" pp. 107-111.
409 Bill Hinchberger, "Guess who owns the company?" pp. 107-111.
410 Bill Hinchberger, "Guess who owns the company?" pp. 107-111.
411 Michael Kepp, "How pension funds are turning companies around," p. 14.
412 Michael Kepp, "How pension funds are turning companies around," p. 14.
413 Michael Kepp, "How pension funds are turning companies around," p. 14.
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limiting holdings to 2 to 3 percent. So how does the fund advocate shareholder activism
With SUCh 3 SmaI1 amount of "on-voting shares? Funcef finance director Jose Carnelo
Xavier Junior answers, "We're reviewing the company statutes, and whenever we
haven't received dividends that we're entitled to, we're filing suit." Funcef has fUed
suits against 15 of its top holdings that failed their test - and have won.«4
According to Institutional Investor writer. Bill Hinchberger, "Previ and its
associates are promoting changes in Brazilian business practices that, in the long run,
could rival the impact of the country's newfound macroeconomic stability." 416 This
significant trend, though similar to the stakeholder model insofar as the directly
participates in industry, is dissimilar insofar as it is a conscious protest against the sort
of family-stakeholder system in place. The move by Previ after having stirred up the
business community back to stock market participation is in line with the thesis that
Previ and other funds are improving corporate governance and are committed to do this
through developing capital markets.
Additionally, though less important in magnitude, there has been an increase in
Latin American companies listing on the American stock exchanges, which means that
they have to adhere to GAAP accounting standards and SEC reporting.416 This process,
of international listing, happening throughout the region, necessarily brings financial
reporting to global standards.
Based on these developments, it is logical to conclude that the funds and
companies are moving toward a shareholder system.
c. Banks
Banco de Investimentos Garantia, one of the most profitable investment banks in
Latin America, organized in 1971 according to a U.S. investment bank model with slight
alterations, began a sort of revolution in the business culture of Brazil, its home country,
and subsequently on the region as a whole. Whereas the traditional goal of
414
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entrepreneurial investors was to build a large conglomerate wh.ch was held
indefinitely, Garantia began buying companies and turning them around or making
them more profitable for resale at a higher price. In its two key recent investments,
Brahma and Lojas Americanas, Garantia began sending management to the United
States to learn American business practices. Managers of Brahma, one of the world's
biggest six breweries, were sent to Anheuser-Busch for training, while management at
Lojas Americanas, one of the largest retailers in the region, was sent to Wal-mart. This
automatic response to send managers to the USA for training instead of Europe or
elsewhere is indicative of a growing orientation toward American business practices.^
Through a combination of international investment banks such as J.P. Morgan
and local bankers bringing new ideas and a new ethic of corporate governance to Brazil,
the business culture is showing signs of change toward a sort of shareholder value
model
.
418
As with Mexico, Brazil’s securities and exchange commission, CVM, is in the
process of creating a new department devoted solely to monitoring the risk exposure of
banks and securities firms. The risk management systems in place with Brazil
commercial and merchant banks are widely considered to be inadequate. "In Brazil,
only a few banks already manage risks using formal models of risk management," said
Bruno Braga, an economist with Brazil's CVM. He added that securities firms are even
farther behind. 419 So while banks remain weak, there are examples of successful banks
based on borrowed models.
So while banks remain weak and the country is still troubled by high debt levels,
a number of signs indicate a movement toward a shareholder value model. The capital
markets are developing through privatizations and debt-to-equity conversions, the
pension funds are playing an activist role, and investment banking practices of mergers
and acquisitions are becoming widespread, slowing effecting a change in the often
mismanaged government and family-owned businesses. This leads to the conclusion
that a shareholder value type of business culture is taking root in Brazil.
417 Lorenzo Weisman, "The Advent of Private Equity in Latin America," pp. 64.
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419
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D. Mexico
1. Financial Flows
The character of capital flows has changed from the 1970's to the 1990's.
Whereas between 1973 and 1982, 85% of capital inflows were in the form of debt, from
1990-1994, two-thirds have come from investments. Roughly speaking, the breakdown
of the investment durmg the nineties has been one third FDI, one third stock market,
and one third money-market, mostly government securities^ Inflows of capital into
Latin America m the early 1990's had many causes. Calv, Leidermann, and Reihart
claim that two external sources, recession in the industrial world and lower U.S. interest
rates, were the prime reasons for these inflows. As capital flowed into Latin America,
exchange rates appreciated, which can be disruptive if flows are short-term. To deal
with this, countries like Argentina instituted mock devaluations by increasing import
tariffs and export incentives. Mexico opted for a more liberal free float.42i
a. Foreign Direct Investment
Foreign Direct Investment has been flowing into Mexico in increasing amounts
since the beginning of the decade. At the end of 1994, FDI stocks in Mexico stood at $35
billion, or just slightly more than the entire GDP of the Czech Republic for the same
year. In the past few years, infrastructure projects (roads, ports and lately, airports) and
the new assembly industry boosted by the NAFTA agreement accounted for almost all
new investment. Future direct investment should be expected as joint-ventures in the
telecommunications and energy sectors. Services such as tourism, banking, and
telecommunications represents an increasingly large share of the FDI in Mexico.422 Most
of the FDI comes from the USA, although many European and Asian multinationals are
showing growing interest in the country. 423
420
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422 Charles Oman, "Emerging Policy Issures for the Dynamic Non-Member Economies; Trends in
Global FDI and Latin America," pp. 59-80.
423 Citicorp, "Citibank Mergers & Acquisitions Capabilities in Mexico," Client Presentation,
London: Citibank Mergers & Acquisitions, 1996.
146
Under the Border Industrialization Program, set up by Mexico in 1965, the
government authorized duty-free importation of plant equipment in the U.S. border
regions and allowed up to 100% foreign ownership. These production facilities, known
as maquiladoras, were to help employ idle Mexicans in the border areas. This plan did
a great deal to industrialize Northern Mexico. Initially set up as a measure to encourage
exports (sales to domestic market was not allowed), the policy gradually changed to
allow up to 50% of sales within the Mexican market.424 During the 1980's production
shifted from labor-intensive products to more sophisticated items such as automotives
and electronic products.42* By 1990, there were 1,938 maquiladora plants in operation.4*
The NAFTA agreement has brought deep changes to the Mexican industry.
"Maquiladoras" are now employing 600,000 workers. In Mexico, low cost production is
a more significant factor in the investment decision than in other countries in Latin
America. 427
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North America is clearly the largest foreign direct investor in Mexico. The
United States and Canada consistently accounted for 50% to 70% of all FDI flows and
stocks during the ten year period of 1985 to 1994. Of North American FDI flows, the
U.S. accounted for 95% on average. From 1986 to 1989, the U.S. doubled its FDI stock in
Mexico and from 1989 to 1992, doubled its FDI stock again. In recent years, U.S.
investment has been increasing. This is definitive proof for the regionalization of
investment flows with respect to Mexico as a part of a larger scenario of regionalization
of investment flows in Latin America.
Net foreign direct investment was slightly affected by the peso crisis, as direct
investment inflows are usually related to long-term projects - FDI estimates for 1996 and
1997 are of $7.5 billion and $8.0 billion, respectively. The following tables offer detailed
information on the character of flows and stocks of FDI by country of origin and target
industry.
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$ millions
OECD area
Europe
Belgium-Luxembourg
Denmark
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Spain
United Kingdom
Other Europe
Finland
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
Other
North America
Canada
USA
Japan
Africa
Central & Eastern
Europe
Latin America-
Caribbean
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Other
Middle East
Des
South and Southeast
Asia
Hong Kong
Korea
India
Other countries
Total429
Table 60: Mexico: Foreign Direct Investment, Flows by Country428
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 IS
3,251 4,195 2,645 2,509 3,690 3,194 3,865 3,507 6,670 10.799
965 1,420 891 755 1,033 1,156 1,612 1,122 1,290 2,879
153 41 56 70 57 265 123 41 50 752
7 14 20 9 16 25 10
(4) 37 14
83 118 (68) (280) 227 157 163 243 196 189
58 462 219 154 426 83 584 252 93 267
2 2
(5) (7) 3 (1)
8 24 17 1 8 30 35 11 5 3
68 113 32 13 90 111 129 39 325 539
72 52 38 32' 24 44 103 93 99 263
247 212 290 495 66 249 154 240 280 622
269 384 287 259 117 192 315 212 201 231
6 1 1 3 (1) (1) 1 2
1 17 (32) 26 1 (2)
80 156 73 119 10 28 99 42 12 72
187 208 200 170 46 147 200 155 112 123
2 13
(4) 2 34 14 16 15 78 33
2,039 2,687 1,372 1,838 2,397 1,751 2,083 2,311 5,318 6,853
97 159 125 71 87 70 107 36 176 492
1,942 2,528 1,247 1,767 2,310 1,681 1,976 2,275 5,142 6,361
247 88 382 (84) 259 286 171 74 61 1,056
2 2 3 2 1 23 (2)
3 (1) 12 3 3 3 (1)
70 79 293 238 141 311 399 211 233 1,371
2 1 1 8 19 1 1
(2) 1 (2) 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 1 9
70 77 294 238 132 290 397 209 231 1,360
12
12
(4 )
16
2
20
20
13
7
(1) 30 143
(4)
(4)
(3)
(1)
44
5
42 46 15
2
354
1
352
8
3
17
20
25
144
4
13 25
2 119
81 69
3,326 4,318 3.105 2.801 3.882 3.578 4.280 4.080 7.007 12.382
428 OECD, International Direct Investment Yearbook, 1996 . Paris: OECD, 1996. Original source:
Directorate General of Foreign Investment (SECOFI). Directorate General of Economic Research,
Banco de Mexico.
429 Provisional data.
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Table 61 :
OECD area
Europe
Belgium-Luxembourg
Denmark
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
United Kingdom
Other Europe
Finland
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
Other
North America
Canada
USA
Other OECD
countries
Japan
New Zealand
Non OECD area
Africa
Central and Eastern
Europe
Latin America-
Caribbean
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Other
Middle East
South and south east
Asia
DAEs
Hong Kong
Korea
India
Other countries
Total431
7,023
BP « I » .18!
7,364
1,615 2,204
152 191
7 10
87 79
355 782
27 34
110 130
100 99
323 364
454 515
1 4
1
152 176
295 324
5 9
5,181 4,950
166 165
5,015 4,785
227 210
227 210
159 212
6 4
2
147 140
3 2
3
141 138
14
17
6
11
4 51
7,182 7,576
ESI
8,865 14,705 15,825 19,106 25,147 29,032™ 5,084
2,688 4,790 5,093 6,547 8,070 8,884 10,776
228 347 321 721 875
19 28 27 59 61
227 415 532 719 898
710 1,063 1,360 1,597 1,675
(2) 8 11 (4) 3
22 30 29 1 60
149 200 432 651 863
1
70
539
726
3
22
344
330
27
5,698
190
5,508
479
479
582
4
(1)
2
47
43
4
116
1,427
1,156
4
(7)
361
720
78
9,431
328
9,103
484
481
3
955
5
11
130
1,018
1,233
5
13
327
805
82
412
1,103
2,119
11
2
563
1,391
151
295
974
1,534
10
16
355
1,059
93
10,167 11,664 15,812 18,807 23,046
300 402 451 547 563
9,867 11,262 15,361 18,260 22,483
1,265 1,341 1,262
969
67
1,144
1,759
4
74
877
3
528
1,270
2,189
9
2
495
1,503
178
1,031
69
1,228
2,312
8
52
1,305
4
715
1,665
2,387
9
2
495
1,709
171
565 895
563
2
1,000
6
14
893
2
1,474
8
26
1,263
2
2,116
18
15
1,341
2,659
13
1,261
4,529
10
378 705 844 1,193 1,806 1,895 2,885
2
1
702
28
28
33
(5)
8 20 9 10 12
1 4 8 2 212 3 4
835 1,168 1,787 1,880 2,867
3
5 3 2 468 1,197
132 206
5
131
1
(1)
17
3
14
244 275
460 1,180
283 434
9,427 15,660 16,825 20,580 27,263 31,691 39,613
29,720
9,269
1,291
62
1,104
1,907
1
29
1,245
1
548
1,399
1682
6
377
1,154
143
18,879
692
18,187
1,572
1,558
5,063
5
3,226
9
(1 )
6
3,212
1,477
33
32
1,444
355
34,783
430 OECD, International Direct Investment Yearbook, 1996 .
431 Provisional data.
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Table 62: Mexico: Foreign Direct Investment, Flows by Industry432
$ million
Primary
Agriculture (2)
Mining and quarrying
Secondary
Food, beverages &
tobacco
Textiles, leather &
clothing
Paper, printing &
publishing
Chemical products
Coal & petroleum
products
Non-metallic products
Metal products
Mechanical equipment
Electric & electronic
equipment
Motor vehicles
Other transport
equipment
Other manufacturing
Tertiary
Construction
Wholesale & retail trade
Transport & storage
Finance, insurance &
business services
Communication
Other services
Total
(15) 128
A:
30 277 199 (27)
L993 1994 |
5 9 22 (18) (2) 12 23 8 41 31
(20) 119 62 48 279 187 174 (35) 7 161
2,570 3,386 2,069 1,875 2,829 2,149 3,191 3,068 4,460 7,432
424 354 324 691 227 882 820 797 941 1,711
74 101 65 85 32 63 51 63 97 258
335 261 166 169 231 31 46 24 252 82
624 894 559 330 678 553 478 631 733 890
180 199 87 58 93 29 118 128 63 629
153 125 112 148 (12) 60 52 72 124 163
21 90 41 7 13 8 20 375 34 245
182 312 212 333 213 107 343 185 354 72
167 334 312 369 220 127 283 237 223 356
380 685 177 (339) 1,149 271 963 518 1,582 2,859
14 4 9 4 (4) 3 13 26 1
16 27 5 20 (11) 18 24 25 31 166
771 804 952 896 776 1,230 892 1,039 2,494 4,744
10 16 117 18 13 26 39 39 271 105
111 228 82 99 236 219 311 438 859 1,138
13 (1) (3) 1 1 (31) (16) 38 36
268 264 292 207 328 422 186 198 439 1,977
174 116 281 458 272
369 297 464 571 198 389 271 99 429 1,216
3,326 4,318 3,105 2,801 3,882 3,578 4,280 4,080 7,007 12,382
432 OECD, International Direct Investment Yearbook, 1996 .
Table 63: Mexico: Foreign Direct Investment, Stocks by Industry433
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
$ million
Primary
Agriculture (2)
Mining and quarrying
Secondary
Food, beverages &
tobacco
Textiles, leather &
clothing
Paper, printing &
publishing
Chemical products
Coal & petroleum
products
Non-metallic products
Metal products
Mechanical equipment
Electric & electronic
equipment
Motor vehicles
Other transport
equipment
Other manufacturing
Tertiary
Construction
Wholesale & retail
trade
Transport & storage
Finance, insurance &
business services
Communication
Other services
Total
413
6
407
269
14
255
343
35
308
509 660 714
129 124 157
447 421 504 755
224
175
469
461
8
252
131
451
524
333
93
980
690
33 36 38
1,176 1,224 1,548
22 16 102
218 255 291
4
393
2
431
3
423
539 520 729
821 869 535 1,283 1,225 661
44 83 122 133 145 139
777 786 413 1,150 1,080 522
oo 12,331 15,057 19,336 22,320 28,059
,903 1,730 3,041 4,542 5,541 6,643
249 201 246 331 385 449
884 698 857 1,193 1,450
,329 2,630 3,311 4,090 4,695 5,762
301 325 522 542 576 783
758 628 750 935 955 1,007
132 67 195 214 683 1,412
,110 1,229 1,352 1,656 1,703 1,735
,015 1,032 1,109 1,403 1,493 1,772
,854 3,525 3,741 4,631 4,910 6,780
10 5 7 23 76 108
70 75 88 112 110 158
,350 3,624 4,988 6,646 8,147 10,889
117 117 141 348 302 624
604 681 1,229 1,563 1,822 2,804
1 2 4 13 21 31
781 1,162 1,577 1,828 2,971 3,162
549 747 1,024 1,435
,847 1,662 1,488 2,147 2,007 2,833
,657 16,824 20,580 27,265 31,692 39,613
545
82
463
>4,579
5,491
414
874
1,721
18
153
9,651
262
2,035
25
433 OECD, International Direct Investment Yearbook, 1996
.
b. Foreign Portfolio Investment
People are quick to blame the speculator, but the speculator
sees [economic] policies that aren't working and goes after
them."—George P. Shultz, former secretary of state.434
Table 64: Mexican Portfolio Investment435
(in USD millions)
Portfolio Outflows (56) (7,354) (603) U^ (56^^
Portfolio Inflows 354 3,369 12,741 18,041 28,919 8,185 (10,140)
The government had supported the development of the stock markets by
lowering capital gains taxes and continued the privatization program commenced in
1982. At the same time, trade was liberalized. Further legislation improving access to
stock markets by foreigners has encouraged new foreign investment, particularly
portfolio investment. In May 1989, the Regulation to Promote Mexican Investment and
Regulate Foreign Investment, guaranteed foreign investors ownership rights and
provided for majority ownership.436
Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of the IMF, claimed that the Mexican
crisis of 1994 was the result of previous success. After the 1982 debt crisis, Mexico
turned around its economic policy. This encouraged growth and low inflation. At the
time of the crisis, the external current account deficit was a very large 6.5% of GDP in
1993. To aggravate this, it was largely being financed by short-term commitments.
Mexican portfolio investment boomed and a growing number of firms turned to equity
markets for financing. As a result of the NAFTA agreement, Mexican companies were
able to issue $4.1 billion in stocks in 1993, accounting for 19% of world stock issues and
434 Tom Petruno "Impatient Capital: Global Money—Free Flows, Free Falls," Los Angeles Times,
March 19, 1995 p. A1+.
435 1971-88 Sources:OECD/DAF and UNCTAD, based on official national statistics from the
balance of payments converted in US$ at daily average exchange rates. 1989-95 source: IMF,
International Financial Statistics, Washington: IMF/ World Bank. December, 1996. pp. 100, 150,
428.
436 Felicia Morrow, "Mexico" in Park, Keith K.H. and VanAgtmael, Antoine W. (eds.). The
World's Emerging Stock Markets: Structure, Developments, Regulation & Opportunities .
Chicago and Cambridge, England: Probus Publishing Co., 1993. pp. 266-7.
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33% of emerging market issues.® See the graph for a picture of the tremendous grow*
of equity issues in Mexico. One *ird of the over $90 billion poured into *e Mexican
economy between 1990 and 1993 was composed of portfolio investment, or "hot
money." By 1993 foreigners controlled an estimated 75% of Mexican stock trading. At
the same time, *e market value of *e Mexican Stock Exchange exploded from $4
billion in 1985 to $200 billion by 1993.438
Figure 12: Issues of Mexican Stock as a Percentage of
International Stock Issues, 1995-1993439
On December 20, shortly after an intergovernmental summit, Mexico devalued
the peso. As a result Mexico lost $5 billion in reserves in the following two days. This
prompted the government to allow the peso to float even more freely, but could not
instill confidence in foreign investors, largely New York fund managers. The
composition of type of investment aggravated the crisis. Short-term municipal debt was
collected upon maturity, amounting to another $10 billion loss in foreign exchange
shortly after the crash of the peso. 440 John Lipsky, chief economist at Salomon Brothers
noted that "the creation of a massive short-term facility creates obvious moral
hazards." 441 Nevertheless, Mexico remained open.442
437 Felicia Morrow, "Mexico," pp. 263-91.
438 Tom Petruno, "Impatient Capital: Global Money-Free Flows, Free Falls," pp. A1 +
439
"Mexico on the International Financial Markets," Review of the Economic Situation in Mexico,
March, 1994, 130. (Original sources: Banamex and the IMF.).
440 Sebastian Edwards, Crisis and Reform in Latin America, From Despair to Flope, pp. 140-141.
441
"Socializing Risk to Foster Free Markets," New York Times, February 12, 1995, p. D13.
442 Stephan Haggard and Slyvia Maxfield. "The Political Economy of Financial
Internationalization in the Developing World," International Organization, Winter 1996, vol. 50,
1, pp. 53-56.
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At the time, Mexico was widely regarded as a model for economic and
institutional change. The only problem was that it was not achieving sufficient growth
to finance its debt. At an average growth rate of 2.9% from 1990-94, it was nowhere
close to Colombia or Chile, which had averaged above 7% for the same period.443 As a
whole, the current account deficit widened to 8% of GDP in 1994.444 Growth did not
meet expectations and the demand for foreign financing went from 69% of the total in
1993 to 38% in 1994, while the "international debt issuance increased 153.6% in the first
nine months of the year over the same period in 1993" .445
President Clinton and the IMF bent the rules to loan over six times the normal
limit. 44o And Mexico has repaid the loan in full, more than three years ahead of
schedule. The $13.5 billion loan from the United States was a part of a $20 billion
package that included IMF assistance.447
Through 1995 and into the first part of 1996, financial markets have been erratic.
Mexican equities were severely depressed after the peso crisis of 1994-95, and began a
revival only after an economic plan was begun in March which increased minimum
wages, gas prices, and sales and electricity taxes, among other adjustments. An earlier
infusion of $52.8 billion which eased the liquidity situation did not appear to have
affected the slide in equities.448 Mexico's devaluation precipitated the acceleration of
non-dollar issues. There was little alternative when, in 1995, American investors
refursed to lend more than $200 million 449
The first sign of restored confidence came in January 1996, when the government
was able to place the first dollar denominated bond issue of $1 billion since the crisis. In
April of 1996, Mexico exchanged its Brady bond debt for $1.75 billion of 30-year global
443 Sebastian Edwards, Crisis and Reform in Latin America, From Despair to Hope, pp. 296-297.
444 Michel Camdessus, "Drawing Lessons from the Mexican Crisis: Preventing and Resolving
Financial Crises -- The Role of the IMF" in The IMF and Challenges of Globalization, Three
Addresses by Michel Camdessus. IMF, Washington, DC, 1995. pp. 9-12.
445 Banamex Newsletter, Nov-Dec 1994. p. 458.
446
"Socializing Risk to Foster Free Markets," New York Times .
447 Frank James, "Mexico Pays Off U.S. Loan Ahead of Schedule," Chicago Tribune, January 16,
1997. p. 8.
448 World Bank, 1996 Emerging Stock Markets Factbook, p. 179.
449 Bill Hinchberger "Latin America," p. 70.
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bonds. Brazil and Argentina are next in line for "de-Bradyisation." 45o Mexico has even
begun to swap some of its Brady Bonds for Eurobonds, which investors prefer because
they are more flexible and allow more types of derivatives to be traded. The extremely
high current account deficits experienced between 1991 and 1994, which are considered
to have set the conditions for the crisis, turned into a small surplus in 1995 and should
remain almost balanced in 1996 and 1997. In April, Mexico issued $1.75 billion of 30-
year Eurobonds in exchange for Brady debt.454 At the end of July 1996, Mexico, with the
help of JP Morgan and SBC Warburg, was able to issue its largest ever Eurobond, a $6
billion floating rate note. This is a huge vote of confidence in Mexico's economic
recovery.452
Foreign investment in the Mexican Bolsa was $31 billion at the end of June, 1996,
representing 28 percent of market capitalization. The foreign shareholders tend to be
quite active and therefore account for much more than 28 percent of trading and exert a
greater influence on pricing.455 After a horrible 1995, Mexican stocks have rebounded in
1996, gaining 24% by the third quarter of 1996.454 Analysts view the market positively.
We've had a strong bias to Mexico," said Jay Pelosky, Latin American equity strategist
at Morgan Stanley & Co. "The market is under-owned." 455 Based on Mexico's $70 billion
market capitalization in Morgan Stanley Capital International indices, Mexico ought to
command 8.6% of an emerging market portfolio. Micropal, a financial reporting firm,
reports that mutual funds that invest in emerging markets surpassed that level and
allocated 8.9% of their portfolios in Mexico at the end of June.
450 Nick Reed, "Emerging markets: Investors seek wider horizons Nick Reed writes that emerging
market derivatives are the big growth area in banking today."
451
"Derivatives Grow in Latin America: Latin Markets (Correct)" Bloomberg Business News .
452 David Robertson, "Mexico's $6 billion comeback," Euromoney, n. 329, September 1996, p. 20.
453 Baron F Levin, "Record breaking?" Business Mexico, v. 6 n. 9, September 1996 p.51.
454
"Mexico Back in Favor With Global Investors: Latin Markets" Bloomberg News Wire .
455
"Mexico Back in Favor With Global Investors: Latin Markets" Bloomberg News Wire .
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Table 65: Examples of Recent
Mexican ADR Stock Issues
Company456
Amount
in USD
millions
Sidek 92.0
DESC conglomerate 130.0
Grupo Industrial Durango 113.6
Grupo Iusacell 155.8
GGemex 139.6
GBM Atlantico 119.5
Grupo Palacio de Hierro 270.0
La Moderna 396.0
It must be also noted that Mexico receives a great deal of equity capital through
ADR's, approximately $4 billion annually for the past few years (with the exception of
1995). They are an important component of Mexican equity financing. The table to the
right details examples of some companies using ADR's.
c. Bank Loans
U.S. commercial banks had reduced their claims on Mexico from $20 billion to
$17 billion from mid-1995 to Q1 1996. The UK had increased its claims on commercial
bank claims to Mexico from $5.6 billion in 1991 to $7 billion by the end of 1994. Canada,
the Netherlands, and France had around $2.5 billion in commercial bank claims from
1993 to 1995. Switzerland's lending grew from $2.3 to $3.1 billion from 1992 to 1995.
The following table details Mexican external debt through 1994.
456 World Bank, 1994 Emerging Stock Markets Factbook, p. 173.
Table 66: Mexican Debt Stocks
U S. $ millions W84 1985 1986 1987 1988' 1989 1990 1991 1992 1995 iqq.
I. OECD &
capital
markets
70,421 67,125 69,224 67,932 63,276 57,265 48,275 47,779 51,202 49,836 55,012
ODA
Official/ off.
supported
206
6,018
296
6,677
497
7,664
648
9,623
587
10,026
552
9,808
629
13,558
725
15,964
758
20,705
863
22,824
1,144
24,451
Financial
markets
64,196 60,151 61,063 57,661 52,662 46,905 34,088 31,090 29,740 26,149 29,418
Banks 60,234 56,443 57,687 54,795 48,444 42,973 28,021 23,048 19,833 9,495 11 039
Bonds 3,962 3,708 3,376 2,866 4,218 3,932 6,067 8,041 9,906 16,654 18,379
II. Multilateral 6,753 8,986 12,237 15,543 15,137 15,844 20,854 22,240 21,487 20,864 20,935
III. Non-OECD 150 212 180 37 13 11 68 47 45 44 42
Creditor
Countries
CEEC's 11 8 5 3 2 2 _ 1
Other
countries &
unspecified
139 138 111 28 5 4 68 45 45 44 42
Sub-total: 77,324 76,322 81,341 83,511 78,426 73,119 69,196 70,066 72,734 70,744 75,989
Long-term debt
Short-term
Banks 13,194 14,662 12,642 16,672 17,735 21,983 20,509 28,443 34,744 38,397 45,783
Export credits 763 1,056 1,137 1,310 1,026 1,344 2,024 2,862 1,939 1,969 2,279
Sub-total: 13,957 15,718 13,778 17,981 18,761 23,328 22,533 31,305 36,683 40,365 48,062
Short-term debt
Total 91,280 92,040 95,419 101,493 97,187 96,447 91,730 101,371 109,417 111,109 124,051
identified debt
2. Business Practices
a. Economy
Private capital flows have delivered a vote of confidence for the Mexican
government's reaction to the peso crisis. Flows have recovered, though Mexico now has
more debt than even Brazil and faces payments of $20 billion in 1997-8. Part of the
optimism of investors in Mexico's economy is lack of good returns elsewhere, as both
inflation and growth are low. More importantly, according to Financial Times
correspondent Stephan Fidler, "There were no important U-turns in policy. Rather there
was a widespread attempt to intensify efforts at economic reform, for example, by
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accelerating privatizations."® This constancy in efforts to push through reforms
indicates a tendency toward acceptance of the shareholder model.
Table 67: Bolsa Mexicana de Valores, S.A.458
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995Number of
Listed
Companies 155
190 203 203 199 209 195 190 206 185
Market
Capitalization
(USD mio.)
5,952 8,371 13,784 22,550 32,725 98,178 139,061 200,671 130,246 90,694
Trading Value
(USD mio.)
3,841 15,554 5,732 6,232 12,212 31,723 44,582 62,454 82,964 34,377
Turnover ratio
Local Index
68 179.3 51.7 33.3 44 47.9 37 36.8 44.5 33
Change in
index (%)
320.6 124.3 100.2 98 50.1 127.6 21.8 47.9 -8.7 17
Gross
Domestic
Product (US$)
129,858 140,375 174,201 199,662 242,452 286,716 334,029 368,289 377,110
The stock market has been developing into an Anglo-style market. Mexico is the
largest stock market in Latin America. The market grew steadily from 1982-1991.459 The
Mexican stock market was brought closer to mirroring the U.S. market as well as
establishing a separate international section and an intermediary market for small and
medium sized businesses to enter the market at lower costs. New market rules covered
insider trading, more stringent disclosure requirements, use of market makers to
improve liquidity, and new listing requirements including a minimum capital of $7
million, documented record of three profitable years, and a 30% float. As a result many
Mexican companies generated great amounts of equity cash in the international market
in 1993.460 The market has largely recovered at this point.
457 Stephen Fidler, "Survey: Latin America." Financial Times, Wednesday, December 18, 1996.
458 Source: Emerging Markets Data Base
. Note: The base date for the BMV General Index is Nov.
1978=0.7816
459 Felicia Morrow, "Mexico," pp. 263-91.
460 Examples include Grupo Carso, Grupo Embotellador de Mexico, Compania Mexicana de
Desarrollo, Bufete Industrial Grupo Tribasa, Dina, TAMSA, Emvasa, Benavides, Casa Autrey,
Maseca, Coke-Femsa, SFQuadrum, Grupo Radio Centro, Grupo Simec, DESC, Grupo Financiero
Serfin, Grupo Financiero Invermexico, and Televisa. World Bank, 1994 Emerging Stock Markets
Factbook, p. 173.
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Mexico started private pension funds, which will help to further develop the
capital markets. The state is bringing in foreign professional financial management
skills by endorsing 18 fund management companies, including a number U.S. and
Canadian financial institutions and three Chilean companies experienced in private
pension systems, to manage the retirement funds generated by the privatized social
security system to begin in July.464 As in Chile and now Brazil, this can be expected to
stimulate the development of capital markets and corporate governance through these
markets.
Table 68: Mexican Pension Funds & Partners
Firm Partners
Afore Banamex Banamex-Accival
Afore Bancomer Bancomer, Aetna International
Afore Bital Bital
Afore Capitaliza GE Capital, GE Capital de Mexico
Afore Genesis Seguos Genesis
Afore Inbursa Banco Inbursa
Afore Previnter Boston AIG Co., Bank of Nova Scotia
Afore Tepeyac Seguros Tepeyac
Afore XXI Mexican Social Security Institute,
Aseguradora Hidalgo
Bancrecer-Dresdner Bancrecer-Dresdner Pension Fund
Afore Holdings, Allianz Mexico Insurance
Co.
Confuturo Afore Banca Confia, Principal International
ING Afore ING America Insurance Holding
Profuturo GNP Afore Grupo Nacional Provincial, Provida
Internacional, Banco Bilao Vizcaya
Profuturo Afore Banca Promex, Banco del Atlantico
Santander-Mexicano Santander Investment, Banco
Afore Mexicano
Serfinciti Afore Citibank Mexico, Banca Serfin, Habitat
DesarroOo Internacional
Solida Banorte Afore Solida Banorte
Zurich Afore Zurich Life Insurance Co., private
investors462
b. Firms
Mexican companies attracted 1.7% of the flow of the global debt market, and
17% of the total demand for securities. Companies were active in mergers, acquisitions,
sell-offs and strategic partnerships including foreign companies. Some companies
461 Brendon M. Case, "Mexico gives nod to 18 managers."
462 Brendon M. Case, "Mexico gives nod to 18 managers," Pensions & Investments, January 6,
1997.
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restructured debt to better qualify for better terms in foreign markets.** Given the
massive American FDI position in Mexico, it would be hard to believe that in terms of
influences from international fmancial flows, Mexico has not been influenced toward a
shareholder value model of business practices.
c. Banks
Mexican banks are weak. They are harmonizing standards with American
standards. Accounting standards compatible with U.S. generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP) were introduced in July 1996. After June, 1997, Mexican banks will
report only according to GAAP standards. 464 With accounting standards compatible
with U.S. GAAP in effect, investors in Mexico are hoping that banks will be forced to
disclose their true bad-debt portfolios and that the Mexican banking crisis will bottom
out. 463 Mexico's National Banking Commission is reviewing legislation that would
enable it to better monitor the risk exposure of banks and securities firms466
It is difficult to use the banking system in Mexico to determine whether the
country is leaning toward a shareholder or stakeholder model, but the convergence of
accounting standards is a strong sign of convergence toward the shareholder model,
because of the increased transparency and stringency of disclosure that will generate a
more accurate picture of this key industry. This improved disclosure level tends to
encourage the development of capital markets.
On the whole, the incredible growth and relative stability of the stock market
after the peso crisis, coupled with the overwhelmingly dominant FDI position of
America in Mexico, commitment by the government, and measures to improve
information quality on which markets depend all indicate a movement toward the
shareholder value model. So overall, there have been more signs in favor of the
argument that shareholder value is being accepted in Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, the
463 Banamex Newsletter, Nov-Dec 1994. p. 458.
464 International Monetary Fund, International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects, and
Key Policy Issues, p. 114.
465
"Finance - Mexico," Crossborder Monitor, June 19, 1996, p. 2. and "Company & Industry -
Mexico," Crossborder Monitor, July 31, 1996, p. 2.
466
"Derivatives Grow in Latin America: Latin Markets (Correct)" Bloombere Business News .
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three largest economies in terms of foreign financial flows, than there is for the
stakeholder value model.
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Chapter V
Conclusion
This study has shown, in some detail, the regionalization of financial flows in
both Central Europe and Latin America. While Central Europe with the exception of
Poland is clearly receiving a disproportion amount of capital from Germany, if not the
EU; In Latin America, the regionalization of capital flows is similar, though weaker in
Brazil. The reason that Poland and Brazil are more diversified in their investment is
that they are the largest markets and thus represent a top priority for firms establishing
activities in just one country to serve the region. A summary of my findings on
financial flows is represented in the following chart.
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Table 69: A Regionalization of Financial Flows...
Foreign Direct
Investment
Portfolio
Investment
Commercial Bank
Loans
Total Flows 1
Europe
Czech
Republic
Germany main
investor, though
major investment
by USA, Holland,
and Switzerland.
small and
untraceable by
country of origin
Germany main
creditor
Germany / EU
Hungary Germany & large, but Germany main Germany / EUAustria main untraceable by creditor
investor country of origin
Poland USA & UK main small and Germany main Diversified
investor untraceable by
country of origin.
creditor
Conclusion: Germany (EU) major investor, therefore, regionalization
Latin
America
Argentina USA main USA main equity USA main USA
investor467 investor through creditor, though
ADR's, fairly closely
diversified bond followed by
investors. Germany.
Brazil USA main USA major equity USA, followed by USA, but
investor, but investor, bond Germany is diversified.
Japan major. investors largest creditor
minor UK,
German, French
investment.468
diversified.
Mexico USA absolute USA main USA main USA
majority investor, creditor
Conclusion: USA major investor, therefore, regionalization.
The continued and growing predominance of Germany in Central Europe and of the
USA in Latin America suggests a regionalization of financial flows.
467
From national reporting of Direct Investment Abroad as taken from OECD, International Direct
Investment Abroad Yearbook. 1996
.
468
From national reporting of Direct Investment Abroad as taken from OECD, International Direct
Investment Abroad Yearbook. 1996 .
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At the same time that flows are regional, practices are becoming increasingly
global. While Latin America is exhibiting a convergence toward a shareholder model.
Central Europe looks in some respects (especially the Czech Republic) like a stakeholder
model. However, signs of capital market development, macro changes in the economy
toward a smaller role of the state, and shareholder motivated corporate governance
leads me to conclude that the region is poised for much stronger movement toward the
shareholder value model. A summary of my findings for each country and region is
detailed in the chart below.
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Table 70 (cont'd) A Globalization of Business Practices...
Economy Firms Banks Overall
Business
Practices
Latin
America
Argentina Government
behind reforms,
though popularity
waning due to
repercussions of
Peso crisis. Strong
development of
stock markets, new-
high in 1996 is
vote of confidence
by markets.
Growth in mergers
and acquisitions
activities, many
small and mid-sized
family-owned
enterprises are
sell mg to larger
corporates. Some
companies listed on
American
exchanges, adhere
to US GAAP.
USA main
creditor, though
fairly closely
followed by
Germany.
USA
Brazil Government
supporting reforms,
but with difficulty,
stock markets are
small, but growing
quickly, new high
in 1996 is sign of
confidence after
Peso crisis. More
privatizations
planned.
Shareholder
activism, by pension
funds has strong
impact on business
culture. Some
companies listed on
American
exchanges, adhere
to GAAP.
USA, followed by
Germany is
largest creditor
USA, but
diversified.
Mexico Reform efforts
intensified after
Peso crisis instead
of weakened.
Securities market is
developed and has,
for the most part,
recovered. Many
pension funds
under Anglo-style
management.
Firms use capital
markets to raise
capital, influence
of American FDl is
strong. Mergers
and acquisitions are
active in Mexico. A
number of
companies are
listed on American
exchanges, adhere
to GAAP.
USA main
creditor
USA
Conclusion: Gradual but discernible movement towards shareholder value model.
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Table 70: A Globalization of Business Practices...
Economy Firms Banks Overall
Business
Practices
Central
Europe
Czech
Republic
Stock market
underdevloped, but
poised for
development with
new disclosure law
in 1997. growing.
Conflicting
evidence on
corporate
governance,
"corporate raider"
culture among
funds. Influence of
German FDL
Banks and funds
hold stakes in
industry.
Resembies
stakeholder
model, but could
change with
eminent
development of
securities
markets.
Hungary Stock markets
growing, but major
further growth
limited as many of
the best companies
were acquired and
“de-listed.”
Many global
competitors in
many industries
have operations
here, and bring
global “shareholder
value" standards.
“Universal” banks,
but banks do not
hold equity- stakes
in industry.
Transition
moving towards
shareholder
value model.
Poland Stock markets
growing quickly,
most developed in
region., partial
privatization of
pension plan in the
works.
Firms use capital
markets to raise
capital,
management
remunerated
according to
company
performance,
bankruptcy
program is debt to
equity swap.
Influence of
Banks do not hold
equity stakes in
industry, NIF’s
provide Anglo input
Transition
moving towards
shareholder
value model.
American FDi.
Conclusion: Resembles stakeholder model in some ways, but indicators of movement towards
shareholder model.
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These findings lead to the conclusion that a gradual, but perceptible globalization of
business practices is occurring. In Central Europe, the movement is weaker. Some have
argued that a pseudo-stakeholder system is preferable at this point in time since
domestic investors have little investing experience, so the solution of having "expert"
banks and funds exert corporate governance is necessary as a bridging solution.
However, on the whole, as indicated on a case by case basis, the evidence shows a
growing tendency to accept a shareholder model.
The movement of Central Europe and Latin America must be understood within
the larger framework of trends that are transforming business practices worldwide
towards a shareholder value type of system. To place these two regions in these
broader trends, I will first discuss signs within the German business community of
acceptance of some aspects of a shareholder value model, then look at the growth of
capital markets through the developing countries, followed by a discussion of drivers of
distinctly "shareholder" business practices.
As Germany itself gradually moves toward a shareholder value type of model,
there is reason to believe that its neighbors, eager to enter the EU will follow suit. The
claim that Germany is moving toward a shareholder model is contentious but
sustainable. Throughout continental Europe, the Anglo-Saxon corporate model has
been increasingly accepted in recent years. Takeovers and de-mergers, as tactics to
increase shareholder value, have been on the increase. Practices and legislation are
changing. For example, hostile takeover bids as a way to create shareholder value are
starting to take place. Krupp's 1992 hostile takeover of the steel maker Hoesch indicated
that hostile takeovers had arrived in Germany.469 Deutsche Bank and Deutsche Post
also made a hostile bid for Postbank. 470 Share buybacks are being allowed in Germany
for the first time. This has corporate governance implications insofar as management
has to become increasingly aware of its performance for its shareholders than for the
banks that are associated with them. There are numerous examples of American-style
corporate restructuring in the German economy, indicating a slow movement toward a
shareholder value system.
469 Janet Bush, "Called to account: Short term, long term," pp. 40-41.
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Mergers and acquisitions as a method of corporate restructuring is growing in
Germany and throughout Europe. This is changing as the founders of firms that built
themselves or rebuilt themselves from World War II are retiring and selling their
companies by listing them publicly or by allowing MNC's and others to buy them out.™
For example, AEG, one of the most respected German industrial companies, is
being de-merged. Hoechst will be de-merged as well. Jurgen Schremp, the CEO of
Diamler Benz
-Germany s largest company- is espousing shareholder value. One of
the consequences of this policy is the reduction of Daimler's payroll by 70,000 in the
past five years.472 As a protest against the underdevelopment of the German equity
market, Daimler listed on the New York Stock Exchange. This entailed costly changes
in reporting standards as a part of compliance to American GAAP accounting rules. In
mid-November, 1996, Europe's largest privatization and at the same time, and at DM 60
billion, Germany s largest initial public offering (IPO), Deutsche Telekom, demonstrated
an ideological victory in the movement toward a shareholder value system. It is
particularly important to note the broad participation among the population. Over two
million Germans, a large number of which had not previously invested in stock,
subscribed, turning a substantial number of Germans from bank deposit holders into
shareholders overnight. It may be true that mentality does not change overnight, but it
was an impressive and large-scale shift nonetheless. Telekom, like Daimler and other
large German players, also issued shares in New York and Tokyo to address liquidity
problems with the German market and attract foreign investment.
The social partnership of management and labor is coming undone. In industry,
BMW founded a major car plant in the southern United States, stating cheaper labor
costs and market access as the drivers for their large investment. Siemens,
Mannesmann and Krupp Hoesche have also divested of substantial unprofitable
portions of their companies. These restructurings result in layoffs of workers and
shifting of production abroad to be able to be price competitive. In a period in which
471 Citicorp, Mergers & Acquisitions in Germany, updated June, 1996. Frankfurt: Citibank
Aktiengesellschaft.
472 R.C. Longworth. "Global Squeeze, Nations Struggle to Cope with Outside Pressures," Chicago
Tribune, October 9, 1996. p.l.
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German labor has priced itself out of the market, the social partnership is becoming less
and less important and the effort to return value to the shareholder is gaining, at least
among these large industrial examples.
In the banking sectors, the major German banks are reorienting themselves
toward a stronger focus on equity and capital markets through the acquisitions of
British investment banks. 473 The new chairman of the board of Deutsche Bank, Rolf
Breuer, is oriented toward the development of capital markets. Currently the chairman
of the bank's investment banking branch, Deutsche Morgan Grenfell and Chairman of
the Deutsche Borse (German Stock Exchange), Mr. Breuer is committed to developing
capital markets in Germany. 4 4 Norbert Walter, chief economist of Deutsche Bank stated
that this postwar comfort [ of the social partnership ] has gone forever." 475 A recent
feature series on globalization by the leading German magazine, Der Spiegel, trumpeted
the arrival of "shareholder value" in Germany.475 The German government is pursuing a
multi-billion dollar privatization program, the latest of which included the $40 billion
privatization of Deutsche Telekom.
This convergence of the stakeholder value system toward the shareholder value
system in Western Europe may well have an impact on which system is being accepted
through Central Europe and possibly even Latin America.
A World Bank study confirms a movement toward a "shareholder" system. The
project investigated how companies in the developing countries finance their activities
and growth. It investigated the financing practices of the top fifty companies in each of
the following countries: India, Korea, Jordan, Pakistan, Thailand, Mexico, Malaysia,
Turkey, Brazil, and Zimbabwe. The findings were unexpected. Companies in lesser-
developed countries tended to rely on equity financing far more heavily than their
developed countries' counterparts, issuing new equity more frequently and debt less
frequently than companies in developed countries. This may have to do with the need
for investors in more risky countries or macroeconomic environment to have control
473 The acquisitions were of Morgan Grenfell by Deutsche Bank and of Kleinwort Benson by
Dresdner Bank.
474
"German Banking: Deutsche Schuffle," The Economist, November 2, 1996, p. 89.
475 R.C. Longworth. "Global Squeeze, the Painful Cost of Economic Revolution," p. 1.
476
"Kapitalismus ohne Grenzen," Spiegel Magazine Archive .
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over their investments, or the cheaper cost of raisirrg capital through equity after
devaluations. Equity is the market for ownership and control so it makes intuitive
sense that developing country companies rely more heavily on equity financing. This
equity financing, in turn increases the equity market size and helps to reinforce and
build an equity culture. From this World Bank study, it can be inferred that the
hesitancy of foreigners to rnvest without control conditions financial markets in
developing countries to lean toward equity financing as opposed to debt financing so
common to the universal banking "shareholder" business culture
.
477
Foreign investors demand high quality information, which brings more
transparency and liquidity. In response to this demand, information has improved,
making it easier, cheaper and safer to invest. Generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP) are being adopted because they provide individual shareholders confidence.
As professors James Don Edwards and Joseph H. Godwin write, "without such
standards, the ability of privately held enterprises to attract capital from bankers and
investors is seriously impaired"™ Part threat and part suggestion, the accounting
professors note that the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) and the
European Union (EU) both articulate accounting standards that are widely respected in
the major capital markets and that in order for emerging markets to attract foreign
capital, they to will have to adhere to these disclosure standards.
Reasons that Germany, Central Europe, and Latin America are moving toward
this model can be located in certain drivers of globalization479
,
namely developments in
4
' Ajit Singh, "Corporate Financial Patterns in Industrializing Economies, A Comparative
International Study International Finance Corporation, Technical Paper Number 2, Washington:
The World Bank, 1995.
478 James Don Edwards and Joseph H. Godwin, "Why Sound Accounting Standards Count."
http:/ / www.cipe.org/ el5/ACROSS.ITTML, 1996. James Don Edwards is J.M. Tull Professor of
Accounting at the University of Georgia. A past president of the American Accounting
Association, he has received the highest award granted by the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants. Joseph FI. Godwin is assistant professor of accounting at the University of
Georgia.
479 As a reminder from the introduction, the drivers of globalization can be all reduced to the
simple idea of arbitrage. Globalization is a project of large-scale arbitrage. Arbitrage, buying low
somewhere, and selling high somewhere else, need not take place in only highly liquid markets
like financial markets, but can also be used in the market for human capital, products, technology,
legal systems, tax laws, and markets themselves. Companies expand into other countries through
strategic alliances, joint ventures, or acquisition in order to trade advantages. Typically,
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information technology coupled with massive deregulation of the global economy
during the Reagan and Thatcher era
,
the growth of multinational corporations, post-
Fordist, and demographic drivers. All of these drivers tend to encourage a specifically
shareholder value type of capitalism.
Information Technology
Information technology (IT) facilitates the arbitrage of many factors across
markets. Pam Woodall, economics editor for The Economist focuses on the
information revolution" as an explanation of globalization. Woodall argues that IT
and globalization are bound together in a self-reinforcing process. IT reduces the cost of
communication and thereby facilitates globalization of financial markets and
production. Globalization then speeds up the development and diffusion of new
technologies by intensifying competition. Competition, in turn, reduces costs even
further. 480 Woodall reminds her readers that in the past two decades, information
transmitting capacity has increased one million-fold, thanks to developments in
computers, telephony, and television.481 Ron Martin agrees with Woodall's emphasis of
the importance of IT, allowing what he calls "propinquity without proximity" among
market participants, which allows the creation of global capital markets.482 Historically,
computing power doubles every eighteen months. The $2,000 notebook computer of
today is many times more powerful than the $10,000,000 mainframe of the mid-1970's.
Computing power has fallen in price by an average of approximately 30% a year for the
past two decades. If cars developed at the same rates as microprocessors, a typical car
knowledge and capital is swapped for market access and low production costs. The OECD firm
typically transfers managerial skills, technology, products, and capital in exchange for access to
local markets, and other advantages such as lower labor factor costs. This is confirmed by the
views of a leading consulting firm, McKinsey & Co., which also views the globalization process as
one large process of arbitrage. An implication of this approach is that economic activity need not
be totally global for globalization to occur. It is activity at the margin that exploits differences.
Looking at globalization as arbitrage is that economies only need to be integrated to the extent
that differences can be arbitraged away. Thus, all activity does not need to be "global" for the
market to become "globalized."
480 Woodall, Pam, The Economist, "A Survey of the World Economy," Sept.28 - Oct.4, 1996, p. 3.
481 Woodall, Pam, The Economist. "A Survey of the World Economy," p. 4.
482 Martin, Ron. "Stateless Monies, Global Financial Integration and National Economic
Autonomy: the End of Geography?" in Corbridge, Nigel and Thrift, Nigel (eds.). Money, Power,
and Space . Cambridge and Oxford: Blackwell, 1994. pp.262.
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would cost $5 and get 250,000 miles per gallon. In the early 1970's, about 50,000
puters existed worldwide, today the number is approximately 140,000,000. The
internet has approximately 50 million users at mid 1996 and the number doubles every
year.® To show the growth of financial markets, she cites the fact that daily foreign
exchange trading has reached $1.3 trillion per day. Cross-border bond and equity
transactions have soared from 3% of America's GDP in 1970 to 136% in 1995.® Thus in
addition to allowing financial markets to develop by allowing complex transactions to
be executed, verified and stored, regardless of distance and at the speed of light, IT
allows, or will allow, companies in all sectors to integrate all functions across the
organization globally.® That is, arbitraging can now take place in areas beyond simple
markets for foreign exchange and can reach into all tradable items. This is a profound
change that reaches far deeper than the mere exchange of physical goods across
borders.® This increasing "tradability" of previously untradable goods and services
through IT marches in lock step with the trend of securitization and disintermediation,
in which formerly untradable financial obligations now become mobile and can be
bought and sold anywhere there is a phone connection.
States lose autonomy as a result of IT and globalization. Walter Wriston, former
chairman of Citicorp, echoes Cox's assertion that states that want to be integrated into
the global economy, or that have no choice but to integrate, need to adhere to certain
economic policies. This is due to the rapid transfer of information to financial markets
worldwide. As Wriston put it.
"The gold standard [ of the 19th century ] , replaced by the gold
exchange standard, which was replaced by the Bretton Woods
arrangements, has now been replaced by the information standard
.
Unlike the other standards, the information standard is in place,
operating, will never go away and has substantially changed the
world. What it means, very simply, is that bad monetary and fiscal
policies anywhere in the world are reflected within minutes on the
Reuters screens in the trading rooms of the world. Money only goes
where it's wanted, and only stays where it's well treated, and once you
483 Woodall, Pam, The Economist. "A Survey of the World Economy," p. 4.
484 Woodall, Pam, The Economist. "A Survey of the World Economy." p. 4.
485 For example. Production, R&D, Sales, Marketing, Financing, etc.
486 See t}qe section on Globalization from the perspective of the firm for more detailed information.
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standard is more draconian than any gold standard... For ftlu^Lem history, the politicians of the world can't stop it. It's beyond Thepolitical control of the world, and that's good news." 487
This leads to the next specifically "shareholder" driver of globalization, the deregulation
of financial markets.
Deregulation
Deregulation is an important part of financial liberalization. States facilitated the
creation of markets by encouraging international business in their metropoles. The
growmg autonomy of markets was not some natural or inevitable process, rather
Reagan and Thatcher's faith in markets as well as liberal ideology pushed it in this
direction
.
488 Clearly, without deregulation, the globalization of financial services would
have been difficult, if not impossible.^ Work by Haggard and Maxfield suggests that
policy makers may have changed their paradigms of dealing with external financing
crises due to the presence of foreign portfolio investors, maintaining open economies
with little financial restriction, thus encouraging a shareholder value brand of
capitalism
.
490 There seems to be a growing consensus among policy makers for open
markets in order to "treat capital well" in Walter Wriston's words. Capital is used by
large multinationals, that in their competition with one another, are increasingly
adhering to a shareholder value system of business practices.
Multinational Enterprises
This arbitrage process has been happening on such a large scale inside firms that
some firms are larger than some countries by certain measures. A study by the Institute
48/ Louis W. Pauly, “Capital Mobility, State Autonomy and Political Legitimacy," Journal of
International Affairs, Winter 1995, 48, no. 2. p. 340.
488Ron Martin,. "Stateless Monies, Global Financial Integration and National Economic
Autonomy: the End of Geography?" in Money, Power and Space
. Corbridge, Stuart, Thrift,
Nigel, and Martin, Ron, eds. Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994. p. 271.
489 Daniel Carter, "Finance as the Simulacra," Seminar Paper for Contemporary Political Theory,
Professor Barbara Cruickshank, Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 1995.
490 Stephan Haggard and Slyvia Maxfield. "The Political Economy of Financial
Internationalization in the Developing World," pp. 35-68.
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for Policy Studies in Washington claims that the world's largest 200 economies control
at least 28.3% of the world's economy. They employ 0.3% of the world's economy Of
the world's largest 100 economies, 51 are companies. The largest 20 companies have
higher sales than the GDP of the poorest 80 countries. The "Global 500," the 500 largest
companies according to Fortune Magazine, raised sales in 1995 by 11%, four times the
growth rate of the world economy. For the same companies, profits rose 15% in 1995
and 62% in 1994.™ Wal-mart is bigger than Israel, Poland, or Greece. Mitsubishi is
bigger than Indonesia; GM is bigger than Denmark; Ford is bigger than Turkey or South
Africa; and Royal Dutch Shell is bigger than Norway.™ To get a feeling for the
"globality" of some of the larger MNC's, I am including a chart highlighting the
presence of certain MNC s in certain emerging markets.
Table 71: Wal-mart v.
No. 42 Wal-Mart vs.
Poland
No. 43 Poland
$93.6 billion: Wal- $92.6 billion:
mart sales GDP of Poland
$360: $390:
Dollars spent in Wal- Average monthly
Mart per year for
every man, woman,
and child in the USA.
salary in Poland.
60 million: Wal- 38.8 million:
Mart shoppers each Population of
week Poland
675,000: 278,600: Militarv
Wal-Mart employees personnel in
Poland493
Globalization, from the perspective of the firm, can mean a number of things. A
recent survey in the Columbia Journal of Business asked prominent international
business professors what globalization in a corporate context means. The general
consensus was that globalization is the coordination of all activities on a global basis.494
491
"Kapitalismus ohne Grenzen," Spiegel Magazine Archive
.
492 R.C. Longworth, "New Global Economics Toss the Rule Book out the Door," p. 12.
493 R.C. Longworth, "New Global Economics Toss the Rule Book out the Door," p. 12.
494 Debra Fleenor, "The Coming and Going of the Global Corporation,"
Columbia Journal of World Business, Winter, 1993. pp. 6-17.
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Th,s coordination allows for “lean production." Flexible or lean product™
operates under different principles from the previously dominant product™ model
known as “Fordism." The Fordist model was based on large-scale production of
standardized items. Labor intensive products were shifted to sites where labor was
cheap. The lean production or "post-Fordist" model of production, in contrast, places
emphasis on physical proximity of supplier and manufacturer and is more capital
intensive, effecting a fall in the share of variable labor costs. Suppliers need to be near
the producer m order to mesh tinting and production schedules to save costs. Thus,
there is a trend of suppliers following producers into markets in order to source on
location. At the same time, fixed costs of research and development rise, due to
increasing automation and reliance on technology, and need to be consolidated on a
global basis in order to achieve economies of scale. Further, other "fixed costs" such as
marketing, design, organizational strategy can be economized through global
consolidation. So while firms increasingly become “local" players in some respects,
they are increasingly "local" globally in these functions and even more global in the
fixed cost aspects of operation.
This paradigm shift from Fordist to post-Fordist production is a driver of
globalization
.
495 Lean production makes physical proximity between firms more
important and brings about a fall in the share of variable labor costs in total operating
costs. These tend to discourage globalization as proximity becomes more important and
automation makes low-wage tasks redundant. Instead, it encourages "global
localization so that global strategies often look like regionalization and force regional
firms to compete with globally competitive companies
.
496
495 Charles Oman, "Investment Strategies and Policy Issues: Emerging Policy Issues for the
Dynamic Non-Member Economies; Trends in Global FDI and Latin America."p. 59.
4,(1 Charles Oman, Emerging Policy Issures for the Dynamic Non-Member Economies; Trends in
Global FDI and Latin America," pp. 59-80.
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Company Name Central & Eastern
Europe & CIS
vestment in emerging i
Asia
markets. 497
Latin American
Ford
(automotive)
Components
production in
Hungary and Czech
Republic. Assembly
plants in Poland and
planned in Belarus
New manufacturing
JV's in India, China,
Thailand and
Vietnam.
Components
production in Korea
auu Vval.lDOfiftn
I
Plans for $3bn
manufacturing
investment in
Brazil and
Argentina
Cable & Wireless
(telecoms)
Cellular phone JV's
in Russia, Latvia,
Kazakstan and
Bulgaria
Controls Hong Kong
Telecom, JV's in
China, Macau,
Thailand, Philippines,
Singapore. Part-
owner of Asiasat.
Operations in 16
countries.
Nestle
(foods and confection)
Produces in Poland
and the Czech
Republic. Acquired
companies in Poland
and Russia in 1995.
Seven production
facilities to open in
China, Malaysia, and
India. Also in
Vietnam, Indonesia,
New plant in
Venezuela,
acquisition in
Mexico in 1995.
Unilever
(detergents, food,
personal products)
Seven production
facilities in Visegrad
countries and Russia.
Acquired detergent
factory in Romania
and built up
distribution in
26 subsidiaries. 12 subsidiaries.
1995 acquisitions in
Chile and Peru.
Frozen foods
launched in
Argentina.
Russia.
ABB
(industrial diversified)
23,000 employees in
80 JV's, subsidiaries,
and representative
offices.
21,000 employees in 69
JV's, subsidiaries, and
representative offices.
8,000 employees.
ABB entered Latin
America in 1988.
Demographic drivers ofglobalization
Another key driver of shareholder value capitalism is the aging of the OECD
countries, as noted by Woodall and Helmut Riesen. In his article, "On the Wealth of
Nations and Retirees," Reisen explains that as populations in the OECD countries grow
older, there is an increasing need among pension funds to seek higher returns, or scale
back benefits. There will be a growth in privately funded pensions, which in turn will
need to diversify portfolios of institutional investors (pension funds) to earn higher
returns. The aging world will thus buy into the younger developing world, mostly by
497
"Not Yet Tigers," Business Central Europe
.
June, 1996. p. 12.
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means of securities,. As the Economist wrote, "Once freed, money may well flow
disproportionately to developing countries. For this is the surest way to beat
demography."499 This will serve to develop capital markets. Anglo mvestment funds
are already active in this. Anthony Bolton, senior investment officer for Fidelity
Investment Services in London says, "We are pushing and encouraging European
companies to move toward the Anglo-American system." Fidelity exercises its voting
rights and forces change "whenever possible."™ Jonathan Hoffman of Credit Suisse
First Boston argues that the transformation toward a shareholder value system "is
already happening." He argues that the rapid increase of institutional share ownership
m Europe is making this happen. Privatizations of industry and pension programs as a
way to meet fiscal targets for Maastricht will, according to Hoffman, double the assets
under institutional management by the end of the decade. He says, "There will be a
reshuffling of ownership of equities away from individuals and banks and toward
investing mstitutions. Intense pressure will develop for the enfranchisement of non-
voting shares." 501 Mark Mobius, president of the Templeton Emerging Markets Fund
Inc., and his teams are increasing their shareholder activism. They attend more and
more annual meetings, vote their shares, and meet with government officials, to police
their investments. Templeton has been involved and active in minority shareholder
rights issues throughout the emerging markets
.
502
Foreign investment is moving to the emerging markets and changing them
through its presence. The growth is real. For example, UK pension funds rose from 7%
in 1979, when it was highly regulated, to 15% in 1985 after regulations were dropped,
and reached 30% in 1994. It would come as no surprise if restrictions on foreign
investment by pension funds were eased in the coming years. The need of pension
funds to seek higher returns in developing countries matches the need of developing
498 Helmut Reisen "On the Wealth of Nations and Retirees" in Richard O'Brien, Finance and the
International Economy, Vol. 8. Oxford University Press, 1994. pp. 87-107.
The Economist, 20 June 1992 in Helmut Reisen On the Wealth of Nations and Retirees" in
Richard O'Brien, Finance and the International Economy. Vol. 8. Oxford University Press 1994
pp. 87-107.
500 Janet Bush, "Called to account: Short term, long term," pp. 40-41.
501 Janet Bush, "Called to account: Short term, long term," pp. 40-41.
502 Margaret Price, "Manager keeps a vigilant eye," Pensions & Investments
, v. 24 n. 24.
November 25, 1996. p. 16.
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countries for capital. Th.s demographic trend will no doubt propel the process of
globalization.
A survey by Burson-Marsteller, a financial public relations firm, indicates that
investors expect assets allocated to the stocks of emerging market countries to increase
and their economdes to grow in *97. The survey covered institutions controlling 78% of
the world's global equity funds, with a total of about $200 billion of emerging market
equities under management. This represents about 60% of all emerging markets
portfolio investment. Institutional fund managers predict good growth rates in all
emerging markets regions simultaneously for the first time. Emerging markets suffered
from the strength of US and UK stocks in the first nine months of 1996.™ Thus, for the
near future, the outlook for even more foreign portfolio investment in emerging markets
is strong.
Reflecting the trend toward an equity finance culture, emerging stock market
capitalization has increased 20-fold in the past decade and its share of global equity
trading increased from 3% to 17%.504 Sixty developing countries have stock markets, as
opposed to half of that m 1985. Liquidity has grown with it from a turnover of 26% to
85% of market capitalization between 1985 and 1994. Domestic companies listed on
emerging markets increased from 8,916 in 1985 to 19,397 in 1995. Foreign investment
funds have followed and driven this trend. From just a few funds with a market
capitalization of $700 million, the industry grew to over 1,000 funds with a market
capitalization of $100 billion by 1994. At the same time, venture capital and private
503
"Global Investors Expect Emerging Markets to Grow, Survey Says." London: Bloomberg
News, December 4, 1996.
3114 Stock Markets and Development," Financial Flows and the Developing Countries
. August,
1996. p. 22.
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5" In Ce-aI^ example, venture capitalists
ZZ s 1989 to manasmg 344 bimon 80 funds by *•^ of1995. There rs nrore investment capital available. Institutional mvestment funds inOECD countries grew from $7.5 trillion to $13 trilhon from 1988 and 1993 There rs
room for further growth of OECD investment funds in emergmg markets. For example,
institutional portfolios are estimated at $9 trillion of which, $2.6 trillion are invested
m stocks. Of this amount, only 1% is invested in emergmg markets, yet emerging
markets accounted for 13% of world stock market capitalization at the close of 1994»
Th ‘ S gr°Wth COmbmed with °n foreign investment legislation and low
interest rates, brought high return seeking investors to the emerging markets. Portfolio
flows accelerated in the 1990's from 3.7% of total flows in 1990 to 17.4% in 1994. The
demographic argument is interesting and cannot be disregarded as a driver for
globalization of investment. As Janet Bush, the economics correspondent of The Tunes
writes, “the Anglo- American model of wider shareholdings will become the norm."**
Demographic drivers will surely serve to develop capital markets along "shareholder
value" lines.
The effects of this trend were not the subject of this paper, but will certainly be
the subject of many strong discussions in the coming years. As states are forced to
follow sound economic policies, and firms play by similar rules, a large shift of wealth
may occur from the rich parts of the world to poorer parts. There may be protest
agamst the increasing role of emerging markets in the global economy from unskilled
workers in rich countries, but by what standard are unskilled workers in one part of the
303 Venture capital is the provision of capital to entrepenuers who would like to start up a
business and have an idea and plan to do so. Direct equity is the equity or ownership stake of
unlisted, untraded, privately held companies. The goal of venture capitalists and direct equity
investors is often to foster the growth of the company and bring it to the equity markets after the
mvestment value has appreciated. Through an initial public offering (IPO), the venture capitalist
can then cash-out of the investment by selling it to the public as an equity. The influence of
venture capitalists and direct equity investors is more often on smaller companies. These
investors, actively monitoring and sometimes managing their investments, demand stricter
financial reporting and quality management practices that do transfer the values of the market
economy on a direct basis. This type of activity is usually broadly associated with what I have
defined as the shareholder value" model of market economics.
5()h International Finance Corporation, Investment Funds in Emerging Markets, p. 13.
307 Janet Bush, "Called to account: Short term, long term," pp. 40-41.
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world enhtied to different benefits than unskilled or even skilled workers in other parts?
Having demonstrated the emerging trend toward the shareholder value model in Latin
Amenca and, to a lesser extent. Central Europe, my conclusion is strengthened by tire
following worldwide trends: The growth of capital markets world wide through
information technology, deregulation, growing pension funds, and global competition
among giant MNC's. Given these trends and the recent economic evolution of Central
Europe and Latin America, an argument for the trend toward a shareholder value
model would be hard to refute.
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